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reconsideration of our understanding of social development. This
book takes on this challenge, providing rich theoretical and empirical
analyses of the political, ideational, economic and transnational forces
shaping these important policy shifts. It will become a significant
landmark in the study of social welfare policy and will greatly influence
the next generation of research on social welfare and inclusive develop-
ment in the Global South.’
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Foreword
Since the mid-1990s there has been something of a quiet revolution in poverty
reduction strategies with the proliferation and expansion of social assistance
programmes that entail direct cash or in-kind transfers to the poor. While
different studies define social assistance—and social protection more broadly—
in different ways and use different data, generating different estimates of their
coverage or reach, they concur that coverage has expanded dramatically across the
global South. The beginning of this century has well witnessed a series of import-
ant political and political economy developments that have reshaped both state–
society relations and the South’s relationship with transnational actors and ideas.
To get a better understanding of this unfolding revolution with reforming
government policy strategies, in early 2016 UNU-WIDER launched the research
project The Political Economy of Social Protection in Developing Countries,
using an innovative and integrated approach to the study of taxation and social
protection systems in developing countries, with a strong focus on southern and
eastern African countries. Taking a system-wide perspective allows for the
exploration of the combined fiscal effect of tax and benefit reforms, in terms of
resource mobilization, economic efficiency, and distributional impact. Social
protection has emerged as a key policy strategy against poverty and vulnerability
in many developing countries, and it has evolved into a wide number of different
forms in terms of focus and targeting population, coverage, scope, and design
features, with some programmes providing income transfers alone, while others
combine income transfers with the utilization of social services and assets.
This book before the reader is the distillation of this research project. I am
grateful to the book’s authors for their scholarly contributions, and sincerely
thank the editors for their analytical and editorial skills in bringing this wide
and layered research work together for the essential reading of economists,
policy makers, and development scholars.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contribu-
tions to its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, in
this case particularly the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency—Sida, and the United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our
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1
The Negotiated Politics of Social
Protection in East
and Southern Africa
Sam Hickey, Tom Lavers, Miguel Niño-Zarazúa,
and Jeremy Seekings
1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s there has been something of a ‘quiet revolution’ in
poverty reduction strategies with the proliferation and expansion of social
assistance programmes that entail direct cash or in-kind transfers to the poor
(Hanlon et al. 2010). While different studies define social assistance (and social
protection more broadly) in different ways and use different data, generating
different estimates of their coverage or reach, they concur that coverage or
reach have expanded dramatically across the global South, including in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). These past two decades have also been characterized by
a series of important political and political economy developments that have
reshaped both state–society relations within SSA and its relationship with
transnational actors and ideas. In this introductory chapter we argue that
the (uneven) expansion of social assistance has to be seen in this context rather
than as read off from general indicators of economic or political development.
These developments include highly contested processes of democratization,
often involving a (re)assertion of clientelistic and sometimes authoritarian
forms of governance, and processes of deagrarianization that continue to
transform rural livelihoods in particular.
The nature of Africa’s engagement with external forces has in some cases
been transformed by the declining influence of traditional aid actors vis-à-vis
‘rising powers’, new natural resource finds, and the changing nature of inter-
national debt. In the evidence and analysis offered in this book, we show how
the process through which social protection has been promoted, contested,
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and rolled out closely reflects the negotiated character of statehood in Africa
(Hagmann and Péclard 2011), both in terms of the heavily transnationalized
nature of governance in SSA and also as part of a bargaining process between
rulers and ruled, whereby concerns with electoral success, legitimacy, and
popular pressures are increasingly influential over budgetary allocations and
welfare provision.
We argue that African political agency has played a powerful role in the
contested expansion of social protection, with the countries that reveal the
highest levels of commitment to social protection driven more by domestic
political imperatives than by external pressure. Importantly, this process has
been strongly informed not only by global influences and elite-level machin-
ations but also by the historical character of welfare regimes in the region,
particularly in terms of long-standing ideas around deservingness and the role
of the state in the context of ongoing processes of deagrarianization (Lavers
2013; Seekings forthcoming).
1.1. Tracking the rise of social assistance in east
and southern Africa
Definitional debates abound regarding the scope and appropriateness of
related but distinct terms such as social assistance, social protection, and social
safety nets. While acknowledging the importance of these debates and associ-
ated terminology, our primary focus here is on state social assistance pro-
grammes that provide support in cash or in-kind to households and/or
individuals as a means of addressing poverty, vulnerability, or food insecurity.
Such schemes are commonly financed through a combination of taxes and
development assistance, rather than direct financial contributions from pro-
gramme participants. As such, our cases include examples of programmes
such as old-age pensions and family allowances that provide income support
to vulnerable groups to smooth consumption and mitigate the effects of
shocks; programmes such as conditional cash transfers that provide income
support to households together with incentives for the utilization of health
and education services; and workfare (or public works programmes), espe-
cially where such programmes provide something close to an employment
guarantee. Social assistance, as defined here, is one component of the
broader concept of social protection, which, according to most definitions,
also includes social insurance and labour market regulation. In contemporary
Africa, it is social assistance that predominates within broader debates over
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social protection (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; World Bank 2018; Seekings
forthcoming).
The widespread agreement that social assistance has expanded rapidly
across the global South can be demonstrated with data from various sources,
including the International Labour Organization (ILO 2017), World Bank
(2017b), and also the most recent Social Assistance, Politics and Institutions
(SAPI) database (UNU-WIDER 2018).¹ To illustrate, SAPI suggests that,
globally, nearly 900 million people currently benefit, directly or indirectly,
from social assistance (UNU-WIDER 2018). African countries lag behind
other parts of the global South. The SAPI database counts more than 60 million
people—about 15 per cent of the population living in extreme poverty²—
currently receiving a cash transfer through a total of eighty-six programmes
in thirty-seven countries (see Table 1.A1 in the Appendix).³ The number of
countries with social assistance programmes has risen, largely driven by a
growing number of public works and family allowances, but also old-age
pensions, and cash transfers for human development (see Figure 1.1),
although the combined reach of these programmes has risen more modestly.
‘Coverage’ rates and public expenditure might be lower in Africa than in
some other parts of the global South (ILO 2017; World Bank 2017b), at least
by some definitions of social assistance, but social assistance is very clearly
on the agenda of many African countries.
Africa is far from homogeneous. There is considerable variation in
how and the extent to which social assistance (and social protection more
generally) has evolved in SSA. Africa has the highest effective coverage
(as measured by the ILO) at 48 per cent of the population (ILO 2017: table
B.3), with its system of social assistance costing close to 4 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP). In stark contrast, other countries have small and
less generous programmes targeted at the extremely poor. Few countries
have coverage rates (as measured by the ILO) above 10 per cent, and
expenditure on social assistance is often less than 0.5 per cent of GDP
(ILO 2017). It is unlikely, however, that any country has no programme.
Even in countries across the Sahel and Horn of Africa, with weak
or failed states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and quasi-state
¹ The SAPI database provides a synthesis of longitudinal and comparable information on: (i) social
assistance programmes, (ii) country-level information on economic and social performance, and
(iii) political institutions in developing countries; see UNU-WIDER (2018).
² Calculations based on the share of the population living on less than US$1.90 a day at 2011
purchasing power parity, as defined by the World Bank (2017a).
³ Estimates based on a typology described in Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa (2010).
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institutions operate feeding and food or cash-for-work programmes (see
Osofisan 2011). According to one recent review (ODI 2016), forty of the
forty-eight countries in SSA now have at least one social assistance pro-
gramme, a doubling since 2010.
The chapters in this book examine how andwhy social assistance programmes
have expanded, at different paces and to different extents, across a set of
countries in east and southern Africa. The case studies are based on research
conducted as part of two research programmes based at the Universities of
Cape Town and Manchester. Both the Cape Town-based programme on ‘Legis-
lating and ImplementingWelfare PolicyReforms’ (LIWPR) and theManchester-
based ‘Politics of Social Protection’ project, which is part of the broader Effective
States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research centre, were funded by the
British Department for International Development (DFID), the former jointly
through the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. The UNU-WIDER
project on ‘The Economics and Politics of Taxation and Social Protection’ helped
bring the two projects together, including through a symposium held in Mexico























Old age pensions Family allowances Child grants
Public works Cash transfers for human development
Fig. 1.1. The recent evolution of social assistance in sub-Saharan Africa by
type of programme.
Source: Authors’ illustration based on UNU-WIDER’s (2018) Social Assistance Politics and Institutions
database (SAPI).
⁴ For more on these three research initiatives, see IDCPPA (n.d.), ESID (www.effective-states.org),
and UNU-WIDER (n.d.).
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These initiatives shared a concern that SSA remains largely ‘off the map’ of
the growing global literature on social protection and welfare state-building,
and that African cases do not fit well into existing global typologies or
explanations. The vast majority of research on social protection in Africa,
mostly commissioned by aid donors, has had an overwhelmingly technical
focus, concerned with issues such as measuring the welfare impacts of par-
ticular programmes, examining how best to design targeting and delivery
systems, and assessing the degree of fiscal space for policy reform. In contrast,
the studies conducted for the ESID and LIWPR programmes, some of which
are included in this book, focused on the politics of policy reform (and non-
reform). The research teams used process-tracing methods to identify the key
drivers of government decisions either to reject proposed reforms or to adopt
or expand social assistance programmes (George and Bennett 2004; Collier
2011). Documents from states and international organizations provided an
important frame, but the most important sources were key interviews with
actors involved in negotiating social assistance within country contexts. The
resulting case studies offer detailed accounts of how contested processes of
policy reform played out over time in relation to wider political and political
economy developments. The chapters focus on eight cases, with a ninth
chapter focusing on one of the major international organizations immersed
in reforms in many of these cases.
The eight countries—Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—vary in most general economic and political
dimensions (see Table 1.1) as well as in the particulars of their social assistance
systems (see Table 1.A1 in the Appendix). While none are in west Africa, and
all are broadly anglophone, they encompass much of the diversity of cases
across SSA. They include a country with high GDP per capita, very little
official development assistance (ODA), little agricultural employment, and
low absolute poverty (Botswana) as well as low-income countries with massive
ODA, considerable agricultural employment, and high poverty rates (espe-
cially Malawi). Some of the countries have small populations (especially
Botswana and Lesotho); one has a very large population (Ethiopia). Some
(Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Malawi) were credibly democratic as of
2015, whilst others remained far from being so (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda).
Our eight case studies also encompass much of the variation that exists
across SSA in terms of social assistance programmes. They include countries
with widespread pension and other cash transfer programmes (Botswana,
Lesotho), countries that have been slowly expanding pilot programmes
(Malawi, Uganda, Zambia), and countries with a stronger emphasis on
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workfare (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania). The case studies do not include,
however, the former settler states of South Africa and Namibia, or the Indian
Ocean island-state of Mauritius. The welfare states of South Africa (and hence
its former quasi-colony, Namibia) and Mauritius long predate those of other
countries across SSA (Seekings 2007, 2011; Ulriksen 2012). South African and
Mauritian cash transfer programmes influenced the design of programmes
elsewhere in Africa (directly in the case of Mauritius and Zanzibar (Seekings
2016b); more indirectly in the case of South Africa and its neighbours, as the
case studies of Lesotho and Botswana below indicate). Nor does the book
consider the countries of west or north Africa.
While our focus is on the politics of whether and how social assistance
programmes become adopted, this cannot be understood independently of the
broader character of the economy and public policy, or what has been called
the ‘distributional regime’ (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). In countries across
Africa, ‘who gets what’ depends on both the ‘market’ distribution and the
pattern of redistribution effected (directly and indirectly) through public
policy. Across most of SSA, policy makers face choices not only between
what interests to promote but also what policies to prioritize. Crucially, even
those policy makers committed to improving the welfare of the poor must
choose how to allocate scarce resources between subsidizing aspects of peasant
production (through, for example, fertilizer subsidies or free seed) and social
assistance to poor households. In many countries, including (most clearly)



















Botswana 6,924 2 18 (2009) 26 2 8
Ethiopia 707 102 34 (2010) 71 96 2
Lesotho 1,040 2 60 (2010) 40 32 8
Malawi 300 18 71 (2010) 70 88 6
Rwanda 703 12 60 (2013) 75 76 3
Tanzania 879 56 49 (2011) 67 27 3
Uganda 580 41 35 (2012) 72 47 1
Zambia 1,270 17 58 (2015) 55 33 7
Note: ¹ Poverty rate measured as share of population with incomes below US$1.90 per person per day at
2011 prices, purchasing power parity (PPP).
² Employment in agriculture as % of total employment.
³ Net official development assistance received by countries as % of central government expenditure.
⁴ Polity IV scale from -10 for fully authoritarian to +10 for fully democratic.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017a) and the
Polity IV database (Center for Systemic Peace 2016).
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Botswana and Ethiopia, current social assistance measures have their origins
in ‘emergency’ drought relief. Protecting citizens against the risk of drought
led to workfare and feeding programmes, and later other cash transfers. In
these countries, social assistance expanded as the limits to agrarian strategies
became clearer. In other cases, however, the agrarian option remains credible
and politically appealing. In both Malawi and Zambia, social assistance has
been sidelined by governments’ preference for fertilizer subsidies. Social
assistance has become important in Africa when and where the prior agrarian
distributional regime has broken down.
2. The Changing Literature on Welfare State-Building
and African Cases
The global study of the drivers of social protection—or welfare state-
building—has gone through at least four phases, applied primarily to the
advanced capitalist economies of the global North (Hicks and Esping-
Andersen 2005; Castles et al. 2010). Welfare state-building was first viewed
as driven by economic modernization, which drove political and demographic
change (Wilensky 1975). From the 1980s this approach was superseded by one
focusing on ‘power resources’, i.e. the distributional struggles between com-
peting interest groups. This approach focused on the political power wielded
by the major classes and the ensuing class conflicts and compromises charac-
teristic of capitalist democracies (especially Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen
1990, 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal
contribution revolved around his insight that welfare regimes varied in form
separately to their level of commitment. Scholars of the USA criticized this
approach for its neglect of political institutions (e.g. Amenta et al. 2001). By
the mid-2000s, a concern with the role of ideas and norms had expanded from
historical case studies to a more general engagement with cross-national
variation (e.g. Béland 2005; van Oorschot et al. 2008) and transnational
diffusion (e.g. Obinger et al. 2013).
The more recent study of countries across the global South has been
influenced strongly by the power resources approach focused on the political
economy. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) show in their comparative study of
Latin America, East Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe that strong
regional differences persist even when controlling, in regression models,
for various measures of economic modernization or development. They
explain inter-regional variation in terms of differences in periods of critical
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realignment—‘the composition of the political elite and in the political and
legal status of labor and peasant organizations and mass political parties’
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008: 45). Similar arguments have been made with
respect to Latin America, in both comparative studies of this one region
(Pribble 2011; Huber and Stephens 2012) and case studies of individual
countries within it (e.g. Dion 2010), and East Asia (e.g. Yang 2017). Recently,
a similar political economy approach has been used to explain variation
between Indian states (e.g. Tillin et al. 2015).
The literature has little to say about Africa. Indeed, one early study empha-
sized the supposed absence of welfare states in Africa (Bevan 2004). Recent
reviews have pointed to key and distinctive features of African cases: a
historically rooted emphasis on social assistance for a predominantly rural
population rather than social insurance for formally employed public sector
and industrial workers; the importance of rural and agrarian rather than
urban and industrial risks, and of the challenges of deagrarianization; and
the important role played by transnational actors in combination with domes-
tic actors (Hickey 2008; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; Lavers 2013; Seekings 2013,
forthcoming; Lavers and Hickey 2016). Until now there have been few detailed
studies of individual countries that allow for analysis of either specific policy
outcomes or overall variation within Africa. The case studies presented in this
book provide a rich and novel base for analysing variation within Africa, as
well as the distinctiveness of Africa in relation to other regions across the
global South.
In explaining varied policy outcomes, the case studies conducted at ESID
and LIWPR have employed slightly different approaches. The ESID studies
have been influenced strongly by the literature on ‘political settlements’ in the
global South, an approach with marked parallels with the ‘power constella-
tions’ approaches to explaining variation between welfare states in the global
North (Lavers and Hickey 2016). The LIWPR studies have attached more
importance to the political institutions—especially political parties and
elections—that characterize much of Africa since (re)democratization in the
1990s. The two approaches reflect in part the selection of cases in each
research programme. The ESID research covered three distinctly undemo-
cratic or only weakly democratic countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda) as
well as two more competitive democracies (Zambia and Kenya).⁵ The LIWPR
research also covered the minimally democratic case of Uganda, but focused
⁵ ESID has more recently conducted studies of social assistance in Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/2019, SPi
8     
primarily on more competitive democracies (including, in addition to Zambia,
Ghana, and Kenya, the cases of Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania (and
Zanzibar), Lesotho, South Africa, and Mauritius). In practice, the two
research programmes broadly converged, paying attention to both political
economic and more specifically political factors, including a strong focus on
the role of ideas, even if they arrived there from somewhat different starting
points.
‘Political settlements’ can be defined as ‘a combination of power and
institutions that is mutually compatible, and also sustainable in terms of
economic and political viability’ (Khan 2010: 4). The analytical focus
of political settlement theory is on the power relations between political,
economic, and social elites; between these elites and non-elite groups; and
how this distribution of power both shapes and is shaped by the formal
and informal institutions that distribute resources and political power. From
this perspective, social protection is a resource whose distribution is subject to
competition and negotiation and which is shaped by the survival strategies of
political elites. The power resources literature in the global North focused on
class struggles and coalition building in the context of relatively developed
capitalist markets and functioning representative democracies. Countries
across the global South tend to have much less developed capitalist markets
and weak or no democratic political institutions. The political settlements
approach has thus considered other forms of political incorporation and
mobilization, including along ethnic and regional lines or through patron–
client relationships, and highlights the importance of informal as well as
formal political institutions.
Studies by ESID have gone beyond Khan (2010, 2017), however, in empha-
sizing, first, that political settlements do not merely reflect the balance of
power between interest groups but are also held together by common ideas
that provide a shared understanding between the factions party to a political
settlement (Lavers and Hickey 2016). These ideas can take many different
forms such as nationalism, developmentalism, socialism, or opposition to
communism (Hickey et al. 2015; Lavers 2018). It is useful here to distinguish
between three types of idea: policy ideas that provide potential solutions to pre-
defined social problems; problem definitions that provide ways of framing
particular social issues, favouring certain types of policy solution over
others; and paradigms or political philosophies that serve as overarching
road maps (Béland 2005: 8; Schmidt 2008). Second, in a context in which donors
continue to finance a significant portion of central government expenditure,
although with significant variation across countries (see Figure 1.1), the
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domestic focus of political settlements theory must be complemented by an
acknowledgement of the transnationalized nature of governance in contempor-
ary Africa (Hagmann and Péclard 2011; Hickey et al. 2015). Foreign donors
operate as a distinct faction (or factions) within political settlements whose
power and influence do not simply follow from the importance of the resources
they provide and the ideas they promote but, vitally, depend on the evolution of
aid relations over years and the strategies African governments have derived to
manage these donors (Whitfield 2009; Lavers and Hickey 2016). Third, the term
‘political settlement’ unfortunately and misleadingly implies that politics remains
settled or static following a ‘settlement’. While political settlements imply a
degree of institutional stability over the short to medium term, they are inher-
ently dynamic (Behuria et al. 2017), transformed not only through economic
growth and financial or other shocks, but also as a result of political challenges
posed by groups previously excluded from political power. The ensuing processes
of change can be either slow and gradual, or rapid and transformative.
There are a number of ways in which the political settlement may shape the
evolution of social protection. The resources provided through social protec-
tion can be an important part of the distributive bargain that underpins
stability of the political settlement itself. In South Africa, relatively generous
social transfers to a broad section of the population have become an integral
part of the post-apartheid distributive bargain, compensating the mostly
unskilled, unemployed, and poor population for an economic growth path
that is capital- and skill-intensive (Seekings and Nattrass 2005, 2015). Even
where social protection does not yet constitute a sufficiently large resource to
be considered a central component of the political settlement itself, social
protection policy-making is still likely to be shaped by the incentives generated
by the settlement and the dominant ideas of ruling elites.
In country after country across SSA, over a single generation, one-party
states, life presidents, and authoritarian regimes have given way to term limits,
multi-party elections, and the ousting of presidents and parties through
electoral defeat (Carbone 2013; Cheeseman 2015). In the eight countries
studied, four have experienced government turnovers following electoral
defeat (thrice in Lesotho, twice in each of Zambia and Malawi, and once in
Kenya). In a fifth case (Botswana), the incumbent party has won several
elections by narrow margins (as is the case in Zanzibar, part of Tanzania).
Even in Uganda, elections have prompted an authoritarian president to adopt
popular reforms (e.g. Stasavage 2005).
Competitive elections shift the incentives facing political elites, who can
choose to use social protection policy as a material or ideological resource to
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win or retain electoral support. Political elites may be unable to retain power
solely through the distribution of rents within the elite, and instead must reach
out to voters through promises to distribute resources (van de Walle 2007,
2014). In SSA, as in Latin America previously, there has been some ‘democ-
ratisation of clientelism’ (Gay 1998). Recent research suggests that democracy
has been a key factor in public health and education reforms (Carbone 2012;
Kudamatsu 2012; Harding and Stasavage 2013; Carbone and Pellegata 2017).
The quality of democracy in contemporary Africa remains very uneven,
however. Not only do incumbents often ensure that the ‘democratic’ playing
field is not level, but political parties in SSA tend to be vehicles for patronage
politics rather than programmatic reform. Few parties have a strong organ-
izational base. Some have no clear ideological position. Many political parties
have remained the highly personalized vehicles for the career advancement of
individual politicians, while politics becomes a competition to build sufficiently
broad ethnic or regional coalitions to secure electoral majorities (van de Walle
2014; Cheeseman 2015). Patronage and clientelism remain the dominant pol-
itical practices in many parts of SSA (Cheeseman 2016). The flaws are evident
even in the sample of eight countries examined in the book, which cover the
full range of possibilities along the democracy–authoritarian continuum (see
Table 1.1) (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bogaards and Elischer 2016).
The case studies in this book examine the interactions between different
actors over policy reforms while locating these in a broader analysis of the
underlying character of politics—i.e. the political settlement—in each country.
The case studies examine how the efforts of transnational actors to promote
particular forms of social assistance through a combination of ideational
influence and financial leverage intersect with domestic political processes in
particular national contexts. Here, the degree to which donor policy ideas fit
with the incentives provided by particular political settlements and democratic
competition is a vital consideration. Likewise, the ability of social protection
advocates to forge coherent coalitions of transnational actors, politicians,
bureaucrats, and civil society representatives, and, vitally, how these relate to
influential figures within the settlement, have an important bearing on social
protection policy-making.
3. Transnational Actors and Policy Diffusion
Perhaps the most immediately striking aspect of the policy-making process
in SSA is the prominence of transnational actors, international finance
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organizations, national aid donor agencies, and international NGOs. As
previous studies have emphasized, transnational actors have been highly
influential in policy reform across much of Africa (Devereux 2010; Cherrier
2014). All major international agencies involved in development have now
adopted a commitment to social protection, and social protection is explicitly
included in the Sustainable Development Goals, as Hickey and Seekings
discuss in Chapter 10.
Transnational actors have diverse approaches. The World Bank, for
example, has promoted the Latin American model of ‘conditional’ cash trans-
fers primarily for families with poor children into SSA, together with workfare
programmes (Peck and Theodore 2015). The ILO has promoted both the
expansion of social insurance and social assistance. HelpAge International
has promoted universal social pensions, while the UK’s DFID has tended to
promote means-tested but otherwise social assistance. The World Food
Programme has promoted workfare programmes as a substitute for direct
feeding schemes.
Transnational actors have employed a wide array of tactics in their
promotion of reform. Within Africa, multiple agencies have invested heavily
in policy advocacy, with DFID in particular ‘working politically’ to secure
their objectives. They have typically invited political leaders and senior
bureaucrats to seminars and on study tours; they commissioned and distrib-
uted research on the benefits, design, and costs of programmes, and provided
technical assistance to government departments; they initiated (and subse-
quently monitored and evaluated) experimental/pilot programmes; and
often played a major role in drafting bold national statements about social
protection policy. Donors have funded significant parts of or even entire
programmes.
The embrace and advocacy of social assistance by transnational actors has
not consistently led to a similar embrace by national governments, however.
Across much of east and southern Africa, governments have resisted the
reforms endorsed and promoted by transnational actors. While aid donors
and international agencies are often perceived to have considerable power, our
case studies suggest that their power has been often limited to putting the idea
of policy reforms on the agenda, falling short of ensuring that governments
actually adopt and implement reforms. This ideational power is far from
insignificant. It is not a coincidence that social assistance programmes have
been introduced in most African countries during the particular historical
period within which social assistance has risen to prominence as a global social
policy (Hickey and Seekings, Chapter 10). But donors and agencies have often
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failed to persuade national governments either to extend (or ‘scale up’)
experimental programmes across the whole country or to accept full financial
responsibility for the programmes.
In the extreme case of Zambia, Pruce and Hickey show in Chapter 7 that
pilot programmes operated for ten years before the national government
began to expand them, despite the use of reformist discourse in planning
documents. In Lesotho, Granvik Saminathen argues in Chapter 6 that donors
were important in the partial introduction of a child grant, but not in the
earlier and more fulsome introduction of old-age pensions. In Tanzania,
Ulriksen in Chapter 5 shows that the government of Tanzania has steadfastly
resisted assuming any responsibility for World Bank-initiated cash transfer
programmes. Seekings also shows in Chapter 2 that international organiza-
tions played no part in the introduction of old-age pensions in Botswana, and
the government of Botswana subsequently resisted proposals that it introduce
a general child or family grant. Meanwhile, Lavers shows in Chapter 3 that the
government of Ethiopia resisted donor pressure to reform the emergency relief
system for years, only introducing the Productive Safety Net Programme
(PSNP) when domestic political crises forced a rethink in policy. These cases
point to the fact that donor power is easily overestimated.
The bounded power of international organizations reflects in part the
shifting financial position of most African countries. In the 1980s and 1990s,
highly indebted African countries were susceptible to external pressure. Debt
relief in the early 2000s reduced the power of international organizations.
Some national governments remain heavily dependent on foreign aid, as
Table 1.1 shows. Overseas development aid to Ethiopia is valued at almost
100 per cent of central government expenditure. Malawi (at 88 per cent) and
Rwanda (at 76 per cent) are not far behind. But many other countries—
including low-income countries such as Tanzania and Zambia—are much
less dependent, and middle-income countries such as Botswana receive
very little aid. Unsurprisingly, international organizations exert very little
influence in Botswana. Even in aid-dependent countries, however, ODA
buys less influence over social assistance reforms than might be expected, as
revealed in Lavers’ chapters on Ethiopia and Rwanda.
Almost no country in SSA spends as much on social assistance as the major
international organizations recommend. Both the ILO and World Bank have
advocated the introduction of social assistance programmes costing several
percentages of GDP, but almost no national governments have approved
expenditures of more than 0.5 per cent of GDP, and most governments
balk at even smaller expenditures (Seekings 2017a). This is partly because
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governments in many low- and lower middle-income countries in SSA lack
the fiscal capacity to implement social protection systems to scale (Barrientos
and Niño-Zarazúa 2011). The precarious level of institutionalization and
financing that remains characteristic of most transfer programmes in the
region (see Table 1.A1 in the Appendix) reflects continuing economic fragility,
partly due to the systemic effects from the Great Recession of the late 2000s
and early 2010s, but also due to the structure of these economies (IMF 2017).⁶
The case studies in this book argue that whether or not national govern-
ments introduce or expand social assistance programmes depends primarily
on the nature of politics within each country. Bilateral donors and inter-
national organizations are certainly players on the national stage, but they
have rarely acted as a united force (frequently on account of their divergent
approaches and organizational dynamics) and individually have played
subordinate roles. In Uganda, as Bukenya and Hickey show in this volume,
the initial failure of transnational actors to persuade the government to
introduce social cash tranfers was in part due to divisions between them;
their subsequent success followed agreement that one organization (DFID)
would take the lead. Similarly in Ethiopia, as Lavers shows in Chapter 3 and
in a forthcoming study (2019), a rare moment of coordination between
donors during the 2003 food crisis forced the government to engage in the
discussions that led to the PSNP, while the subsequent donor fragmentation
over the design of the programme enabled the government to dictate key
aspects of the design. Donor coordination around a shared agenda also
helped give impetus to social assistance reforms adopted in Zambia, as
described in Chapter 7.
Some of the international organizations have themselves recognized that
successful reform requires that national states take ‘ownership’ of reforms
and have made efforts to align their advocacy with political incentives and
ideas (Hickey and Seekings, this volume). If external actors overplay their
hand, they undermine the likelihood of local ownership of the process. This
is evident in the contrast between Tanzania and Zanzibar. In Tanzania, as
Ulriksen shows in her chapter, the World Bank has poured considerable
resources into social assistance, funding the roll-out of the Productive Social
Safety Net through the Tanzania Social Action Fund. The national govern-
ment has declined to pay for any programmes itself. In Zanzibar—a largely
autonomous territory within Tanzania—the idea of a universal pension was
⁶ For a detailed discussion on the role of taxation and revenue mobilization in state-building and
economic development, see Addison et al. (2018) and the accompanied articles in the same issue.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/2019, SPi
14     
also placed on the agenda and then promoted for five years by external
actors, especially HelpAge International. The reform was effected only when
the Zanzibari state saw it as their initiative with external actors providing
assistance (Seekings 2016b).
International organizations have often been most effective when they have
facilitated policy transfer (and adaptation) from one country to another.
Ethiopia’s PSNP provided an important inspiration for Rwanda’s Vision
2020 Umurenge Programme (as Lavers has shown in his chapter). However,
the attraction of Ethiopia’s PSNP was in part because Rwanda shared the
Ethiopian government’s developmental vision and paradigmatic worldview,
including the importance of self-reliance. Meanwhile, global and even regional
initiatives and ‘agreements’ on social protection have had little direct influ-
ence on national-level policy-making. African governments were party to the
UN-wide Social Protection Floors Initiative and the ILO’s Recommendation
202 on national Social Protection Floors. The African Union adopted a
Social Policy Framework in 2008. The process-tracing conducted for the
case studies failed to uncover evidence that these external agreements did
more than legitimate—to some extent—the possibility of social protection.
The experience of international organizations in SSA points to the limits to
their power and influence. When they do influence national policy-making,
their preferred approach is more often translated rather than simply applied
or replicated.
4. State and Society
While transnational actors have exercised some influence on the expansion of
social assistance within SSA, the case studies here emphasize that the timing of
scheme adoption, the types of programmes adopted or rejected, and the degree
of programme expansion are all fundamentally driven by domestic political
dynamics. Cases as diverse as Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda all highlight how
donor pressure for policy reform and the expansion of social assistance has
been resisted over extended periods, only resulting in programme adoption
and expansion when domestic political factors shift or where donors realign
their advocacy efforts to fit with dominant ideas and incentives within
national-level politics. Here we focus on how these political dynamics, par-
ticularly in terms of political settlements, ideas, and electoral politics, have
shaped the adoption and expansion of cash transfer programmes in our eight
case study countries.
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4.1. Social assistance and the politics of elite survival
in east and southern Africa
In stark contrast to research on the politics of welfare states and social
protection in Latin America, and also in the South Asian context, the case
studies in this book suggest that popular political mobilization has played a
minimal role in the expansion of social assistance in east and southern Africa.
Instead, the driving force for reform has been where social assistance is
incorporated as an element of the political survival strategies employed by
domestic political elites to build regime legitimacy, secure political allegiance,
or win over electoral support. These survival strategies differ according to both
the nature of the political settlement within each country, with reference to the
balance of power relations among elites and between elites and subjects, and
the dynamics that flow from these shifting power relations. Of the case studies
that employ the political settlements framework, a clear divergence exists
between those countries where political power is concentrated among a
handful of political elites within a dominant ruling party (Ethiopia and
Rwanda) and those in which power is more dispersed among elite groups
(Uganda and Zambia). In the former, electoral politics are a mere façade,
offering little to no possibility of regime change. In contrast, in the latter some
degree of dispersal of political power in Uganda and Zambia requires that
politicians prioritize building broad political coalitions through alliances and
the distribution of rents in order to win elections.
There are strong similarities between the Ethiopia and Rwanda cases in
terms of how this basic political settlement translates into commitment to
particular forms of social assistance. In each case, the ruling elite secured
political power through military means, and this narrow elite is commonly
associated with a minority ethnic group, which would stand little chance of
maintaining power through the distribution of rents and coalition-building
strategies common in Uganda and Zambia. Instead, both regimes have
adopted a developmental orientation as a foundational element of their pol-
itical settlements, seeking to build regime legitimacy through the delivery of
rapid and broad-based socioeconomic development, alongside the suppres-
sion of political voice outside the ruling party. These clear developmental
visions initially excluded social assistance—quite explicitly in the case of
Ethiopia (Lavers, this volume)—while prioritizing ideas of self-reliance and
the importance of maximizing resources for broad-based economic develop-
ment. It was only in the context of perceived threats to the political
settlement—including a major food crisis in 2002/3 following a series of
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‘Armageddons’ facing the leadership in Ethiopia and rising inequality that
threatened to undermine the post-ethnic national building strategy in
Rwanda—that social assistance schemes have been integrated into existing
development strategies as a means of enhancing regime legitimacy and neu-
tralizing potential political threats (see Chapter 4 on Rwanda). In doing so,
very particular forms of social assistance have been adopted and rapidly rolled
out, with a strong focus on productive programme designs through an
emphasis on the development of community infrastructure through labour-
intensive public works and links between receipt of transfers and credit and
livelihoods schemes to promote self-reliance and graduation.
A very different process unfolded in Uganda and Zambia, as shown in the
respective chapters (8 and 7). While ruling parties in these countries period-
ically express a desire to pursue developmental or social democratic agendas,
these have been inconsistently applied in practice, not least as a result of the
necessity of elite coalition building and rent distribution that undermines
developmental impulses. As such, ruling party ideology has provided little in
the way of support for the expansion of social assistance, while concerns about
the dangers of welfare dependency resulted in significant opposition, particu-
larly from finance ministries in both cases. Rather, the original strategy for
social assistance in Uganda and Zambia came from donors who lobbied
extensively to secure approval for pilot cash transfer schemes. These pilots
were then the focus of further advocacy efforts focused on building the
evidence base for programme efficacy (particularly in Zambia) and organizing
visits for influential politicians and bureaucrats to demonstrate the pro-
grammes in action. However, the moderate levels of political support that
have ultimately been secured in each case, particularly in Uganda, only
materialized as a result of domestic political shifts and attempts by donors
to align their advocacy efforts with the interests and ideas of ruling elites (see
also Grebe and Mubiru (2014) and Grebe (2014) on Uganda; and Kabandula
and Seekings (2016) and Siachiwena (2016) on Zambia).
However, it is not just the type of political settlement that matters, but also
the way in which the shifting nature of power relations that underpin them can
generate perceived threats to the legitimacy and stability of the ruling coali-
tion. The willingness and urgency of elites to extend social assistance can be
linked directly to the level of threat that they perceived themselves to be under.
The response has been weakest where the political threat to ruling elites was
weak, as in Zambia and Uganda, and highest where the threat was perceived to
be high (Ethiopia and Rwanda). During the mid-2000s when donors started to
promote social assistance in Uganda and Zambia, the respective political elites
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did not face a significant crisis that threatened their legitimacy or hold on
power. The main motivation for political elites in these contexts was to secure
local-level political support in the context of certain lower-level shifts within
the political settlement, rather than cope with threats to the deal itself. For
example, in Zambia, the direct trigger for increasing expenditure on social
assistance was a crisis in the agricultural subsidy system which had constituted
the primary mode of rent distribution used by elites to maintain legitimacy
and political support in rural areas (see Mason et al. 2013).
In contrast, the strongest cases of elite commitment to social assistance
derive from perceived threats—even existential threats—to the political settle-
ment to which social assistance is seen as a potential solution. Here, elites have
been motivated by broad concerns about political legitimacy, as well as
mitigating specific threats to the ruling coalition that originate in distribu-
tional crises.⁷ In addition to the ‘Armageddons’ that political elites in Ethiopia
perceived themselves to be threatened by, Rwanda’s ruling elite was catalysed
by the failure to translate economic growth into a reduction of poverty or
inequality, thereby threatening the coalition’s claims to promote inclusive
development and build a post-ethnic society. The case of Botswana suggests
that these findings hold across time. The chapter by Seekings shows how the
prolonged drought that the country experienced in the 1960s helped instigate
a response that would set in place a process of building the welfare regime
apparent today. This crisis coincided with a critical political moment within
the process of state formation in Botswana, with the new ruling coalition keen
to establish its developmentalist and nation-building credentials, in part to
assuage concerns that a certain element of the Tswana elite would seek to
govern in sectional rather than national interests. In Botswana, as in South
Africa, the welfare state became a major pillar of the legitimacy not only of
democratically elected government but also of the democratic institutions
themselves.
The chapters on Lesotho and Tanzania also incorporate aspects of the
adapted political settlements framework to explain the social assistance policy
process. In both cases, dominant party settings provided sufficient stability
and long-term horizons to enable coherent decision-making on social assist-
ance. In Tanzania, in a dominant party setting the adoption of a clear
productivist developmental vision and an emphasis on self-reliance has
favoured productivist forms of social assistance, requiring labour supply
⁷ In line with past research that highlighted the importance of crises in the adoption of social
protection policies (Hickey 2009).
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from households and other conditions, rather than pure income transfers.
Meanwhile in Lesotho, the transition from an extended period of highly
unstable competitive politics to a more stable dominant party system follow-
ing reform to the electoral system provided the ruling elite with an opportun-
ity to introduce a social pension.
4.2. Electoral politics
If political settlements underpin enduring patterns of politics, elections
provide opportunities for change. The case studies in this book provide a
rather mixed picture regarding the influence of electoral competition on
policy reform. There are certainly examples in which the general trend
from dominant leaders and parties to increasingly competitive, multi-party
elections during the 1990s and 2000s has spurred campaign promises to
expand the reach and generosity of social assistance. In some cases, candi-
dates have sought to brand or distinguish themselves in terms of social
protection. More often, social assistance has been a valence issue, with
competing political parties outlining similar views, whether in favour of or
sceptical towards social protection. The chapter on Botswana shows that the
ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had long branded itself as the party
of drought relief. Faced with stronger challenges from urban-based oppos-
ition parties that themselves advocated increased expanded public provision,
the BDP moved to introduce old-age pensions and to expand its feeding and
workfare programmes. Likewise, Granvik Saminathen argues in her Lesotho
chapter that the social pension was introduced in a period of political
dominance and stability, although the pension payment rates subsequently
became a focus for competition between political parties promising voters
ever higher rates. In Zambia, Hickey and Pruce show that the expansion of
the social cash transfer programme followed the change of government in
2011, although this had not been an issue in the election itself. Furthermore,
the chapter on Uganda shows that the addition of a fifteenth district in the
original pilot was linked to the ruling party’s political strategy for building
support in the opposition-leaning north of the country, while the subsequent
roll-out of the scheme was intended to provide visible state transfers in the
lead-up to presidential elections in 2016. The case of Malawi, however,
provides a somewhat cautionary tale regarding the potential of social pro-
tection as an electoral strategy. Hamer and Seekings argue that in a context
in which competing candidates had already staked out the pro-growth and
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pro-peasant political brands, President Banda resorted to a pro-poor and
pro-women social assistance brand as part of her electoral strategy. Though
her resounding defeat had multiple causes, the results suggest that the
political appeal of social assistance has its limits.
The other case studies do not identify electoral politics as a major driver of
social assistance. In Tanzania, the adoption of a new social pension was
announced prior to the 2015 elections, but, as Ulriksen argues, this has not
been matched with budgetary allocations and it is unclear whether there is
any real commitment to meeting those electoral promises. Finally, and
unsurprisingly, there is little evidence that electoral competition had any
real effect on the adoption of social assistance programmes in the highly
dominant party regimes in Ethiopia and Rwanda. Despite common claims in
the literature regarding the influence of the 2005 elections on the adoption of
the PSNP earlier that year, Chapter 3 shows that the drivers of the pro-
gramme lay in earlier distributional crises and revision of the government’s
development strategy. The political protests and violence following the
highly contested 2005 elections in Ethiopia did, however, influence the
recent adoption of the urban PSNP. Here localized electoral losses in
urban areas, as well as the large-scale opposition protests held in 2005,
provided a spur for a renewed political strategy that combined both repres-
sion and closing of political space, alongside more populist initiatives to win
back support including food subsidies, employment schemes, and, latterly,
the urban PSNP.
4.3. The role of ideas
Variation between countries, and between governments in a country, also
reflects ideological differences. Governments and other actors make choices
when they are aware of alternative models or possibilities, and in light of their
ideologies and beliefs as well as their calculation of interests. While political
elites across much of Africa are generally resistant to the idea of ‘handouts’,
they often also recognize collective responsibilities for certain categories of
deserving poor, including even working-age adults and their dependants in
times of drought. Within what might be considered a general conservative
liberalism there are important variations. In Botswana, for instance, the
political leaders—beginning with the founding President Seretse Khama and
continuing under his successors from the BDP—developed a benignly con-
servative welfare doctrine that justified public support along conservative lines
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(Seekings 2016a). A similarly conservative view of welfare and deservingness
seems to hold in Uganda, also, where donors’ initial advocacy efforts were
unsuccessful until they were re-framed within a politically acceptable dis-
course regarding the need to preserve the dignity of vulnerable and deserving
groups such as the elderly, rather than ‘the poor’ in general (see Chapter 8).
Conservatism also seems to have underpinned the widespread anxiety over
‘dependency’, i.e. citizens (especially poor citizens) becoming dependent on
government ‘handouts’ undermining their self-reliance and work ethic; see
Seekings (2017b). Political leaders seem to embrace policy reform when
incentives (rooted in political crisis or competition) combine with a sense of
responsibility to overshadow any anxiety over dependency.
Paradigmatic ideas regarding the importance of rapid and relatively inclu-
sive socioeconomic development have been strong influences on social assist-
ance policy in Ethiopia and Rwanda. In each case, regimes associated with
minority ethnic groups have sought to build regime legitimacy and promote
political stability through rapid development, requiring all policy, including
social assistance, to contribute to these productive objectives. Despite the
strong Marxist–Leninist roots in Ethiopia, in both countries the resulting
approach to social protection is in stark opposition to social democratic
ideas, with a strong resistance to perceived western-style welfare dependency
(see Chapter 3). In Ethiopia, at least, developmentalism has also been specif-
ically framed in opposition to a caricatured neoliberalism. Nonetheless, gov-
ernment ideas on social protection in Ethiopia and Rwanda have actually
resonated most strongly with the neoliberal, or what has more generously
been described as ‘inclusive neoliberal’, views of the post-Washington Con-
sensus World Bank at points. The resulting social assistance programmes have
been narrowly targeted on the poorest and most food insecure, with a strong
emphasis on work requirements for anyone receiving support, and links to
livelihood programmes aimed at making recipients productive and thereby
enabling them to graduate from support.
Efforts to frame social assistance as a policy solution to a particular set of
social problems were also influential at times, although only extensively so
where they also fitted well with the types of paradigmatic ideas discussed above
(Schmidt 2010). For example, new evidence that the rate of poverty reduction
was declining helped convince some bureaucrats and politicians in countries
like Rwanda and Zambia that new policy solutions were required. Chapter 7
informs us how in Zambia bureaucrats who had been co-opted into trans-
national policy coalitions in support of social assistance were able to point to
evaluation evidence from randomized controlled trials that revealed the social
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cash transfer scheme to be more effective and efficient than other government
interventions.
Our work on these normative and ideological dimensions of public policy
help to fill a conspicuous gap in the existing literatures on African politics,
namely the politics that animates negotiations between elites and state-
citizens, and between politicians and bureaucrats, which is informed by the
ideas as well as the material incentives of the actors involved. In showing how
the ideas and discursive strategies of key players within politics and inter-
national development can help explain the ‘politics of change’ around social
assistance in Africa, we reflect the growing sense that political elite behaviour
is not shaped solely by material self-interest (Hall 1993; Blyth 2002; Schmidt
2010). This is consistent with the constructivist turn in political studies (Hay
2011: 65–82), and Hagmann and Péclard’s (2011) insistence that the negoti-
ation of statehood in Africa involves a significant discursive element.
5. Conclusion
The process through which social assistance has been promoted, contested,
and rolled out thus closely reflects the negotiated character of statehood in east
and southern Africa (Hagmann and Péclard 2011), both in terms of the
heavily transnationalized nature of governance, which continues to offer an
influential role for external actors and ideas, and also the terms of the bargain
between rulers and ruled, whereby concerns with electoral success, legitimacy,
and popular pressures are increasingly influential over budgetary allocations
and welfare provision. Our evidence suggests that political agency in the
region has played a powerful role in this process, with the countries that reveal
the highest levels of commitment to social assistance driven more by domestic
political imperatives, and in some cases ‘neighbourhood’ effects, than by
external pressure. Importantly, this process has been strongly informed not
only by global imperatives and elite-level machinations but also by the par-
ticular historical character of welfare regimes in SSA, particularly in terms of
long-standing ideas around deservingness and the role of the state, and the
related effort to manage ongoing processes of deagrarianization.
It is worth pointing out some tensions arising between different elements in
our analysis. On the one hand, and contrary to the Latin American experience,
we find evidence that dominant and authoritarian regimes can be equally,
and even more, committed to and capable of delivering social assistance than
their more democratic counterparts. On the other hand, we also find that
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multi-party elections—and other aspects of democracy, including the media—
can play a positive role in driving up a focus on social assistance. This could
lead us to re-open long-standing debates regarding the relative strengths and
weaknesses of democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes. However, we
would argue that such debates tend to shed more heat than light (Kelsall 2014).
What matters is the specific nature of state–society relationships in different
contexts, how these are being reconfigured in different ways, and what this
means for elite power, citizenship, and broader issues of legitimate and
accountable rule. Contrasting democracy with authoritarianism is also
unhelpful when it comes to discussing the strategic implications of the findings
discussed here in practical terms. It is of little use to tell politicians and civil
servants in Zambia and Ghana that Rwanda and Ethiopia are doing better
than they are at delivering social assistance because they have dominant
political settlements.
Understanding social assistance as forming part of the processes through
which negotiated processes of statehood are currently taking place in east and
southern Africa offers a good deal of analytical power and helps reveal the
possibility that social assistance may more readily form part of the politics of
patronage in SSA than a politics of ‘rightful claims’ (see Ferguson (2015)),
initially at least. This is not to deny that democratization can have a positive
effect on extending social assistance; indeed, some of our cases are broadly
consistent with van de Walle’s (2014: 231) claim that democratization is likely
to provide incentives to make clientelism more redistributive by extending
services and benefits to larger sections of the population. Social assistance
within east and southern Africa, then, is both flowing from and helping to
embed very different political forms, not all of which are well aligned with
contemporary hopes for a new politics of citizenship and social contracts on
the continent.
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Appendix
Table 1.A1 Coverage of social assistance in sub-Saharan Africa






Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved
2015 2010 2005 2000




2013 250,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Commerce
Botswana Old-Age Pension Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 1996 493,570 450,000 400,000 350,000 Department of Social Protection,








Institutionalized 2008 55,000 n.a. n.e. n.e. Department of Social Protection,






Institutionalized 2003 33,730 30,518 n.a. n.e. Department of Social Protection,






Institutionalized 1999 175,380 n.a. 52,537 n.a. Department of Social Protection,
Ministry of Local Government and
Rural Development and UNICEF





Pilot 2008 16,250 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Health, Plan
International, the International HIV/








Pilot 2014 200,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Cameroon, with support
from International Development
































2006 105,000 100,000 n.e. n.e. Ministry of Youth, Employment and
Human Resources Development of











Pilot 2014 18,704 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Social Affairs, World Bank,








2015 32,685 n.e. n.e. n.e. State Secretariat for National Solidarity






Pilot 2010 7,500 7,500 n.e. n.e. Djibouti Social Development Agency
















Institutionalized 2005 7,640,000 7,000,000 5,000,000 n.e. Government of Ethiopia with financial
support of a consortium of donors
(Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), DFID, European













































Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved












2008 725,000 177,500 n.e. n.e. Ministry of Gender, Children and Social
Protection and Ministry of Employment
and Social Welfare with financial
support of a consortium of donor











Pilot 2012 200,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Guinea and the World
Bank

























Pilot 2011 12,693 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Ivory Coast, French
Government, and the World Bank






Pilot 2004 1,300,000 400,000 n.a. n.e. Ministry of Home Affairs Children’s









2006 295,000 165,000 n.e. n.e. The Ministry of Gender, Children and
Social Development with financial
support of a consortium of donors (the
World Bank, DFID, UNICEF, WFP,






























Pilot 2009 400,000 n.a. n.e. n.e. Ministry for the Development of
Northern Kenya, DFID, and Australian










2012 45,505 n.e. n.e. n.e. The Ministry of Gender, Children and
Social Development with financial
support of a consortium of donors (the





Institutionalized 2004 425,435 415,000 345,230 n.e. Department of Pensions, Ministry of







2007 122,500 n.a. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Social Development with







Pilot 2009 10,000 9,500 n.e. n.e. National Social Cash Transfer
Secretariat, Ministry of Planning and
Economic Affairs, and the National
Social Protection Steering Committee,












2014 1,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of National Education,
National Office of Nutrition and






Pilot 2006 1,522,670 400,000 n.e. n.e. Government of Malawi, UNICEF,
Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Irish Aid, the








































Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved




















Pilot 2005 521,000 n.a. n.a. n.e. Local Development Fund, Malawi Social





Pilot 2012 26,201 n.a. n.e. n.e. European Union
Malawi Food-for-Assets
programme
Pilot 2008 85,000 53,260 n.e. n.e. WFP






































Mauritius Old-Age Pension Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 1958 737,948 447,540 483,208 447,540 Ministry of Social Security, National
Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare
and Reform Institutions/Ministry of





Institutionalized 1950 20,302 21,815 22,672 21,323 Ministry of Social Security, National






Institutionalized 1950 30,715 27,679 25,646 19,958 Ministry of Social Security, National






Institutionalized 1950 400 369 n.a. n.a. Ministry of Social Security, National
Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare
and Reform Institutions
Mauritius Child Allowance Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 1960 16,311 18,556 18,367 n.a. Ministry of Social Security, National









1997 359,859 217,000 69,095 n.a. Government of Mozambique, DFID,
Government of the Netherlands,
UNICEF, ILO, IMF, the World Bank,







2012 288,267 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Mozambique and the
World Bank
Namibia Old-Age Pension Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 1949 750,000 754,275 n.a. 483,800 Ministry of Health and Social Services
Namibia Disability Grant Pure income
transfer






Institutionalized 1977 117,663 86,086 34,707 20,000 Ministry of Gender Equality and Child
Welfare
Namibia Foster Parent Pure income
transfer


































Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved

















Pilot 2011 85,988 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Niger; World Bank,
UNICEF









2007 110,000 93,750 n.e. n.e. National Poverty Eradication
Programme and Office of the Senior
Special Assistant to the President




























Institutionalized 1997 36,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. Rwanda Demobilization and
Reintegration Commission and

















































































Pilot 2008 5,000 5,000 n.e. n.e. Ministry of Education and National
Committee against AIDS with support
from USAID, World Bank, UNICEF
Seychelles Old-Age Pension Pure income
transfer











2007 13,547 16,000 n.e. n.e. Ministry of Employment and Social

































Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved
2015 2010 2005 2000






2010 45,993 n.a. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, the World Bank, and
National Commission for Social Action




Institutionalized 1928 15,761,310 13,118,595 10,720,585 9,387,690 South Africa’s Social Security Agency




Institutionalized 1998 11,953,974 10,047,986 5,661,500 974,724 South Africa’s Social Security Agency




Institutionalized 2004 140,645 110,304 88,889 n.e. South Africa’s Social Security Agency




Institutionalized 2004 539,791 479,283 252,106 n.e. South Africa’s Social Security Agency







Institutionalized 2004 1,240,000 210,000 1,700 n.e. Department of Public Works
South Africa Disability Grant Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 1946 1,098,018 1,224,294 1,307,551 608,761 South Africa’s Social Security Agency
South Africa Grant-in-Aid Pure income
transfer
Institutionalized 2004 119,541 n.a. n.a. n.e. South Africa’s Social Security Agency




































Swaziland Old-Age Grant Pure income
transfer
















Pilot 2008 13,000 6,000 n.e. n.e. Government of Tanzania; International
Development Association, DFID,













2000 6,000,000 5,000 n.a. n.a. Government of Tanzania, IDA, DFID,
SIDA, USAID, UNICEF, UNDP, ILO,








Pilot 2013 14,828 n.e. n.e. n.e. Government of Togo, World Bank,
UNICEF












Pilot 2007 105,836 45,000 n.e. Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social











2010 123,153 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social


































Coverage (direct and indirect beneficiaries) Agencies involved



















2010 20,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Community Development,
Mother and Child Health




2014 300,000 n.e. n.e. n.e. Ministry of Community Development,








1950 25,859 n.a. n.a. n.a. Ministry of Community Development
and Social Services, Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Education, World Vision,








Pilot 2004 900,000 20,000 5,900 n.e. Government of Zambia, UNICEF,
DFID, Irish Aid, Government of




















































14.6% 9.1% 6.4% 3.2%
Notes: ¹ We follow Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012) and Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa (2010) and adopt a typology that distinguishes social assistance programmes by objectives and core design
features: first, pure income transfers such as old-age pensions and family allowances are designed to smooth consumption and protect vulnerable groups, including children, the elderly, and
people with disabilities, from extreme deprivation. Second, income transfers + community assets provide income support to households with members of working age in exchange for labour
supply and take a ‘productivist’ approach in their design to mitigate idiosyncratic risks and the effect of variations in economic conditions. Finally, income transfers + human capital investment
are programmes that provide income support to households in poverty as well as preferential access to, and incentives for the utilization of, health or education services. These programmes
adopt a ‘human development’ approach with the explicit objective of reducing present and future poverty.
² ‘Institutionalized’ indicates a leading role of central governments in the implementation and coordination of programmes. In such cases, programmes usually have national coverage, and are
well integrated into legislation and the governments’ budgets, even when supported by donors. ‘Precarious institutionalization’ reflects the leading role of central governments in programme
implementation, although financial and administrative considerations remain major challenges. ‘Pilot’ indicates a leading role of donors in the implementation of programmes and therefore
their future institutionalization remains uncertain.
³ Estimates from the World Bank (2017), based on population and poverty rates measured by the share of the population living on less than US$1.90 a day at 2011 purchasing power parity.
‘n.e.’ stands for non-existent by the reference year. ‘n.a.’ stands for no available data.
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2
Building a Conservative Welfare State
in Botswana
Jeremy Seekings
1. Botswana as a Distinctively African Welfare State
Overviews of welfare regimes in Africa distinguish typically between the
middle-income countries of southern Africa (including Botswana) and the
lower-income countries elsewhere on the continent (Garcia and Moore 2012;
Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). The more expansive welfare states in the southern
African countries are said to have been ‘driven by settler elites’ prior to the mid-
1990s, and by a mix of newly democratic politics and ‘sub-regional demonstra-
tion effects’ thereafter (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012: 165–6). South Africa’s welfare
state did indeed originate in the racist politics of the early twentieth century
(Seekings 2007), and Namibia’s welfare state reflects its history as a de facto
colony of South Africa (Devereux 2007). Settler politics do not explain the
origins of the welfare states in either Mauritius or Botswana, however.
The Mauritian welfare state resulted from the distinctive political economy
of Mauritius, with a large agricultural Indo-Mauritian working class on sugar
plantations and a growing Indo-Mauritianmiddle class (Seekings 2011; Ulriksen
2012). Botswana had neither a significant population of settlers or immigrants
nor the class structure of either South Africa or Mauritius, yet it too built a
substantial welfare state in the late twentieth century—to the point that the extent
of the welfare state generated widespread anxiety among the country’s elite.
Botswana’s route to welfare state-building proceeded through the pro-
grammes, institutions, and ideology developed in a hitherto agrarian society
in response to drought. In this, the case of Botswana prefigures a more general
process underlying welfare state-building across much of Africa. Most African
welfare states have their origins in the social risks facing peasants as a result of
drought together with related changes in agrarian society that undermined the
willingness or ability of kin to support the poor. Most African welfare states
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were not a response to the risks facing workers as a result of industrialization
and urbanization—as had been the case in the more industrialized countries
of Europe (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990), Latin America (e.g. Huber and
Stephens 2012), and even East Asia (e.g. Yang 2017).
Its agrarian origins explain why previous studies have provided sharply
conflicting assessments of Botswana’s welfare state. One set of scholars has
focused on Botswana’s enduring failure to include all of its citizens in the
benefits of growth. Bar-On (2001) emphasized the parsimony of the country’s
welfare policies and concluded that ‘Botswana’s social assistance scheme fails
many of the very poor completely, and those who do benefit from it are
receiving steadily less of the nation’s increasing prosperity’ (2001: 264).
Ulriksen (2011, 2012) contrasted Botswana with Mauritius. Both were multi-
party democracies with open, middle-income economies and competent state
institutions. Both invested heavily in public education, as well as public health
and housing. But Botswana spent much less on social protection and had
no national social security legislation. Hickey (2011) similarly contrasted
Botswana unfavourably with South Africa. In contrast, World Bank studies
have described Botswana’s social protection system as ‘one of the most
extensive . . . in the region’ in terms of both the range and coverage of pro-
grammes (Garcia and Moore 2012: 227), and as ‘mature and complex’ (BIDPA
and World Bank 2013: x). Devereux also assessed that ‘By African standards,
Botswana implements an unusually comprehensive set of social welfare pro-
grammes for its poor and vulnerable citizens’ (2007: 554).
Botswana’s social assistance programmes reach a large proportion of the
population. As much as one half of the population receives food and about
10 per cent of the population receives other social assistance benefits even in
non-drought years, with the proportions rising sharply in drought years.
Seleka et al. (2007: 33) calculate that government transfers reduced the poverty
headcount rate in 2002/3 by 10 percentage points, from about 40 per cent to
about 30 per cent. Whilst coverage is widespread, total expenditure is modest.
This is primarily because most benefits are set at parsimonious levels. ‘Min-
imum assistance’ is provided to ‘genuine destitute persons’, as the government
itself puts it (Botswana 2002: 2). The old-age pension introduced in 1996was set
at just one quarter of the value of its equivalent in neighbouring South Africa,
and workfare ‘wages’ are similarly low. As a result, poverty might be reduced
but is certainly not eliminated. The conservative character of the welfare state
is evident also in the preference for workfare and for the provision of benefits
in kind (and more recently food coupons). Furthermore, programmes assume
and respect the centrality of the family: workfare is designed to enable
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a working-age adult breadwinner to support his or her familial dependents; a
‘destitutes’ programme is intended to support households where there is no
able-bodied, working-age adult; pensions and orphan support became neces-
sary when individuals fell outside families, in the case of the elderly because of
shrinkage in the ‘extended’ family. None of the social assistance programmes
are statutory, i.e. none are based in legislation, and there is no dedicated
ministry for social welfare.
The governing party also developed a distinctively conservative welfare doc-
trine to justify its interventions. The state sought to strengthen the social order
built around the family and the community, and to limit interventions inmarkets.
Botswana’s welfare state was not built on universalist, egalitarian, or highly
redistributive principles. It thus resembled the conservative welfare regimes of
continental Europe, which perpetuated stratification of households by class and
status as well as gendered inequalities within households, rather than the social
democratic welfare states in the Nordic countries (van Kersbergen 2003).¹
Botswana was an early example of a distinctively African welfare state,
characterized by a distinctively conservative approach to precisely who is
decommodified, how, to what extent, and with what legitimating ideology.
The value of examining the history of welfare state-building in Botswana in
the late twentieth century is precisely because it prefigured subsequent processes
and patterns of welfare state-building elsewhere in east and central Africa.
This chapter examines how and why a conservative welfare state was built in
Botswana. Sections 2 and 3 examine the origins of welfare programmes in
drought relief in the 1960s and 1970s and their institutionalization and consoli-
dation in the 1980s and 1990s. Section 4 focuses on how the particular formof the
welfare state in Botswana was shaped by social, economic, and cultural factors,
whilst section 5 examines the impetus to reform provided by political competi-
tion. Whilst spectacular economic growth from the 1970s facilitated the con-
struction of a welfare state in Botswana, political dynamics explain the incentives
facing the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The conclusion reflects further on
how the case of Botswanafits into the broader landscape ofwelfare state-building.
2. Drought and the Foundations of the Welfare State
Welfare policies in Botswana have long revolved around three major components:
food or cash-for-work, i.e. workfare, for able-bodied adults; ‘supplementary’
¹ This comparison was suggested by Tlou, Parsons, and Henderson (1995).
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feeding programmes for designated ‘vulnerable groups’, i.e. children, pregnant
women, and lactating mothers; and additional support for selected categor-
ies of people, initially along the lines of poor relief for ‘destitutes’ who
could not support themselves and were not being supported adequately by
kin, and later through universal old-age pensions and support for orphans.
In contrast to neighbouring South Africa, Botswana has never introduced
a general child support grant paying benefits to poor mothers or other
caregivers.
All three major components of public welfare provision date back to
independence (from colonial rule) in the mid-1960s. At the time Botswana
was a sparsely populated, arid country with a small population of about half a
million. It was one of the poorest countries in the world, with GDP per capita
about one half of its northern neighbour Zambia and one tenth of its southern
neighbour South Africa. The new country had little infrastructure and few
public services. Whilst the country had never had many settlers, it was highly
stratified, with a wealthy cattle-owning Tswana elite, a large population of
small Tswana farmers with few or no cattle, and a non-Tswana underclass.
The country was chronically vulnerable to drought.
Independence coincided with terrible drought and famine. The government
negotiated with the newly established World Food Programme (WFP) over
food aid for, at one point, more than half of the population, as well as stock
feed for cattle. Massive support from the WFP and elsewhere—with an
estimated value of at least 2 per cent of GDP—averted starvation (although
one third of the country’s cattle died). When it became clear that famine would
continue beyond the scope of a WFP ‘emergency operation’, the BDP govern-
ment and the WFP together designed a suite of ‘developmental’ programmes.
First, feeding programmes provided directly for pre-school and primary
school children, and pregnant and lactating mothers (and, later, tuberculosis
patients also). Second, food-for-work programmes provided rations to
working-age adults working on ‘self-help’ projects, building school facilities,
roads, etc.; the rations were intended to support entire households. In add-
ition, assistance was expanded for other ‘destitutes’ who were unable to work
on grounds of age or infirmity (Seekings 2016a).
The drought of the mid- and late 1960s also shaped the development, within
the government and BDP, of a conservative welfare doctrine (Seekings 2016b).
The drought added to the pressure on the BDP government to articulate the
relationships between and respective responsibilities of citizens and state.
Crucially, the state assumed responsibilities supposedly undertaken hitherto
by the chiefs (Makgala 2012). It also adapted existing understandings of chiefly
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authority and responsibility to accommodate the new state institutions. The
result was a doctrine that represented the state as benign, with clear respon-
sibilities to the poor, but at the same time emphasized the responsibilities of
the poor themselves to contribute to their own welfare.
The 1970s were years of relatively good rains and harvests. The country’s
cattle herds grew rapidly. Drought did not disappear, however, and the
government began to institutionalize its relief and recovery programmes.
The regular feeding programmes expanded steadily. Food-for-work pro-
grammes stopped and started until 1978, when a decision was made to operate
continuously, i.e. in non-drought as well as drought years. The government
also sought to formalize its support for ‘destitutes’ who were unable to work,
and who needed support in good years as well as bad. In 1974 the responsible
Minister asked his cabinet colleagues to decide ‘whether the nation has
reached that stage of economic and social advancement at which it can
afford to begin succouring at the end of their lives the very poorest people
of all’. Although he believed ‘that the time has come to take a major step
towards implementing a genuine long-term programme of relief for the
chronically destitute’, opposition from the Ministry of Finance and Devel-
opment Planning (headed by the Vice-President, Quett Masire) stalled the
proposed reforms.²
The government expected that economic growth would end poverty. The
government focused initially on the cattle industry, to the benefit of many BDP
leaders and bureaucrats who had acquired large cattle ranches. In the 1970s,
the government’s focus shifted to mining. Rapid economic growth led, how-
ever, to growing inequality. The incomes of the rich and even the formally
employed working class grew sharply, with only modest benefits trickling
down to the poor.
When drought recurred in 1978–9, the government and WFP together
provided drought relief for about 80 per cent of the population. The govern-
ment formalized its public works programme (as the Labour-Intensive Public
Works Programme) and introduced a new National Policy on Destitute
Persons. The latter provided for minimal benefits in kind for any individual
‘who is rendered helpless due to natural disaster or temporary hardship’, and
had neither assets (with a limit of four cows) nor close kin to support them
(Gooch and Macdonald 1981; Botswana 2002).
² Botswana National Archives (BNA), OP 28/6: ‘Social Welfare: “Chronic” Destitutes’, Draft
Cabinet Memorandum drafted by Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 7 February 1974, signed
by the Minister, K.P. Morake, and subsequent correspondence.
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An even more severe drought recurred between 1981 and 1986. Arable
production fell by two thirds. Three hundred thousand cattle had died by
1984. The government responded by expanding its drought relief and recovery
programmes: feeding programmes were extended to provide meals for school
children over weekends and during school holidays; the public employment
programme was expanded, and also introduced cash payments alongside food
rations; and more generous food parcels were distributed to much larger
numbers of ‘destitutes’. Once again, more than half of the population benefited
from one or other feeding programme (Botswana 1991: 452). As in the late
1980s, drought relief was followed by drought recovery efforts. Drought relief
and recovery programmes were run through existing, largely bureaucratic
structures, not by politicians. They were widely acclaimed as a great success,
and a good example of the general dictum that democracies do not permit
drought to lead to deaths on a large scale (e.g. Dreze and Sen 1989; Teklu 1995;
De Waal 1997).
In 1985, concluding their study of the drought relief programmes, Holm
and Morgan had assessed that:
Drought relief is coming to assume a role in Botswana politics comparable to
education and welfare in the industrialised countries. Indeed, it is already so
popular that the leaders of the BDP have resisted pressures for cuts from
bureaucrats. It will be difficult for the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning, which quite naturally concerns itself with balancing the budget, to
find a politically acceptable way of reducing the various relief programmes,
once the drought is over. (Holm and Morgan 1985: 476)
Holm and Morgan were soon proved correct as the government not only
prepared for further droughts but also moved to address more fully the
challenge of chronic poverty.
3. The Consolidation of Welfare Programmes in the 1990s
The combination of drought and economic growth pushed the government to
consolidate its welfare programmes in the 1990s. In 1990, consultants com-
pleted a study for the government of its drought relief programmes since 1981.
This informed, first, the government’s seventh National Development Plan
(NDP) (Botswana 1991). Poverty persisted even in years of good rain, indi-
cating ‘a structural poverty problem’ (ibid.: 17). Social justice and the decline
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of extended family support required government action: ‘Government food
aid, its drought relief and recovery programmes, and other aid measures
targeted for the destitute are intended to supplement the incomes of the very
poor in order to ensure that their disposable incomes, both cash and in kind,
provide them with a minimum standard of living’ (ibid.: 33). But rising costs
(and declining foreign aid) meant that programmes needed to be rationalized.
The government envisaged that ‘existing assistance measures’ would ‘be con-
solidated into a simple, single-channel “safety net”, based on strict eligibility
criteria, for disadvantaged households’, which could easily ‘be expanded
during drought to protect basic needs and the productive assets of vulnerable
households’ (ibid.: 89). In 1992, a Government Paper proposed various
reforms, which were discussed further at a major conference on ‘drought
management’ in late 1993. These reforms included reduced benefits for work-
fare, to allow broader coverage without commensurate expense, and to ensure
more precise (self-) targeting on the very poor. Workfare would, however, be
paid in cash, not in kind. Feeding programmes would also be more narrowly
targeted (Botswana 1993).
Policy reform was driven also by the threatened (and finally effected)
withdrawal of the WFP from Botswana, which was itself due to Botswana’s
economic growth, which raised GDP per capita above the threshold at which
the country ceased to be eligible for free WFP food aid. The WFP had raised
with the Government of Botswana the issue of the transfer of financial
responsibility as early as the late 1970s, but enduring drought meant that
this was repeatedly postponed. In anticipation of the transfer of financial
responsibility for drought relief and related welfare programmes, the Govern-
ment of Botswana budgeted for drought relief and related programmes in its
1991 National Development Plan. A drought in 1992–3 was the last for which
Botswana received WFP emergency food aid, although the WFP’s phased
withdrawal from school and other feeding programmes was finally completed
only in 1997.
As the transfer of responsibility of feeding programmes from the WFP to
the government’s own budget became more imminent, the government was
compelled to think more carefully about the design of its programmes. On the
one hand, it was concerned not to perpetuate ‘dependency’, which might entail
more precise targeting of some programmes. On the other, it was forced to
consider which citizens were ‘deserving’, and especially which chronically
poor citizens were deserving of support in non-drought as well as drought
years. The dilemma was set out explicitly in the seventh National Development
Plan: ‘The major challenges Government faces is to ensure that the temporary
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reliance of vulnerable groups on drought relief does not become a permanent
dependency’ (Botswana 1991: 389). Across most of Africa, post-colonial
governments were wary of encouraging laziness and ‘dependency’ by provid-
ing overly generous assistance (‘handouts’) to households with able-bodied,
working-age adults. Botswana was unusual in that drought had led to pro-
grammes with unusually broad coverage, whilst economic growth had led to
the WFP’s withdrawal. Questions of ‘dependency’ were therefore addressed
earlier in Botswana than elsewhere.
Feeding programmes for children and other ‘vulnerable’ groups were least
controversial, although there was some discussion over the scope of the
programmes and especially whether they needed to be better targeted on
the poor. The government took over full financial responsibility for these
from the WFP in 1997. Provision for ‘destitutes’, on the other hand, had
always been more controversial. The government did nudge up the value of
the benefit in 1990 (ibid.: 389) and resolved to restrict eligibility to people
who were unfit for work (Botswana 1993). The big question, however, was
whether there were specific groups of people for whom the destitutes policy
was no longer adequate.
The most pressing group of chronically destitute were the elderly. Hitherto,
Botswana’s safety nets were based on the assumptions that most elderly people
either supported themselves or were supported by their kin and the small
number of exceptions was covered adequately by provision for ‘destitutes’.
Social and economic change made both assumptions doubtful. In April 1988,
after years of drought, Members of Parliament from both the BDP and
opposition parties called for the introduction of old-age pensions.³ The gov-
ernment’s response was to commission research (through the Ministry of
Health), resulting in a workshop in Gaborone in 1993 (see Bruun, Mugabe,
and Coombes 1994). The research confirmed that many elderly people—
especially widows—were impoverished, without sufficient support from chil-
dren or destitute relief. Elderly people told researchers that ‘our children do
not seem to care much about us; we are forced to sit back and wait for any
form of relief, hoping that the Government has also not forgotten us’. But the
government apparently also ‘does not know that old people exist’ (Ngome
1994: 105–6). Following the 1993 workshop, an inter-ministerial working
group was reportedly set up to continue discussions over ministerial respon-
sibilities to address the challenge of poverty among the elderly. The BDP’s
1994 election manifesto included the promise at least to ‘study the feasibility
³ Hansard, 8 April 1988, pp. 971–8.
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and the affordability of an old age pension scheme’ (BDP 1994: 19, para 13.3).
Drought recurred again in 1995. Early in 1996, the Minister of Finance and
Development Planning (and Vice-President), Festus Mogae, announced that
non-contributory old-age pensions would be introduced. In his memoirs,
published a decade later, Masire wrote that the BDP was aware that ‘trad-
itional’ support systems were withering, especially in the towns, and poverty
was growing among the elderly. ‘We discussed the idea of an old age pension
scheme for many years’, he wrote; ‘by 1996, we felt that we had enough
revenue coming from diamonds, and those funds belonged to all Batswana.
So we discussed it and decided to go ahead’ (Masire 2006: 234).
The old-age pension programme and the assumption of responsibility for
feeding programmes cost close to 1 per cent of GDP. This level of recurrent
expenditure would have been a massive outlay for many African countries, but
for Botswana it was less than the government was spending on drought relief
and recovery much of the time. Moreover, at the time public finances seemed
buoyant. Former Deputy-Minister of Finance and long-time cabinet member
David Magang later accused Masire of profligacy as minister, throwing money
away (2008: 475). The eighth NDP (1997/8–2002/3) forecast budget surpluses,
with rising revenues outpacing the rising expenditure (Botswana 1997a: 69–71).
In 1998/9, however, the country incurred its first budget deficit since 1982/3,
of more than 6 per cent of GDP. Deficits recurred also in 2001/2 and 2002/3
(Botswana 2003: 35–9). Whilst the deficit was driven primarily by the
public sector wage bill, increased domestic funding of welfare programmes
also contributed.
Orphans comprised a second category inadequately covered by destitute
relief. The Ministry of Local Government was tasked with keeping a register of
orphans and providing them—and their foster families—with necessary food
and other benefits in kind (such as school uniforms). As the number of
orphans grew, due primarily to AIDS, the Ministry was unable to cope. By
1998 it was thought that less than one half of all orphans were registered. In
1999, the government approved a Short-Term Plan of Action for Orphans,
which provided for the appointment of dedicated child welfare officers and
committees, and initiated a new Orphan Care Programme (OCP) to take
orphans off general destitute relief. Through the 2000s there were about
50,000 orphans being supported under this programme. Although there were
fewer beneficiaries than there were old-age pensioners, the cost of the food
basket for orphans (and their foster families) was much higher than the value
of an old-age pension, which meant that the total cost of the OCP was about
the same as the total cost of the old-age pension scheme (Chinyoka 2019).
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Finally, in 2002, the government reformed its ‘destitutes policy’. The new
policy defined more clearly ‘permanent’ destitutes (comprising primarily the
disabled) and ‘temporary’ destitutes (resulting from drought or the death of or
desertion by a breadwinner). Special provision was made for ‘needy children’
(other than orphans, who were covered by the OCP). The ‘Revised Policy’
raised the value of the food basket and introduced for the first time a modest
cash benefit on the grounds that destitutes needed cash (for items such as
toothpaste and paraffin) as well as food rations. The 2002 Revised Policy was
more generous but it remained highly moralistic, based on an understanding
of destitution that encompassed a failure to take advantage of opportunities to
improve one’s life. The Policy identified the ‘responsibilities’ of destitutes and
specified appropriate actions to be taken if they ‘flouted’ these responsibilities
(Botswana 2002: 11–12).
By the early 2000s drought relief programmes funded heavily from abroad
had been extended and consolidated into a permanent welfare state funded
from domestic revenues. There are no good data on precisely what proportion
of the population benefited from the various government programmes. Seleka
et al. (2007) report that one in three households was receiving support from
one or other programme as of 2002/3, but this figure seems to have excluded
school feeding programmes. By 2009/10, the proportion had risen further.
Although only about 10 per cent of the population benefited directly from cash
(or ‘near-cash’) programmes, many of these supported large households, so
the proportion of indirect beneficiaries was much larger. An even larger
number of individuals benefited from feeding programmes: Given some
overlap between programmes, it is likely that approximately one quarter of
the total population benefited from school meals, and a similar proportion
directly from other programmes. It is probably true that a large majority of
households benefited from one or other government welfare programme. Cash
benefits remained parsimonious, however, especially in comparison with
neighbouring South Africa.
In the 2000s, when new social assistance programmes were being intro-
duced across much of Africa, Botswana’s government focused rather on
containing costs. The finance minister warned in 2010 that the number of
people receiving assistance was ‘economically unsustainable’.⁴ The govern-
ment rejected proposals for a broader child grant, first in 2010, and then again
in 2013 (when the proposals were made by the World Bank). Expenditure on
⁴ 2010 budget speech (presented by O.K. Matambo, Monday 8 February 2010, Hansard, vol. 163,
part I.
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programmes for children in Botswana remained at about 0.7 per cent of GDP,
i.e. about one half of the level in neighbouring South Africa. Botswana’s
various social assistance programmes cost a total of about 1.9 per cent of
GDP (BIDPA and World Bank 2013: 42), which was substantially less than in
South Africa but more than in most African countries. One programme that
did see significant reform—or at least repackaging—was workfare. Another
review of Destitute Policy, in August 2008, recommended (again) that able-
bodied ‘destitutes’ should be enrolled in workfare instead.⁵ This required that
the workfare programme be extended to all parts of the country where there
were able-bodied destitutes. The former Labour-Intensive Public Works Pro-
gramme was renamed the Ipelegeng programme, becoming permanent rather
than intermittent and poverty- rather than drought-focused, from 2008/9
(Hamer 2016).
4. Economic, Social, and Cultural Change
The expansion and consolidation of a welfare state in Botswana—much earlier
than in most of Africa (excepting South Africa)—reflected the availability of
resources as well as the perceived need. Economic growth was exceptional,
with GDP per capita in 2008 fourteen times higher in real terms than it had
been at independence. This ensured rising public revenues. At the same
time, the welfare state was ‘necessary’ to ensure that the benefits of growth
were shared across the whole population. Economic growth did not elimin-
ate poverty. Even with an expanding welfare state, 19 per cent of the
population fell below the national poverty line in 2009/10, and the poverty
gap remained large in relation to the resources spent on safety net pro-
grammes. Whilst the population was urbanizing rapidly, poverty remained
highest in rural areas. A rising proportion of rural households had no cattle,
little or no land, and weak or no kin or other networks through which they
could claim support. Poverty was the result of deagrarianization in rural
areas rather than urbanization.
As early as 1977/8, a year of reasonable rain and production, one survey
found that only 7 per cent of households were able to meet their food needs
through their own production. Almost all households were dependent on
other sources of food, especially income from waged work, whether as
migrants in neighbouring South Africa (in the mid-twentieth century) or
⁵ Ibid.
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within Botswana itself (in the later part of the century) (Vierich and Sheppard
1980: 50). The simplest measure of deagrarianization in Botswana is the
declining proportion of households, including of households in rural areas
only, who had access to cattle, whether through ownership or some kind of
lease arrangement (including mafisa, i.e. the traditional system of loaned
cattle). In the ‘traditional’ agricultural sector, i.e. excluding about 500 large
commercial farms, 32 per cent of farming households had no cattle in 1981. By
1995, this proportion had risen to 49 per cent (Botswana 1997a: 227–8).
A social aspect of deagrarianization was the shrinkage of kinship obliga-
tions. The official narrative of Tswana culture emphasizes the extended family.
In 1970, for example, then Vice-President Masire praised the ‘African
extended family . . . with its built-in system of social security’ as ‘an invaluable
institution’. He warned that, ‘if the extended family system were to disintegrate
we would all be the losers’. He continued to laud ‘the traditional system of
sharing natural resources of water and grazing, and land generally’ for pro-
viding ‘a sound basis on which to build a just and egalitarian society’ (quoted
in Kooijman 1978: 212). Contemporary ethnographic studies reported, how-
ever, that the extended family system was threatened by the rise in individu-
alism and decline in perceived obligations towards kin, including even parents.
Kooijman, who conducted research in the early 1970s, reported a decline in
the former practice of young men ploughing for their parents. She illustrates
this with a discussion of one poor family, whose kin were not prepared to
support them except in return for work. A wealthy kinsman told Kooijman
that ‘I cannot give him food without him or his family working for us. My wife
could never agree to a free gift of corn. She would ask me what I am doing by
giving food to “lazy” people’. Perhaps in part in consequence, poor people
were often ashamed to ask for help (ibid.: 234–5). In the early 1990s, govern-
ment officials repeatedly recognized that the extended family system was
disintegrating (e.g. Botswana 1991: 18; Bruun et al. 1994). In the parliamentary
debate on the old-age pension in 1996, an opposition MP recalled that ‘before
independence, the sense of communal obligation was very strong as the care of
the aged, orphans and the disabled was voluntarily undertaken by relatives
under the system of extended family. Now, today, as you are all aware, that
sense has now died. What remains is the sense of everybody for himself and
God for us all’.⁶
The BDP government’s response to the persistence of poverty amidst social
change was shaped by its understanding of Tswana culture and its paternalistic
⁶ BNF MP for Kanye, Mr S. Gabathswane. Hansard, Thursday 15 February 1996, p. 95.
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but conservative ideology. From the mid-1960s, the BDP sought to appropriate
traditions of responsibility. The official narrative of Tswana culture places a very
heavy emphasis on tradition, more explicitly than most other national cultures
in east and southern Africa. According to this narrative, chiefs had clear
responsibilities for the poor. In the case of the Batswana, when the chief
(kgosi) was installed, he was told:
Morafe wa gago ke oo
O babalele
Ke wena ramasiela, ke wena rabahumanegi
Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho.
Translated: There is our nation, care for it, you are the father of the orphans
and the poor, the king is the king by the grace of the people (Tlou 1998). The
BDP was led by a traditional leader (Seretse Khama, who had effectively been
deposed as chief of the BaNgwato after marrying a British woman), but was
nonetheless a ‘grand coalition’ of the modernizing, educated ‘new men’ who
became commercial cattle farmers, embraced liberal democracy, and removed
many of the powers of chiefs (Gillett 1973; Parson 1984; Tlou et al. 1995;
Samatar 1999; Sebudubudu with Molutsi 2009). The BDP was not a broad-
based nationalist movement nor was it led by a natural ideologue (such as
Nyerere, in Tanzania).
Formed to negotiate independence and having won an overwhelming major-
ity in the pre-independence elections, the BDP had to define an ideology setting
out the relationships between the new (BDP-run) state and its citizens. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, Khama, Masire, and the BDP, with the assistance of
their mostly expatriate scriptwriters, crafted conservative doctrines of govern-
ment, growth, and welfare. These doctrines were shaped profoundly by the
drought and ensuing destitution and poverty that accompanied independence
and the government’s determination to transfer powers from the chiefs to the
new state. With respect to welfare specifically, the result was a doctrine with four
key elements. First, it idealized rural society and demonized urban life. Second, it
emphasized ‘self-help’ and was hostile to ‘dependency’ on the charity of the
state. Third, it aspired to social harmony, despite inequality. Finally, it proposed
a sharing of responsibility between individuals and the state. The overarching
concept was kagisano, which was usually translated as ‘unity, peace, harmony
and a sense of community’ (Gulbrandsen 2012; Seekings 2016b).
BDP leaders were liberal in their preference for markets over the state, and
were conservative on many social issues (including both the family and sex),
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/2019, SPi
54     
but saw the state and society as having responsibilities for the poor. These
responsibilities were shared with the poor themselves: The poor had a respon-
sibility to work hard and take advantage of whatever opportunities were open
to them; they should not rely on government ‘handouts’. Improved product-
ivity was always to be preferred to welfare. Khama and Masire were insistent
that their ideology was not socialist (see Seekings 2016b). At the end of
Masire’s presidency, the BDP’s ideology was rearticulated in Vision 2016.
Vision 2016 invoked the Tswana concept of ‘botho’: ‘This refers to one of the
tenets of African culture—the concept of a person who has a well-rounded
character, who is well-mannered, courteous and disciplined, and realises his
or her potential both as an individual and as a part of the community to
which he or she belongs’ (Botswana 1997b: 2). Vision 2016 set out a clear,
implicit commitment to social justice. Botswana would become ‘a compas-
sionate and caring society, offering support and opportunity to those who
are poor, and including all people in the benefits of growth’ (ibid.: 8,
emphasis in original). Vision 2016 envisaged that poverty would be halved
by 2007, and absolute poverty would be eliminated by 2016. This would be
achieved primarily through economic growth and the provision of oppor-
tunities, but ‘there will be a social safety net for those who find themselves in
poverty for any reason’ (ibid.: 9). At the same time, Botswana should worry
about the ‘deterioration of national values’. In a section on the ‘ “give me”
attitude’, Vision 2016 insisted on the importance of avoiding ‘a culture of
dependency’ (ibid.: 25).
Festus Mogae, who was Masire’s Vice-President and Minister of Finance
and Development Planning before succeeding Masire as President in 1998,
emphasized even more strongly the need for balance between public and
individual responsibilities. He affirmed repeatedly his commitment to tackling
the challenges of poverty and unemployment but saw this in terms of ‘mutual
social responsibility’. ‘National development’, he explained in his budget
speech in 1993, was ‘a cooperative endeavour, and we must all play our
part.’ Mutual self-responsibility meant ‘that self-reliance takes precedence
over appeals to Government for assistance’.⁷ In the first BDP election mani-
festo under his leadership, Mogae called for ‘self-reliance as opposed to a
dependency syndrome’ (Mogae 1999).
BDP leaders’ anxiety over dependency (on ‘handouts’) reflected the reach of
the programmes that they had implemented since independence. References
⁷ Hansard, vol. 110, part 1, Monday 8 February 1993, p. 4. See also the BDP’s 1994 election
manifesto.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/2019, SPi
       55
to ‘dependency’ proliferated in the mid-1980s, as programmes were expanded
in response to chronic drought (Seekings 2017). As anthropologists noted,
rural villagers came to see the new state ‘as a generous patron’:
Many villagers see ‘the government’, often personified by the President, the
local member of parliament or other local representatives of the state, as
motswadintle—as ‘he from whom good things come’ . . . The general attitude
is that ‘the government’ or the ‘BDP’ will deliver the goods, so that villagers
can live their village lives . . . [I]n 1990, when a number of programmes
relating to an eight-year-long drought had just been brought to an end, the
general attitude among villagers was that the state’s behaviour was maswe
(bad). Two years later the government (no doubt thanks to the impending
election) reintroduced many of these programmes and the general attitude
shifted in a more positive direction.
(Helle-Valle 2002: 195–6; see also Gulbrandsen 2012)
At the same time, as Helle-Valle notes, the government bureaucrats on the
front line of the new state treated villagers with disdain.
5. Political Competition
The combination of drought and economic growth underlay both the need
and possibility of expanding public provision for—and decommodification
of—the poor. But the actual impetus to reform was political. BDP leaders were
pushed to reform by two forms of political competition. First, at and soon after
independence, the BDP leadership sought to provide the new state with some
legitimacy through assuming responsibilities previously attached to chiefs.
Later, including especially in the early 1990s, the BDP faced serious electoral
challenges from rival political parties. Social assistance programmes may have
led to distasteful dependency, in the view of BDP leaders, but they also
underpinned the legitimacy of the new state and continuing electoral support
for the governing party.
At independence, the BDP under Seretse Khama sought to build the
institutions of a ‘modern’ state, to assume most of the functions performed
hitherto by chiefs. In Botswana, to a greater extent than elsewhere,
chiefs had been integral to colonial governance. The Chieftainship Act of
1966, subsequent Amendment Acts, and other legislation transferred most
of the chiefs’ legislative and executive roles to new institutions, including
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especially popularly elected district councils and related bureaucrats
(Gillett 1973; Vengroff 1977). Khama himself was the rightful chief of the
Bangwato but he threw his lot in with other educated cattle owners in the
BDP. For him, as well as for Masire, chiefly authority was both an obstacle
to economic growth and change and a source of continuing tribal division.
Drought relief provided a vehicle for reconstituting relations between
state and citizenry, i.e. for a new social contract. Prior to independence,
colonial District Commissioners had worked through chiefs and headmen to
address drought. From independence, drought relief was administered
by District and Village Development Committees. Ideologically, also, the
BDP could wrap the new state in the flag of paternalist responsibility
(Seekings 2016b).
By the mid-1970s the new state had established its hegemony. Thereafter,
the primary challenge to the BDP came from other political parties. The
distinctive expansion of the welfare state in Botswana in the decades following
independence reflected in part the country’s unusually democratic political
system. Almost uniquely in Africa, Botswana held multi-party elections regu-
larly, although the country has never experienced any turnover in government.
The BDP won more than half of the vote in every election from the pre-
independence election of 1965 through to 2009. The BDP had a comfortable
parliamentary majority throughout this period, even when its share of the
vote was only just over 50 per cent, because of the Westminster-style first-
past-the-post constituency system. In 2014, for the first time, it failed to win a
majority of the vote but nonetheless retained a majority of seats in parlia-
ment. The BDP is arguably the most successful party in Africa in terms of its
success in remaining in office for fifty years (and counting). The limits to
democracy in Botswana have been well documented (Nthomang 2007; Good
1996, 2016). Nonetheless, the BDP has faced electoral challenges, and these
have pushed it into more extensive policy reform that it might have under-
taken in the absence of electoral competition. The election of 1994, when the
BDP’s share of the vote fell dramatically to 53 per cent, was a particularly
powerful shock.
The BDP has always faced vocal criticism from opposition parties, including
initially the Botswana People’s Party (BPP) and later the Botswana National
Front (BNF). The BDP restricted the BPP and BNF to a small number of seats
until 1994, when the BNF won thirteen seats (to the BDP’s twenty-seven), with
support concentrated in urban areas. Whilst both the governing BDP and
opposition parties (and trade unions) were rhetorically pro-poor, their rhet-
oric differed. The BDP espoused a paternalist, conservative doctrine, whilst the
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opposition presented a more orthodox social democratic discourse (with
occasional Marxist flourishes).
The BDP has used public expenditure to bolster its electoral support,
especially in rural areas. Faced with competition from the new BNF in the
1969 elections, Khama’s government secured continued support from the
WFP for drought recovery programmes (and other rural development pro-
grammes). In 1979, MPs from the BDP reportedly pressed the government to
declare a drought so that drought relief programmes could pour money into
their constituencies in the run-up to that year’s elections (Munemo 2012:
132–3). Press reports from the 1979 election campaign indicate that the
distribution of food aid was an important campaign issue (ibid.: 147).
‘Young Turks’ in the BDP criticized the party’s leaders for neglecting inequal-
ity whilst pursuing economic growth (Pickard 1987: 170). The 1984 elections
have been described as being ‘critical in bringing BDP to see the political value
of drought relief ’ (Holm and Cohen 1988: 36). The Cabinet reportedly over-
ruled the Ministry of Finance and expanded massively the drought relief
budget in order to maintain the BDP’s support in rural areas (ibid.).
In 1994, the BNF criticized the BDP for ‘dividing the nation into the haves
and the have-nots’, and promised that a BNF government would ‘create more
jobs’ and ‘provide social welfare for the most needy’, including free education,
contributory and non-contributory old-age pensions, dependents’ and
orphans’ benefits, unemployment benefits, and pre-school facilities for work-
ing parents (BNF 1994: 3–8). Following its narrow victory in the 1994
elections, and looking forward to the next elections in 1999 (Nthomang
2007: 212), the BDP government moved to introduce old-age pensions and
orphans’ benefits, and to assume financial responsibility for feeding pro-
grammes, despite the considerable cost of these at a time when the budget
was beginning to take strain. Later, in the 2009 and 2014 elections, BDP
leader and president Ian Khama (the son of Seretse Khama) sought to brand
himself as pro-poor through, inter alia, expanding the Ipelegeng workfare
programme (Hamer 2016).
Scholars who have conducted ethnographic research in rural areas suggest
that the BDP’s expansion of state provision (on top of governing during very
rapid economic growth) was crucial to it sustaining its electoral support in its
rural strongholds. Until the late 1980s, ‘the ruling party and the government it
dominated exercised its hegemony so forcefully . . . that it was no simple matter
for the opposition to establish a convincing political alternative’. When the
government provided schools and clinics, roads and water supplies, and
feeding programmes, all that the opposition could criticize was that this was
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not enough (Gulbrandsen 2012: 249). The BDP insisted that its leaders—and
government officials—participated in popular meetings (kgotla), where they
were exposed to (controlled) criticisms of the government’s performance
with respect to development. Holm and Morgan noted in 1985 that the
BDP—from the president down to local councillors—had come to view
drought relief as ‘a very effective means of reinforcing its rural support’
(1985: 476). A survey showed that ‘the single most important reason given
by respondents . . . for being a member of the BDP was the Drought Relief
Programme’ (Molutsi 1989: 128). In the face of widespread allegations of elite
corruption, pro-poor welfare programmes were crucial to sustaining the
BDP’s electoral support.
Electoral competition helps to explain both the expansion of public provi-
sion and its pronounced rural bias. Munemo (2012) argues, perversely, that
the BDP implemented cash-for-work programmes rather than food aid in the
1980s because of its strength, as the incumbent party, not because of its
electoral vulnerability. His overarching hypothesis, applied to several coun-
tries, is that electorally vulnerable government prefer food aid which politi-
cians can manipulate to consolidate their support, whilst more secure parties
are happy to shift from discretionary expenditures to programmes adminis-
tered by bureaucrats. Contra Munemo’s hypothesis, Botswana was a case of
a governing party introducing more and more programmatic reforms as its
share of the vote declined.
The case of Botswana extends our understanding of the role of partisan
politics in policy reform. Centre-left parties, with strong bases among the
urban and industrial working class, have often been the primary drivers of
expanding social programmes, including in India, Mexico, Korea, and Brazil
(Dion 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012; Seekings 2012; Yang 2017). In a
number of countries, however, centre-right parties have embraced and even
expanded social programmes. In cases such as Mexico and Chile, they did this
in reaction to centre-left initiatives (Fairfield and Garay 2017). In Botswana,
the BDP acted pre-emptively, initially to usurp the roles of chiefs, and later to
shore up its rural support base in the face of rising challenges from urban-
based opposition parties.
6. Conclusion
Botswana was one of the pioneers in welfare state-building in Africa. By the
time of Seretse Khama’s death, in mid-1980, the state was already massively
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involved in the decommodification of its citizens through providing a safety
net that was wide (and very wide during times of extreme drought). This was a
welfare state that insured its citizens against the risk (of drought) that was
most pressing in a still largely rural society. This was not a welfare state that
insured its citizens primarily against the risks associated with urbanization
and industrialization. Drought intermittently pushed into poverty households
that were headed by working-age, able-bodied adults. Food-for-work pro-
grammes providing rations for a single adult per household were intended to
strengthen families, not compensate for family breakdown. At the same time,
the state accepted responsibility for children and mothers and for ‘destitute’
people who were unable to work, but at minimal levels. The long drought
of the 1980s pushed the government to expand and entrench relief and
recovery programmes. In the 1990s, faced with the withdrawal of the WFP
and enduring poverty, the BDP consolidated its welfare programmes. As
Ulriksen (2011, 2012) and Hickey (2011) emphasize, Botswana’s welfare
state was modest in comparison with the more generous welfare states of
Mauritius and South Africa. By comparison with the rest of Africa, however,
it was extensive in terms of both coverage and expense (costing close to 2 per cent
of GDP).
The predominant approach to explaining variation between welfare states
(or regimes) focuses on the political power of the classes produced by capitalist
industrialization. Where working classes were organized, united, and willing
to forge alliances with family farmers or sections of the middle class, then
social democracy became hegemonic, and universal, egalitarian welfare states
were built. This was the case across much of northern Europe (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001) and, from the late
1990s, East Asia (Yang 2017). In Germany, in contrast, labour-intensive
agriculture predominated in the early twentieth century, and farmers were
recruited into a conservative coalition that sought to repress trade unions and
left-wing parties whilst co-opting some workers (especially civil servants) into
corporatist institutions. After the Second World War, the German middle
classes supported conservative reforms because they wished to preserve occu-
pationally segregated social insurance programmes (and ensuing status differ-
entials) and remained loyal to the Christian Democrats. The experiences of the
early industrializers in Latin America—Argentina, Chile, and Brazil—were
more similar to the German model, in that large parts of the formally
employed working class were co-opted into corporatist institutions that pre-
served a status hierarchy (and excluded most of the urban as well as rural
poor) (Huber and Stephens 2012). The risks facing people varied more
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between classes within societies than they did across national boundaries, but
politics played out very differently in different national settings.
The choices made by political parties, informed by their ideologies, were
consequential in terms of the kind and extent of welfare state that was
built. Germany’s history of absolutism (rather than liberal democracy) and
Catholicism (with its commitment to preserving the traditional family) shaped
its welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26–33, 133–5). Even after the Second
World War, the Christian Democratic understanding of social citizenship
emphasized ‘duties rather than rights, the family and the social group rather
than the individual, society rather than the state, and distributional justice
rather than social justice’ (Van Kersbergen 2003: 178), with distributional
justice understood in terms of classes or status groups receiving their fair
but unequal shares.
Citizens of Botswana faced very different risks to their counterparts in more
industrialized and urbanized societies. From the 1960s through the 1980s, and
even into the 1990s, the primary risk was drought. In a society that remained
largely agrarian—notwithstanding the dependence of the ‘peasantariat’ (or
semi-proletarianized peasantry) also on the remittances of migrant workers,
especially on SouthAfricanmines (Parson 1984)—drought pushedmost house-
holds into poverty and destitution. Even the rich were affected, through the
decimation of their herds of cattle, which were the source of both wealth and
status. In the mid- and late 1960s, again at the end of the 1970s, and then
throughmost of the 1980s, the newly independent state faced immense pressure
to address the challenges of drought and famine. The scope for public provision
was expanded by the tax revenues generated by rapid economic growth and the
existence of a broadly Weberian bureaucracy, facilitating a programmatic
response to poverty rather than the deployment of discretionary patronage.
How the state responded, however, was shaped by politics. As Ulriksen
(2012) emphasizes, the absence of an independent middle class meant that the
political elite faced little political pressure to implement the more ‘social
democratic’ programmes introduced in Mauritius. Successive governments
have been reluctant to increase either direct or indirect taxation (Ulriksen
2017). Nonetheless, the leadership of the BDP, drawn from the educated,
cattle-owning elite, was under pressure to legitimate the new state, which
entailed taking over responsibilities from chiefs, and to consolidate electoral
support for the BDP in the face of competition from opposition parties. The
BDP’s core support lay in rural areas, and the party consolidated its support
through massive drought relief, then drought recovery, and then continuing
welfare programmes.
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The conservative welfare regime in Botswana had some features in common
with the conservative regimes of continental Europe: The state sought to
co-opt public sector workers, in part through social security (spending 1.2
per cent of GDP on this, compared to just under 2 per cent on all ‘safety nets’);
and the BDP and state were strongly committed to both the status hierarchy
and the family. But the welfare regime was far less statist than in countries
such as Germany, leaving protection against risks to the market as well as kin.
Botswana’s welfare state was more residual than the conservative one in
Europe, providing means-tested benefits for the poor (including through
workfare), whilst universal programmes (such as the old-age pensions and
school feeding programmes) provided modest benefits. Social insurance
remained very limited.⁸ Moreover, Botswana’s welfare state was hardly cor-
poratist. In these respects, the welfare regime in Botswana was more akin to a
conservative, familialist version of the liberal variant of welfare regimes that
Esping-Andersen identified in Europe. The BDP adhered to a conservative
ideology, but not one with roots in Catholicism. It was an ideology of mod-
ernization, but one concerned more with the challenges of deagrarianization
than those of urbanization and industrialization.
Botswana’s route to building a welfare state was very different to the routes
followed by either Mauritius or South Africa. Both Mauritius and South Africa
recognized in the mid-twentieth century that welfare programmes were
required because deagrarianization had resulted in a large population that
was vulnerable to poverty but was unable to support itself through subsistence
agriculture. Across most of Africa, colonial and post-colonial states imagined
that poverty could be addressed through interventions to strengthen peasant
agriculture. These agrarian welfare regimes remained vulnerable to drought,
and hence required drought relief programmes. Botswana’s experience with
drought between the 1960s and 1980s pushed its governing party to the
recognition that relief programmes were needed on a permanent, not temporary,
basis.
This agrarian route to welfare state-building has been followed by other
African countries also. Across much of east and southern Africa drought and
social change pushed governments—usually with help from the WFP and
elsewhere—into welfare programmes. The impetus has almost always been
⁸ Botswana provided pensions for white-collar public sector employees. These were privatized in
2001, requiring massive capital transfers during 2002–3. There is no mandatory social insurance
(although this was debated in parliament in 2008), and manual workers in the public sector are not
covered by the public sector scheme. Most workers rely on gratuities or severance payments (including
through provident funds)—see Selolwane (2012): 112–15, 120–2.
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rural rather than urban. In this volume, Lavers documents the shift from
emergency drought relief programmes to permanent social assistance in
Ethiopia, where severe drought was common and disastrous. In Ethiopia,
the governing party sought first to sustain peasant agriculture through an
agrarian welfare regime. In the 2000s it became apparent that ‘emergency’
programmes were needed all of the time. The result was the Productive Safety
Net Programme (PSNP), from 2005, which combined workfare with cash
transfers and feeding schemes for individuals or households unable to work.
In Botswana, the form of reform was shaped by the ideology of the
governing party, but the impetus came from political considerations: first,
ensuring the legitimacy of the post-colonial state and, later, sustaining support
for the governing party among voters. Across much of Africa, redemocratiza-
tion in the 1990s provided strong electoral incentives to political parties
to appear to be addressing the challenges of poverty. In societies where
peasant agriculture remains viable—and there are opportunities for raising
productivity—many voters, parties, and governments prefer that public funds
are allocated to farm input subsidies, i.e. to sustain an agrarian welfare regime.
Across much of Africa, however, it is evident that more and more people slip
through the cracks of an agrarian welfare regime and require programmatic
support. In many countries, individual leaders, factions, or whole parties have
championed the expansion of social protection (as is evident in the chapters in
this volume on Malawi and Zambia). Ethiopia and Rwanda followed a slightly
different path, in which electoral politics played little or no role, although the
governing parties in both countries were very concerned with their legitimacy.
In both its responsiveness to voters’ concerns and its ensuing, cautious support
for welfare programmes (at the same time as it was concerned over ‘depend-
ency’), the BDP in Botswana in the late twentieth century prefigured the shifting
policy positions of many governments in both semi-democratic and largely
authoritarian contexts elsewhere in Africa in the 2000s.
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3
Distributional Concerns, the
‘Developmental State’, and the Agrarian
Origins of Social Assistance in Ethiopia
Tom Lavers
1. Introduction
The existing literature emphasizes the innovation of recent social assistance
initiatives—particularly cash transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010). However, a nar-
row focus on the recent expansion of cash transfers obscures from view a
broader range of policies that African states have long used to support rural
populations (Seekings 2012), as well as skewing emphasis towards proximate
drivers of programme adoption and expansion. Notably, the literature has
emphasized the role of donors as part of an epistemic community spreading
social assistance ideas around the world (Von Gliszczynski 2015; Cherrier 2016).
This work risks neglecting deeper continuities between social assistance and
longstanding mechanisms by which states distribute resources within soci-
ety, as well as the broader political economic context against which the
social assistance agenda has taken shape in specific national contexts. This
chapter examines Ethiopia, home to one of the largest social assistance pro-
grammes in Africa—the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)—as well as
a range of other noteworthy programmes brought together under a new
National Social Protection Policy. The analysis highlights the deep roots of
social assistance within the state’s distributional strategies, particularly with
respect to the rural population, land access, and the challenge of food insecurity.
A growing literature analyses the important role for the state in the
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF’s) development
strategy (Lavers 2012a; Oqubay 2015; Clapham 2018). To date a major
consideration has been the successes and limitations of Ethiopia’s proclaimed
‘double digit growth’ (Hagmann and Abbink 2011), with much less discussion
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of the distribution of these economic gains. Yet the distributional implications
of development have been at the forefront of the EPRDF’s thinking since it
came to power in 1991 and even beforehand during the Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) administration of Tigray during the 1980s. Exist-
ing work is quite correct to highlight the great emphasis that the EPRDF places
on delivering rapid economic development. However, this chapter shows that
the EPRDF never pursued growth at all costs, instead seeking to manage
economic transformation in the interests of social and political stability. To
this end, the ruling party pays close attention to distributional concerns as a
means of limiting social and political instability.
This chapter traces the evolution of this distributional strategy, showing how
change and continuity reflect the interplay between evolving ideas and political
interests among the EPRDF leadership. From the early days of the TPLF, rapid
and broad-based socioeconomic progress has been seen as a key means of
securing popular support. While this basic orientation is evident from the
1970s, the means by which this is pursued has changed over time. First, there
has been a shift in EPRDF ideology from the socialism that influenced the TPLF
during the struggle to the present focus on ‘developmentalism’. Second, there
has also been an evolution in the EPRDF’s social policy approach, from what
can be described as an ‘agrarian’ distributional regime—which sought to pro-
vide welfare through access to land and other resources required for agricultural
livelihoods—to a ‘productivist-pauperist’model—which targets social assistance
narrowly to specific groups, yet seeks to ensure that protective policies also have
productive impacts. These changes were motivated primarily by a series of
political and distributional crises in the early to mid-2000s.
At the time of writing, Ethiopian politics is in the midst of highly uncertain
political changes resulting from mass anti-government protests in Oromiya,
the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister in April 2018, and the
political reforms he has undertaken. While the chapter highlights some of the
many causes of the protests and key political challenges that the new govern-
ment faces, given the uncertainty at the present time, the chapter limits its
analytical focus to the period prior to Abiy taking office. The chapter draws on
research conducted over ten years on politics, social policy, and agrarian
transformation in Ethiopia. This involved primary research in Ethiopia in
2009–10 and on regular visits during 2014–18. More than seventy key inform-
ant interviews were conducted with senior political figures, bureaucrats, donor
representatives, and consultants. This primary material was supplemented by
government policies and strategies, as well as published interviews and
speeches by the former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi.
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Section 2 sets out the chapter’s analytical framework. The chapter then
applies this framework to the EPRDF’s policy initiatives under three distinct
eras: first, the policies pursued in liberated areas of Tigray; the initial devel-
opment strategy pursued as a national government from 1991 to the early
2000s; and then the ‘developmental state’ project since the mid-2000s.
Section 6 concludes.
2. A Framework for Analysing the Politics
of Distribution in Developing Countries
Among the most prominent analyses of distribution in advanced economies is
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
While his much-cited regime typology is of little relevance for the analysis of
a low-income economy, there are useful insights from his work for analysing
the politics of distribution in developing countries. The first is that a regime
refers to the ‘systematically interwoven’ nature of social structure, employ-
ment, and social policies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2). Social and economic
policy are in essence two sides of the same coin and so need to be analysed
together (Polanyi 2001; Mkandawire 2004). As such, policy makers make
social policy choices in response to and/or in anticipation of broader distri-
butional concerns rather than in isolation from other policy areas (Huber and
Stephens 2001; Seekings and Nattrass 2005). The second is that a regime
comprises not just social policies but a complementary set of institutions
and interests that reproduces itself over time, leading to distinct patterns of
welfare and distribution of resources between countries.
There have been several attempts to translate the insights from Esping-
Andersen’s work to the very different contexts of developing countries. Gough
andWood (2004) extend Esping-Andersen’s focus on the balance of provision
between state and market to include other actors involved in the production of
welfare and insecurity in developing countries such as the community, family,
and transnational actors. While their approach offers many benefits, high-
lighting the different forms and levels of provision to different societal groups,
their work intentionally downplays the role of the state. Given that the purpose
of this chapter is to analyse the drivers of state social assistance, Jeremy
Seekings’ work is more relevant in that it seeks to identify the dominant
form of state provision within particular national settings. Seekings develops
the concept of a ‘distributional regime’, which combines interlocking ‘welfare,
labor market and “growth-path” policies’ (Seekings 2008: 24). Seekings proposes
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three ideal regime types, though acknowledging that more than one regime
often co-exists within a country. The first is a ‘labourist regime’ prevalent, for
example, in Latin America, in which the state provides support for formal
sector workers through subsidised social insurance and labour regulation.
The second is the ‘pauperist regimes’ where states recognize that some
section of the population requires support independent of their status as
workers, with provision provided through narrowly targeted social assist-
ance schemes. The third variety, of particular relevance to sub-Saharan
Africa, is the agrarian regimes, which support the peasantry through land
reform and a range of agricultural services to smallholder farmers, including
agricultural extension and irrigation.
A further distinction made in the regimes literature concerns welfare
policies in East Asian developmental states. Seekings (2008) argues that
since welfare supported workers through employer-based social insurance,
these countries are best classified as labourist regimes. Yet, this only partially
captures the rationale underlying provision in these countries. Rather, the core
motivation was to use social policy to promote economic development and, as
such, ‘social policy is not conceived as an autonomous sphere of policy
concerned to de-commodify and extend social rights. Rather it is part of an
economic and developmental strategy to secure high growth rates and to
transform national development’ (Gough 2004: 182). While the regime was
‘labourist’ in relying significantly on social insurance, it was at its core dis-
tinctively ‘productivist’ in using social protection as a means of enforcing
savings rates and generating resources for state-led investment (White and
Goodman 1998; Holliday 2000).
This chapter’s aim is not to add to the often pedantic debates about whether
one or another country fits a particular ‘regime type’. Rather the intention is to
use Seekings’ typology as a heuristic device to highlight the changing nature of
the EPRDF’s distributional policies and as an entry point to explain the
political drivers of this shift. A common thread of the welfare state literature
views social policy as the outcome of a distributional struggle between con-
tending interest groups in the context of institutional constraints (Huber and
Stephens 2001). Great emphasis is placed on political mobilization of the
working class through unions and leftist political parties to demand redistri-
bution. In the context of a developing country such as Ethiopia, while the basic
insight that social policy is the result of a distributional struggle is useful, this
approach must be adapted (Lavers 2013a; Lavers and Hickey 2016). First,
where democratic institutions cannot be taken for granted, political mobiliza-
tion may be constrained. While interest groups may have limited ability to
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mobilize and express demands, political elites nonetheless make policy
decisions based on their perceptions of the threat posed by different social
groups. Second, politics in such contexts tends to be more weakly institution-
alized, while informal political institutions may actually dominate the formal
‘rules of the game’.
While these interest-based explanations have provided important insights
into the development of welfare systems (Huber and Stephens 2001), they
are based on a limited understanding of human motivation and, as such,
have been subject to growing critique. Actors promoting policy reform
are ‘motivated as much by ideological commitments as by strict material
interests’ (Brady 2009: 103). Ideas therefore provide an important comple-
ment to interest-based explanations of social policy development. Such ideas
include overarching ideologies such as socialism, neoliberalism, or develop-
mentalism, which shape individuals’ perception of their own interests and
provide a roadmap as to how to proceed, as well as social norms regarding
the expected impacts such policies have on individual behaviour and incen-
tives (Schmidt 2008).
The analysis that follows explores the changing nature of the distributional
regime under the EPRDF as a result of changing ideas and interests within the
ruling party. The analysis therefore focuses on the political survival strategies
(Migdal 2001) employed by the EPRDF, including vitally how the Front has
negotiated periods of cohesion and fragmentation within the ruling coalition,
as well as class and ethnic divisions within society, and how this is reflected in
evolving distributional strategies. To provide political context for the reforms
undertaken since the EPRDF came to power in 1991, the chapter begins with
an overview of the TPLF’s liberation struggle. Given the constraints imposed
by the conflict, it would be an overstatement to describe this as a distinct
distributional regime. However, the period establishes basic continuities in the
TPLF/EPRDF approach to distribution.
3. Distribution and Mobilization in Liberated Tigray
The TPLF originated in the socialist-inspired student movement at Haile
Selassie I University in the early 1970s. Although the military Derg regime
that came to power in 1974, displacing Emperor Haile Selassie, adopted a
radical Marxist-Leninist agenda, the Derg and different factions within the
student movement were divided by ideological questions related to class and
nationalities (Berhe 2008). Like many student activists, the TPLF left the cities
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during the Red Terror of the late 1970s and returned to the western lowlands
of their native Tigray to start armed opposition.
The TPLF employed an ethno-nationalist message, fomenting resentment
at the marginalization of Tigray within Ethiopia, as a means of mobilizing
the peasantry (Young 1997). However, the ‘TPLF leadership understood that
success depended on its ability to maintain the unwavering commitment of
the peasants’ and, as a result, they quickly adopted a Maoist approach to
organization and warfare (Young 1997: 172; Berhe 2008). This involved
‘delivery, and control, of socio-economic advantage’ in areas liberated by the
TPLF through ‘health, education and agricultural services, and relief and
rehabilitation support’ (Vaughan 2011: 625). Common features of the TPLF
approach to service delivery were emphases on community mobilization,
self-reliance, and ensuring that services also made a productive contribution.
Land reform was one of the principal means by which the TPLF sought to
achieve these goals, redistributing land to promote equality, while banning
land sales in order to protect farmers from displacement (Young 1997). Land
reform was explicitly framed in class terms and aimed to turn the peasantry
into ‘a “homogeneous mass” with common needs, interests and outlook’
(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 117). In part, this focus can be attributed to
the socialist ideologies that influenced the TPLF, which shared the ‘land to the
tiller’ slogan with other revolutionary groups. However, as one TPLF founding
member describes, land reform was a low priority until competing organiza-
tions, including the Derg and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
(EPRP)—a rival Marxist group fighting the Derg—started to conduct their
own land redistributions (Berhe 2008). While land reform aimed to promote
equality, it was adopted in part to secure the support of rural Tigrayans and
urban merchants, while punishing opponents (Berhe 2008).
The TPLF also founded the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) in 1978 as a
dedicated relief and development organization, channelling support from
western NGOs to Tigray. While much of the burden for coping with food
insecurity remained with households and communities, REST assumed import-
ance as the Derg restricted humanitarian assistance to TPLF-controlled areas, as
a means of undermining the TPLF (De Waal 1997; Milas and Latif 2000).
REST—technically autonomous, but in reality an arm of the TPLF (Young
1997)—distributed food aid during the 1984/5 famine, using food aid as a
productive resource, and engaging recipients in agricultural and environmental
rehabilitation programmes through public works projects (Salih 2013).
While TPLF social provisioning was constrained by the ongoing conflict, the
activities undertaken were based on common principles: first, that socioeconomic
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progress is a means of building support and enhancing legitimacy. This
emphasis might well be attributed to the interests of the TPLF, which had
few options other than to win the support of the peasantry as a means of
pursuing its struggle. However, the second is ideological—the idea that
people are expected to contribute whatever resources they have in exchange
for support they receive and that welfare provision should not merely be
protective, but also make a productive contribution. While the overarching
ideology of the TPLF—which drew on Maoism, Marxism-Leninism, and,
latterly, the model of Albania under Enver Hoxha (Berhe 2008)—has evolved
subsequently, these features of welfare provisioning remain consistent.
4. Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization
and the Pursuit of an Agrarian Distributional Regime
The TPLF removed the Derg from Tigray and seized national power in
1991. The new government faced significant challenges internally and exter-
nally. The TPLF had spent almost the entire conflict in Tigray mobilizing the
Tigrayan population—just 6 per cent of Ethiopia’s total—based on an ethno-
nationalist message. While the TPLF was militarily dominant post-1991, it
lacked national legitimacy, with large sections of the population viewing the
new government with suspicion. The TPLF’s response was to extend the
successful approach from Tigray, namely a combination of ethno-
nationalism and the delivery of socioeconomic progress. As the TPLF’s
ambitions grew from controlling Tigray to governing Ethiopia, it formed
the EPRDF, a coalition of ethno-nationalist parties intended to represent
Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, and introduced a federal system to provide for
ethnic self-determination (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). The government
also formulated a new development strategy—Agricultural Development-
Led Industrialization (ADLI)—to provide the broad-based socioeconomic
development to win popular support.
Second, the EPRDF came to power shortly after the collapse of the
Soviet Union at a time when socialism had been discredited. After years of
civil war the new government desperately needed external resources to
support reconstruction and development, and the main aid sources were
the multilateral and western bilateral donors at the peak of the Washington
Consensus. It is hardly surprising that the EPRDF abandoned its adherence
to Albanian socialism. The transformation was swift, with the EPRDF ditching
its Marxist terminology—in public, if not in internal debates—and adopting a
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discourse of market-based development and democratization. The EPRDF
agreed structural adjustment programmes with the World Bank and IMF,
and framed ADLI in terms of the establishment of a ‘free market economy’
(MoFED 2003: 13).
4.1. Agricultural development-led industrialization
ADLI was first outlined by the Transitional Government in 1993/4 (TGE 1994).
However, little progress was made in its implementation until the early 2000s
because of the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, resource shortages,
the 1998–2000 Eritrean war, and, as Prime Minister Meles later argued,
disagreements among the leadership (Zenawi 2006). The 2001 split in the
TPLF leadership, initially over the Eritrean war (Tadesse and Young 2003;
Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003), resulted in a fundamental realignment of the
EPRDF, with the expulsion of senior TPLF figures among the party’s ‘left
wing’ (Lefort 2012: 682), ending the system of leadership through consensus
and leaving Meles in ‘a position of unchallenged supremacy’ (Tadesse and
Young 2003: 397).
ADLI served multiple objectives: a long-term development strategy;
a distributional strategy that integrated social and economic policies; and a
political strategy for managing the instability inherent to periods of rapid
transformation. ADLI may have been framed as a means of creating a ‘free
market economy’, but in reality it is nothing of the sort. While economic
reforms did remove price controls and privatize some state enterprises, instead
of the Washington Consensus, Meles looked for policy inspiration in the
experiences of South Korea and Taiwan (MoFED 2003; Zenawi 2006). Unsur-
prisingly, then, given the state-led model pursued by these ‘developmental
states’, it is the state, not the market, that is the centrepiece of ADLI.
The premise of ADLI is that as a labour-rich and capital-poor country, to
make the best use of Ethiopia’s resources, labour-intensive, non-mechanized
agriculture should be implemented alongside technologies such as irrigation,
fertilizer, and improved seeds, which improve yields but do not replace labour
(TGE 1994; MoFED 2003). Increased agricultural productivity is expected to
lead to national food security and stimulate labour-intensive industry through
forward production linkages—the supply of wage foods and industrial
inputs—and backward linkages—with increasingly affluent smallholder farm-
ers providing demand for domestic production of fertilizer, farm implements,
and consumption goods. Agriculture will also be a source of export commodities
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providing the foreign exchange with which to import capital goods required
for industrialization. Consequently, in this agriculture-first strategy, ‘[a]
griculture is . . . believed to be a potential source to generate primary surplus
to fuel the growth of other sectors of the economy (industry)’, leading to
labour-intensive industrialization (MoFED 2002: 41; MoI 2002).
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, donors pushed the government to
carry out further reforms, including the privatization of land, banking, and
telecommunications, all to no avail (Feyissa 2011). Meanwhile, the donor
response to ADLI’s state-led development model in the early 2000s was
‘ridicule’.¹ The idea of Ethiopia modelling itself on Korea and Taiwan seemed
preposterous. Moreover, the emphasis on the state clashed with the more
limited role envisaged by the Washington Consensus and post-Washington
Consensus. The latter included the social protection agenda that was just
emerging among the main donor agencies in the early 2000s (see Hickey
and Seekings, this volume).
4.2. The central role of state land ownership in ADLI
The Derg nationalized land in 1975, and state land ownership was maintained
under the EPRDF. State land ownership is central to ADLI’s economic, social,
and political objectives and the distributional regime that it entails. Policy
statements identify three main socioeconomic objectives of the land policy,
each with important distributional implications. First, state land ownership—
including a prohibition on land sales and rental restrictions—protects the
peasantry from displacement.² Meles even claimed that state land ownership
provides a form of ‘social security’ to peasants by guaranteeing access to land
and therefore an agricultural livelihood (cited in Marcus 1995). In stark
contrast to neo-classical economics, for which clearly defined private property
rights are vital, for the EPRDF, ‘[t]he question of access to land should . . . be
addressed from the point of view of both output growth and the welfare of the
people’ (MoFED 2002: 53). ADLI presents market forces as damaging to
peasant security, necessitating state intervention.
¹ Interviews with former DFID and World Bank officials by Skype, 9 and 23 July 2015, respectively.
² ADLI was much less concerned with protection for those engaged in pastoralism and shifting
cultivation in predominately lowland regions. ‘Settlement’ was considered the best means of addressing
these supposedly unsustainable livelihoods, bringing them in line with the main thrust of ADLI
(MoFED 2003: 58).
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A second role of the land policy, like the socialist rationales used to justify
Derg and TPLF land reforms, is to promote equality and prevent class
differentiation. The EPRDF regularly voiced fears that land privatization
would lead to the re-emergence of wealthy landowners and exploitative feudal
or capitalist labour relations, playing on smallholders’ concerns about
displacement:
By fully privatizing land ownership, one starts the process of differentiation.
The creative, vigorous peasant farmer gets to own larger pieces of land and
the less effective get to be left to live in doubt . . .We do not believe this is the
right approach in our country . . . It is simply assumed that those who would
buy land would be the very ones who would use it best. We do not know of
any logic or evidence to prove that. (Meles cited in The Reporter 2000)
In contrast, by retaining land in the hands of the smallholder masses, the
economic surplus resulting from agricultural productivity increases accrues to
those same farmers, resulting in an inherently egalitarian development model
(MoFED 2003).
Finally, the land policy has a productive role, enabling the state to allocate
factors of production—labour, capital, and land (MoFED 2002: 53; MoFED 2003).
Specifically, state land ownership ensures that land remains in the hands of
smallholders, who will employ labour-intensive agricultural production
techniques, in contrast to market-based land allocation, which would lead
to land concentration and capital-intensive production, wasting Ethiopia’s
main resource, its labour force.
If we pursue a development strategy that does not make much use of labor
and land resources in economic activity, the contribution of such factors of
production to Ethiopia’s development will be forestalled, thereby causing a
pace of development that is well below potential. If, on the other hand, we
rely too heavily on capital as a basis of our development effort, then our
efforts will be curtailed by the limited availability of this resource. Our
development strategy that is centered on agriculture and rural development
promotes a judicious use of factors of production. (MoFED 2003: 10)
The result is a development model that integrates concerns with growth and
distribution, economic, and social policy. In effect this is a state-led attempt—
in Polanyian (2001) terms—to ‘embed’ economic development within an
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
    77
agrarian distributional regime in which state welfare is provided not through
social assistance or social insurance, but rather the allocation of land and
agricultural extension services.
4.3. ADLI as a political strategy
ADLI was also a political strategy, fundamentally concerned with building
political support and managing economic transformation. ADLI is a broad-
based approach that aims to improve the living standards for the smallholder
majority, in line with the TPLF’s strategy in Tigray. The control of land has
long been a central means of securing and maintaining political power in
Ethiopia (Hoben 1973; Rahmato 2009), as elsewhere. The EPRDF—following
on from the TPLF experience—continued to see the peasantry as its core
political base and state ownership was a means of securing the support of
the peasantry and preventing the re-emergence of a landholding class that
might threaten the EPRDF (Rahmato 2009). However, it is actually population
growth that was considered the ‘single over-riding challenge’ facing the coun-
try (TGE 1994: 8), resulting in rural land shortages, food insecurity, and ‘the
persistent onslaught of rural to urban migration’ (Office of the Prime Minister
1993). Uncontrolled urban and inter-ethnic migration are considered the
source of ‘economic, political and social instabilities’ (MoFED 2002: 56),
contributing to the growth of a politically dangerous class of under- and
unemployed urban migrants (MoFED 2003).
While ADLI is ultimately expected to lead to industrial development
and the expansion of urban employment opportunities (MoFED 2003:
26), for the time being, ‘in the absence of better employment opportunities’
the land policy encourages ‘farmers to remain on their land, thereby avoid-
ing unproductive and potentially harmful labor mobility’ that ‘may even be
detrimental to peace and stability’ (MoFED 2003: 27). What ADLI proposes
therefore is state-managed structural transformation, with the land
policy limiting urban migration in the interests of political stability until
such time as ADLI has created sufficient industrial employment to remove
restrictions.
We do not believe that the long-term future and destiny of our peasant
farmers is to be stuck in the mud, so to speak. We feel that ultimately there
has to be industrialization, ultimately these people have to find to get [sic]
employment outside agriculture. (Meles cited in The Reporter 2000)
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4.4. The food security problem that would not go away
ADLI assumes that agricultural productivity increases would benefit all farmers,
addressing food insecurity and removing the need for targeted support
(MoFED 2003). This approach was based not only on the merits of ADLI
but also deep ideological concerns about the dangers of handouts that would
undermine work incentives and lead to dependency (Lavers 2019). In reality,
though, the humanitarian system that originated in the 1984/5 famine
expanded with the World Food Programme, USAID, and others providing
annual assistance to some 5–6 million food-insecure people throughout the
1990s. As was the case in Botswana (Seekings, this volume), in Ethiopia
subsequent social assistance programmes built on this humanitarian
machinery. While donors and international NGOs played a major role in
this humanitarian system, the government shaped the delivery mechanisms
in line with its ideological commitments and built on REST’s relief model
(Salih 2013).³ The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) attempted to
mobilize emergency relief for developmental objectives, requiring all relief to
able-bodied people to be provided through employment generation schemes.
4.5. Changing ideological reference points
and political interests
After 1991, the EPRDF ditched its socialist rhetoric, gradually adopting the
role models of Korea and Taiwan in place of Albania. Despite this apparent
ideological sea change, what is perhaps most notable in this discussion are the
continuities between the approach employed by the TPLF in Tigray and the
EPRDF as the national government. First, ethnic self-determination and
broad-based socioeconomic progress were seen as the solution to the limited
ruling party legitimacy. To that end, the government outlined ADLI, an
integrated distributional strategy combining economic, social, and political
objectives for managing structural transformation and securing popular sup-
port. State land ownership played a central role in all these objectives and, as
such, it was hardly surprising that donors who attempted to pressure the
government into privatizing land were given short shrift, with Meles famously
declaring that land privatization would only happen ‘over the EPRDF’s dead
body’. Second, where targeted food aid was provided with donor support, this
³ Interview, former USAID official, by Skype, 15 July 2015.
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was shaped by the EPRDF’s ideological commitments to ensuring recipients
worked for support received and that this provision also made a productive
economic contribution.
As such, ADLI sought to consolidate an agrarian distributional regime in
which state provision was through the distribution of land and agricultural
inputs, rather than social assistance. To that end, there was a massive push to
train agricultural extension workers, expand the system of cooperatives, and
increase use of improved agricultural inputs. However, as discussed in section 5,
while the core principles of building support through socioeconomic progress
and ensuring that welfare is productive remain important influences to the
present day, this agrarian regime has gradually been deconstructed since
the mid-2000s with social protection programmes increasingly taking its place.
5. Ethiopia’s ‘Developmental State’
and an Emerging Pauperist-Productivist Regime
Since the mid-2000s, the EPRDF’s development strategy has progressed from
the original articulation of ADLI to a self-proclaimed ‘developmental state’
model. There is clear continuity between ADLI and the ‘developmental
state’ in terms of the focus on industrialization, the promotion of economic
linkages between agriculture and emerging industry, and the export of pro-
cessed products rather than primary commodities. As such, the argument that
the EPRDF’s development strategy has moved on from ADLI is not to say that
ADLI has been abandoned. That said, the developmental state involves sig-
nificant policy shifts from the original ADLI, particularly from a distributional
perspective. As discussed below, the ‘developmental state’ model entails a
change in agricultural strategy, moving away from ADLI’s broad-based focus
that sought to raise the productivity of all smallholders, to a dual strategy that
supports, on one hand, the better-off smallholders in a position to take
advantage of new technologies and, on the other, agricultural investors
employing capital-intensive production techniques. Ethiopia’s ‘developmental
state’ also involves a more active industrial policy, in contrast to ADLI’s
agriculture-first approach. This shift in economic strategy has resulted in the
gradual erosion of the agrarian distributional regime that ADLI had sought to
construct, and a complementary shift towards a ‘productivist-pauperist’model.
The change in strategy was an evolutionary process rather than a one-off
reform, beginning with the 2005 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Devel-
opment to End Poverty (PASDEP) and gathering pace during the 2010 and
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2015 Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP 1 and 2). The catalyst for these
changes were a series of existential political crises or what became known in
the EPRDF leadership as ‘Armageddons’.⁴
The first Armageddon was the 2001 TPLF split. While the initial response
was to re-affirm commitment to ADLI, the split had broader ramifications for
the EPRDF’s ideological approach that shaped the evolution of the strategy
over time. The principal cause of the split was the handling of the Eritrean war
and a power struggle between Meles and a dissident group in the TPLF
(Tadesse and Young 2003; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). However, Meles
subsequently claimed that,
. . . the full articulation of the paradigm [developmentalism] with all its
policy implications was one of the key causes of the most serious split in
the history of the ruling party that took place in 2000–2001. (Zenawi 2006)
Vitally, the split resulted in the decision taken to reject socialism and to
embrace capitalist development. This entailed expanding the party’s ranks
beyond the peasantry, to include key interests vital to economic growth: the
national bourgeoisie, diaspora capital, and the wealthiest farmers (Tadesse
and Young 2003; Lefort 2010; Simon 2011). As a Marxist group, the TPLF
had historically been sceptical of both capitalists and wealthy farmers
(Young 1997; Berhe 2008). But from the mid-2000s, domestic, foreign, and
diaspora investors who fit with government priorities were actively courted
(Lavers 2012a) and wealthier farmers were made a central focus of the devel-
opment strategy, enrolled en masse as ‘model farmers’ and EPRDF members
(Lefort 2010).
Subsequent Armageddons challenged the assumptions underpinning
ADLI. During the 2002/3 food crisis some 14 million people required emer-
gency support from donor agencies in order to survive (Lavers 2019). This
crisis highlighted that achieving food security through their own production—
the objective of ADLI—was implausible for many households. Population
growth in the context of land shortages was resulting in the division of land
into economically unviable plots (Rahmato 2003), while the limited adoption
of improved inputs constrained agricultural productivity (Dercon and Vargas
Hill 2009). This situation closely resembled what Meles had previously
described as the ‘nightmare scenario’: population growth in the absence of
⁴ As noted in an interview with former Deputy Prime Minister, Addisu Legesse, Addis Ababa,
7 October 2015; and former Minister of Communications, Bereket Simon, in his book (Simon 2011).
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agricultural productivity growth and off-farm job creation leading to growing
food insecurity in rural areas and politically problematic urban migration and
unemployment (Meles cited in The Reporter 2000).
Finally, the 2005 elections exposed political problems resulting from the
comparative neglect of urban areas and growing urban migration. The EPRDF
lost every seat in Addis Ababa and many others in urban centres around the
country, while urban protests met the EPRDF’s declaration of overall victory.
According to the deputy Prime Minister, these events constituted ‘another
Armageddon’,⁵ reinforcing longstanding concerns about the dangers of urban
unemployment and highlighting the need for urgent action rather than wait-
ing for agriculture-led growth to generate urban employment, as described in
ADLI (Simon 2011).
The remainder of this section outlines the revisions to the development
strategy—first the ‘developmental state’ model and then the emerging distri-
butional regime. This distributional regime entails new forms of social assist-
ance that respond to ADLI’s failings and the ‘disembedding’ effects of the
‘developmental state’. However, it is worth noting that while the development
model was revised, the EPRDF’s longstanding strategy of securing support
through socioeconomic progress continued. EPRDF leadership remained con-
vinced that ‘economic development is the answer to any discontent’ (Simon
2011). Since the mid-2000s, the EPRDF has sought legitimacy through the
delivery of ‘double digit growth’ (Zenawi 2010) and reaching ‘the level of a
middle-income economy as of 2020–23’ (MoFED 2010: 21).
5.1. Beyond ADLI: the developmental state model
ADLI was based on the assumption of the inverse relationship—that small-
scale, labour-intensive agriculture is more productive and efficient than
large-scale production (MoFED 2003). ADLI did not differentiate between
smallholders, assuming that agricultural inputs would be scale-neutral, with all
farmers benefiting. Policy since the mid-2000s has taken a very different
approach, focusing on the wealthiest smallholders—enrolled as ‘model
farmers’—with greater potential for technology adoption and commercial
production, effectively excluding many poor farmers (Lefort 2010, 2012;
Lavers 2013a). Lefort (2012: 682) cites EPRDF party documents pointing to
⁵ Interview, Addisu Legesse, former deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Rural
Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 7 October 2015.
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the failings of the previous ‘pro-poor strategy’ that had ‘prevented “the farmer
from escaping a hand-to-mouth and scattered way of life”, because the Front’s
goal was “to detach the farmers from commercialization” instead of “focusing
on market economy as the centre of rural activities” ’. Agricultural policy now
aimed to capture farmers’ ‘private initiative’ to commercialize smallholder
production, focusing on high-value crops and high-potential areas (MoFED
2005: 46).
Complementary reforms were undertaken in land tenure. This included
massive land registration programmes since the mid-2000s to improve tenure
security and investment incentives, and to prevent the further division of land
into unviable plots (Lavers 2017).⁶ In Amhara, the regional government
removed all rental restrictions to allow wealthier farmers to rent land from
poor farmers, leading to increased productivity and differentiation.⁷ Further
initiatives undertaken as part of the Agricultural Growth Programme and
Agricultural Transformation Agency have similarly focused on high-potential
areas and high-potential farmers.
The government has also actively promoted capital-intensive agricultural
investments (Lavers 2012a), again marking a departure from ADLI. ADLI had
noted the potential for large-scale, capital-intensive agricultural investments in
sparsely populated lowlands, but this was very much a secondary focus to the
smallholder emphasis described above (TGE 1994; MoFED 2003) and such
capital-intensive investments remained an unrealized ambition. However,
since the late 2000s and the onset of the ‘global land rush’, the government
leased large tracts of supposedly ‘uncultivated’ land to investors and, in doing
so, dismissed the land claims of politically marginal populations involved in
pastoralism and shifting cultivation (Lavers 2012b).
In an inversion of ADLI’s smallholder focus, moreover, the government has
promoted small-scale but capital-intensive investments in densely populated
highland areas particularly for horticulture and floriculture projects. Here
smallholders are displaced where the government believes there is the poten-
tial for increased agricultural productivity and the shift to high-value crops
(Lavers 2012b). In line with the government’s longstanding concern about the
dangers of displacement and urban migration, the government favours capital
and labour-intensive projects that require large numbers of workers, such as
⁶ Interview with the head of land administration in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MoARD), Addis Ababa, 17 January 2009.
⁷ Interview with a senior expert in the Amhara Bureau of Environment, Planning and Land
Administration and Use (BoEPLAU), Bahir Dar, 18 March 2010.
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flower farms, or projects that combine investor capital with family farms
through outgrower schemes (Lavers 2012b).
Finally, and by no means least, in contrast to ADLI’s agriculture-first
approach, the ‘developmental state’ simultaneously promotes agricultural
and industrial development. Rather than waiting for agricultural productivity
growth to stimulate industry, as previously, from the 2005 PASDEP onwards
there was a shift, with the prioritization of a handful of high-potential, export-
oriented sectors, namely: meat, leather, and leather products; textiles and
garments; and horticulture and floriculture (Oqubay 2015). Under the 2010
GTP, the emphasis further expanded from export industry to import substi-
tuting industry, including: sugar, cement, chemicals, steel, pharmaceuticals,
and engineering; and the creation of industrial parks throughout the country
to attract major transnational firms. A key part of this industrial policy has
been massive state investment in infrastructure to improve the investment
environment. This includes expansion of the transport network, including
roads, railways, and airports, as well as a series of major dams to support
irrigated agricultural plantations and provide reliable electricity for growing
industry and export to neighbouring countries (Verhoeven 2013).
5.2. From an agrarian towards a productivist-pauperist
distributional regime
The ‘developmental state’ implies a fundamental shift in the distributional
regime and the deconstruction of the agrarian model based on access to land
and agricultural livelihoods. Rapid population growth, land shortages, and the
prioritization of new forms of agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural
development have rendered the guarantee to land all but meaningless for a
significant proportion of the population. In its place, social protection pro-
grammes initiated since 2005 have plugged the gaps—compensating for a
shortage of land and employment opportunities while still seeking to promote
productive activity. As these are gradually institutionalized, they resemble a
productivist-pauperist distributional regime.
The ‘developmental state’ offers certain groups significant economic oppor-
tunities through investment opportunities and employment with state organ-
izations or private firms. These include foreign and diaspora investors,
domestic capitalists, some of those with the required education (secondary
and above) and skills to find employment, and model farmers with sufficient
land, labour, finance, and political connections to take advantage of new
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technologies and market opportunities. These are exactly the groups that the
EPRDF embraced post-2001. What is less clear is how this new growth path
will benefit the EPRDF’s original core constituency—the masses of small-
holder farmers—for which ADLI, however ineffectively, had sought to cater.
Less well-off smallholders have progressively limited access to agricultural
extension services and improved inputs and therefore limited potential to
raise agricultural productivity. Meanwhile, a whole generation of young adults
in rural areas have no land access given severe land shortages, land registra-
tion, and the moratorium on future land redistributions.⁸ In effect, the ‘devel-
opmental state’ has dismantled the agrarian distributional regime that ADLI
had sought to create, resulting in an increasingly inegalitarian growth path.
In many respects the industrial strategy is impressive and has rightly
attracted media and academic attention. Yet industrialization alone cannot
absorb the huge amounts of surplus labour resulting from land shortages and
high rates of population growth. The recently opened industrial park in
Awassa is expected to create 100,000 jobs when fully operational, with a
further 20,000 each in Kombolcha and Mekele (Addis Fortune 2017). Gov-
ernment targets include construction of a total of seven industrial parks by
2020 and the creation of two million manufacturing jobs by 2025. In turn these
industrial jobs would no doubt support additional service sector jobs. While
this level of job creation would be a major achievement, in a country whose
population is estimated at approximately 105 million, it pales in comparison to
the millions of young adults who have limited opportunities in agriculture and
need employment. Data are not good, but to give an indication, the last census
in 2007 found that there were approximately 40 million people under the age
of twenty at the time, many of whom will now be in or entering into the labour
force with varying levels of educational attainment. While some may have the
opportunity to pursue an agricultural livelihood, vast numbers will not as a
result of the severe land shortages. Indeed, a 2011 survey found that
unemployment in urban areas was 18 per cent, while 48 per cent of respond-
ents reported being underemployed (Broussar and Gebrekidan Tekleselassie
2012: 13). Meanwhile the majority of young people who fail to complete
secondary education have no access to new manufacturing jobs, which require
such qualifications.
Rural landlessness and urban unemployment are two symptoms of the same
underlying challenge: despite its considerable successes, the developmental state
⁸ There has been no further land redistribution since the EPRDF came to power in 1991, with the
exception of Amhara in 1997.
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model has been unable to create sufficient livelihood opportunities—rural or
urban—leading to serious distributional failings. In response to the erosion
of the agrarian distributional regime and the distributional failings of the
growth path, the government has introduced and expanded social assistance
to those with limited economic opportunities who might otherwise present a
political threat to the ruling party. While this agenda has been promoted by
some of Ethiopia’s foreign donors—in line with the global trends described
in Hickey and Seekings (this volume)—the government’s motivations
are shaped by longstanding domestic political concerns. First, the delivery
of tangible benefits continues to be seen as the best way of securing political
support with targeted programmes introduced in response to specific polit-
ical crises. Second, social programmes that provide protection to vulnerable
people are also expected to make productive impacts, while anyone receiving
support should contribute labour in return.⁹ Third, deep concerns about the
political dangers of urban migration and the need for mass employment
opportunities continue to shape the design and objectives of particular
policies. The result is an emerging productivist-pauperist distributional
regime to replace the agrarian model envisaged under ADLI.
The PSNP is the largest such programme and was established in 2005 to
support chronically food-insecure households through public works for able-
bodied participants and unconditional direct support for those unable to work.
From 2015, the PSNP provided support to up to 10 million people per year.
The PSNP was a direct response to the 2002/3 food crisis, which highlighted
ADLI’s inability to resolve food insecurity (Lavers 2019). While Ethiopia’s
foreign donors have provided the vast majority of the finance and promoted
many of the ideas included in the PSNP, government ideas and objectives
fundamentally shaped the programme (Lavers 2019). First, the PSNP’s public
works focus builds on longstanding ideas regarding the importance of pro-
ductive contributions and concerns about welfare dependency going back to
the TPLF era. As in Botswana, this commitment to public works reflects a
congruence of ideas between national political elites and transnational
actors—the World Bank, USAID, and World Food Programme (WFP) in
Ethiopia and WFP in Botswana (Seekings 2016; Seekings, this volume;
Lavers 2019). Second, from its inception, the PSNP was linked to livelihoods
⁹ In addition to social assistance, the same ideas regarding self-reliance and the need to mobilize
resources for development have underpinned social insurance expansion with a mandatory formal
sector pension scheme introduced in 2010, legislation for mandatory social health insurance, and a
community-based health insurance scheme for the informal sector that is rapidly expanding to cover
some 11 million people by 2017 (Lavers 2019).
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programmes providing credit and extension services to increase household
production and work towards ‘graduation’ from support.
Under ADLI, state land ownership was intended to guarantee an agricul-
tural livelihood for the peasant majority. The 2002/3 food crisis highlighted
the inability of the land policy to fulfil this mission and, as such, the PSNP
compensated for the limitations of the land policy, ensuring the viability of
rural livelihoods in food-insecure areas (Lavers 2013b). The EPRDF initially
intended the PSNP as a short-term stop-gap with the ultimate solution to food
insecurity lying in economic transformation and the creation of non-
agricultural employment (Lavers 2019).¹⁰ Yet, with the failure to reduce the
PSNP caseload over the last fourteen years, there has been a gradual accept-
ance that the PSNP is not going anywhere. Under donor pressure, the gov-
ernment has taken on an increasing role in financing the PSNP (Lavers 2019).
Protests against the 2005 elections further reinforced government concerns
about urban unemployment. In addition to repression of political opposition,
the government introduced several social programmes. Once again, these
initiatives follow EPRDF ideology, requiring labour contributions in return
for support and aiming to make both productive and protective contributions.
The 2006 Youth Development Package promotedMicro and Small Enterprises
(MSEs) to provide unemployed urban youth with economic opportunities. As
with model farmers, government assistance was expected to secure youth
political support by enrolling participants as party members (Di Nunzio
2014; Gebremariam 2018). Furthermore, in 2006 the government launched
the Integrated Housing Development Programme which built 245,000 hous-
ing units by 2015 in cities across the country, including 175,000 in Addis
(Keller and Mukudi-Omwami 2017). The programme is intended to placate
urban populations by providing housing for poor and middle-income house-
holds, while creating employment for unskilled labourers.
Another response to 2005 and inflation in food prices since 2008 has been
the adoption of an urban PSNP from 2016–17 that will expand to cover some
600,000 people over the coming years (Lavers 2019). This UPSNP operates in
the country’s major cities and adopts a similar design to the rural programme.
Government respondents acknowledge that the UPSNP is the direct result of
the failure of the development strategy to provide rural livelihoods, with the
UPSNP intended to limit political instability.¹¹ While the UPSNP has started
¹⁰ Interview with an expert in the Food Security Coordination Directorate, Addis Ababa, 1 and
7 October 2015.
¹¹ Interview with the Programme Head, Urban Food Security and Job Creation Agency, Addis
Ababa, 29 January 2016.
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relatively small, widespread anti-government protests across Oromiya in
2014–16, which took place in small towns and cities across the region, have
prompted the Ministry of Urban Development to propose the UPSNP’s
expansion over ten years to cover some 4.7 million people in 972 towns and
cities with a population greater than 2,000. The threat of urban migration to
political stability is again at the forefront of the ministry’s thinking, with the
UPSNP intended to limit migration to major cities.¹²
5.3. Rapid growth and growing distributional concerns
Meles once argued that guaranteed land access constituted ‘the only social
security the peasants have’ (Meles Zenawi, cited in Marcus 1995), with state
land ownership forming the basis of an agrarian distributional regime. The
political and economic crises of the early to mid-2000s revealed the limitations
of this distributional model, while the construction of a ‘developmental state’
and rapid population growth have gradually eroded the protections that it
provided. Since 2005 the government has expanded social assistance to com-
pensate to some degree for these failings. As such, while undeniably important,
the EPRDF’s focus is not just on growth and industrialization, but rather a
politically managed process of structural transformation that minimizes the
social and political instability arising from rapid change. New social assistance
programmes build on longstanding productivist principles—requiring labour
contributions in exchange for basic protection while mobilizing resources for
productive objectives. As such, government policy is moving in the direction
of a productivist-pauperist distributional regime. Ethiopia provides a useful
contrast with Botswana, as described by Seekings (this volume). As in Ethiopia,
the origins of social assistance in Botswana lie in longstanding drought relief
programmes. In Ethiopia the transition from emergency relief towards longer-
term social assistance was the result of a dominant party responding to distri-
butional crises.Meanwhile, in Botswana, a comparable transitionwasmotivated
by severe droughts, but also growing electoral competition during the 2000s.
6. Conclusions
This chapter has situated the expansion of social assistance in Ethiopia within
the context of changing economic models and political dynamics. The chapter
¹² Interview with the Programme Head, Urban Food Security and Job Creation Agency, Addis
Ababa, 29 January 2016.
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argues that the emergence of social assistance not only derives from
donor advocacy, but also flows directly from the erosion of the previous
agrarian distributional regime and the need to address fundamental political
and distributional challenges. While this shift in distributional regime involves
significant changes, there are nonetheless continuities in the ruling party’s
approach. First, the delivery of broad-based socioeconomic progress has been
a mainstay of TPLF/EPRDF’s political strategy since the 1970s. Second, while
the central objective since coming to power in 1991 has been to achieve
industrialization, there is also a fundamental concern with the distributional
challenges of such a process, leading to major concerns about urban migration,
unemployment, and landlessness. Third, social assistance initiatives, subor-
dinated to the necessity of promoting development, have taken a ‘productivist’
form throughout, with all programmes also expected to promote self-reliance
and productive economic contributions.
Theoretically, the chapter suggests that the common tendency in the litera-
ture to focus on short-term drivers of policy change risks obscuring pro-
grammes’ deeper roots in longstanding mechanisms by which states project
authority and provide support to rural areas. In Ethiopia, as elsewhere, the
state has sought to support rural populations through access to land and
agricultural inputs. In this sense, the PSNP, though employing a new policy
model, represents considerable continuity with past initiatives. Furthermore,
social assistance is an integral part of the political economic strategy employed
by the ruling party to promote national development and retain political
power. As such, in Ethiopia, where a dominant and cohesive ruling coalition
has been pursuing a strong state-led development project, social assistance is
not merely a donor initiative, as suggested in some parts. Instead, social
assistance is integrated into domestic political economy and used to promote
political stability.
Finally, it should be noted that—alongside debates about the implementa-
tion of ethnic federalism, concerns about TPLF dominance within the EPRDF,
and the brutality of police and military—the distributional challenges noted in
this chapter were among the main drivers of widespread anti-government
protests since 2015. In particular the shortage of land and employment
opportunities and the displacement of smallholders to make way for investors
emerged as important flashpoints in the protests. From 2018 under new Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed the EPRDF will continue to face the central distribu-
tional challenge identified here regarding how economic and social policy can
combine to provide sufficient protection and economic opportunities for
Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population. New industrial parks—though
impressive—can only address part of this challenge. This seems likely to
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leave an important political space for the further consolidation of this
productivist-pauperist model in the coming years.
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Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme
Tom Lavers
1. Introduction
The Rwandan government introduced the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme
(VUP) with donor support in 2008. The VUP comprises: public works;
unconditional direct support for those unable to work; and a financial services
component that promotes financial literacy and provides credit. The programme
was gradually rolled out from an initial thirty pilot sectors.¹ By June 2014 public
works were operating in 180 of 416 sectors and providing support to 104,310
households, while direct support reached 61,948 households in 330 sectors. At
this point, total programme coverage was roughly 6 per cent of the population
and the equivalent of 13 per cent of those below the national poverty line.²
This chapter analyses the political economy dynamics influencing the
adoption and evolution of the VUP, employing the ‘adapted political settle-
ments framework’ described in Chapter 1 of this volume and in Lavers and
Hickey (2016). This framework focuses on the interaction between the polit-
ical settlement, the distributional regime, and particular policy domains. In
this framework, the political settlement comprises not just competing interest
groups and a compatible set of formal and informal institutions as in Khan’s
original work (2010), but also a set of paradigmatic ideas that provide a shared
understanding between these interest groups. The distributional regime mean-
while encompasses the existing mechanisms for distributing resources within
¹ Administratively Rwanda is divided into (from largest to smallest): districts, sectors (s. umurenge/
pl. imirenge), cells, and villages.
² Author’s calculations based on the average household size in the latest Rwandan census.
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society, including but by no means limited to social protection. Finally, the
policy domain is shaped by the ideas and incentives that flow from the
overarching political settlement, but also contestation and negotiation
between domestic and transnational actors within the policy domain involving
the formation of policy coalitions advocating particular problem framings and
policy ideas. This framework suggests that commitment to social protection
will be influenced by: the incentives flowing from the political settlement; the
degree of ideational fit between particular problem frames and policy models
advocated by social protection proponents with the paradigmatic ideas that
underpin the settlement; and the potential for social protection to address
politically important failings of the prevailing distributional regime.
The chapter employs a process tracing methodology (George and Bennett
2004) to reconstruct the policy-making process based on semi-structured, key
informant interviews with senior politicians and technical staff within gov-
ernment (eleven interviews), representatives of donors and international
organizations (nine interviews), and foreign consultants (seven interviews).
These respondents are detailed at the end of the chapter and constitute the
majority of key actors, past and present, involved in design and programme
administration. These interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Rwanda
in May 2015 and before and afterwards by Skype with key people who had
subsequently left the country. The analysis links this policy-making process to
underlying political settlement dynamics and policy context. For this purpose
the chapter draws on the existing academic literature on Rwandan politics,
official policy documents, and statistics.
The chapter finds that specific characteristics of the political settlement
shape strong elite commitment to the VUP. The VUP is a direct response
to distributional problems—high rates of poverty and inequality—perceived
in government to pose a threat to the political settlement. While the
VUP’s objectives and framing have shifted over time, the VUP has never
been solely a social transfer programme, but an integral part of the govern-
ment’s development strategy. Within this context, the government has
actively sought to learn from outside expertise, including the social protec-
tion ideas promoted by development partners. However, these transnational
ideas are purposely re-interpreted and adapted by government to fit existing
policy ideas and framings with a view to meeting its overall developmental
and political goals.
The chapter begins by analysing Rwanda’s political settlement and the
broader distributional regime within which the VUP operates (sections 2
and 3). The analysis then turns to the VUP itself, focusing on the adoption
of the programme and its evolution over time (section 4). Section 5 concludes.
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2. The Political Settlement Under the RPF
Rwanda’s current political settlement originates in the Rwanda Patriotic
Front’s (RPF’s) military victory in 1994 that ended the genocide and civil
war. Following a period of post-conflict reconstruction, around 2000 there was
a series of departures from the ruling coalition that led to a high degree of
cohesion within the ruling coalition, strong control of political elites over
lower-level factions, and little to no elite opposition in the country.
2.1. From post-conflict reconstruction to the current
political settlement
The RPF was the dominant force in the Government of National Unity
(GNU, 1994–2000); however, there were clear attempts to present an
image of power-sharing between political parties, as well as ethnic balance,
with the new president, Pasteur Bizimungu, being a Hutu from the
RPF. Nonetheless, the RPF could not count on widespread support across
Rwanda. The new government was ruling over a majority Hutu population
that had been subject to extensive propaganda demonizing the RPF (Prunier
1998; Uvin 1998), while a significant proportion of the population had taken
part in massacres of Tutsis during the genocide. Furthermore, with govern-
ment structures and infrastructure all but destroyed during the conflict, and
opposition troops making regular incursions into Rwanda from the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a direct threat to the ruling coalition
remained. As such, the government relied heavily on military and security
forces to quickly restore social order and re-build state capacity (Golooba-
Mutebi 2008; Reyntjens 2013).
The current political settlement was forged in the period between the late
1990s and the 2003 Constitution. At this time there was a wave of resignations,
expulsions, and defections from the ruling coalition, including the prime
minister, president, and speaker of the National Assembly, while the Mouve-
ment Démocratique Républicain, the second largest party, was banned for
promoting sectarianism. Although the government continued to rule as a
coalition, these changes strengthened the RPF’s position. Meanwhile, Paul
Kagame—previously vice-president—became president in 2000, comfortably
winning subsequent elections.
As with so much in Rwandan politics, these events are subject to wildly
diverging interpretations. For critics, the expulsions and defections constituted
the centralization of power by the RPF and President Kagame (Reyntjens 2013).
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In contrast, more favourable analysts argue that these expulsions can be
explained by a lack of commitment by certain individuals and factions to core
ideas of the ruling coalition (discussed in section 2.2) (Golooba-Mutebi and
Booth 2013). Either way, the result is that there is no significant elite competi-
tion to the RPF-led coalition within Rwanda, with opponents limited to vocal
Rwandan diaspora and remnants of opposition forces in the DRC.
President Kagame is widely acknowledged to be enormously powerful and
central to all key government decisions. This power derives in part from his
strong support both within the RPF and in the military. Indeed, the military
remains key to state power in Rwanda (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011;
Jowell 2014). Beyond the Ministry of Defence (MINADEF), probably the two
most important ministries are the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
(MINECOFIN) and the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC). MINA-
LOC’s prominent position results from the radical decentralization reforms
undertaken since 2000, with all sectoral activities coordinated through
MINALOC. Analyses of Rwanda’s political settlement have also pointed to
the prominent position of state, party, and military-owned business conglom-
erates and the important role they play in financing the party, reducing the
need to finance politics through corruption (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011;
Behuria 2015).
The RPF coalition received relatively little donor support immediately after
the genocide. Since the late 1990s, however, the UK Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), the US, the World Bank, and the European
Union have provided as much as 50 per cent of the government budget in
2010, though declining to approximately 30 per cent by 2014 (IMF 2015: 17).
As such, foreign donors are a key component of the political settlement,
providing resources to sustain the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment views donors as unreliable because of the failure of foreign governments
to stop the genocide, the limited support afterwards, and repeated conflicts
with donors over human rights (Hayman 2009). Indeed, donors play a dual
role within the political settlement, supporting the ruling coalition with
resources, but also periodically challenging it.
Not only is Rwanda’s political settlement characterized by elite cohesion
and centralization of power around the president, but the political elite has
also dominated lower-level factions. Ostensibly a means of enhancing local
participation, the ambitious political, administrative, and financial decentral-
ization implemented since 2000 is frequently noted as having enhanced
central control over local administrations (Chemouni 2014; Ingelaere 2011;
Purdeková 2011). Imihigo—a form of performance contract—detail specific
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targets to be met in the coming year by government officials. In principle,
imihigo combine national priorities and community objectives. In practice,
however, research concludes that national priorities dominate and that imi-
higo enhance accountability of local government officials upwards to the
national government (Chemouni 2014; Ingelaere 2011). Imihigo provide
strong incentives for officials to deliver on their targets as a result of the
formal signing ceremonies held with the president and their use as the basis
for promotion and dismissal.
2.2. Developmental ambitions and the role of ideas
in the political settlement
Analyses have pointed to the RPF’s ‘systemic vulnerability’³ as an explanation
for its developmental outlook (Chemouni 2014; Mann and Berry 2016). From
this perspective the need to broaden the ruling coalition—which continues to
be associated with a Tutsi minority (Ansoms 2009)—alongside resource
constraints and ongoing security threats provide the ruling elite with little
option but to establish a ‘developmental state’. However, the interests of the
ruling elite cannot be neatly separated from the paradigmatic ideas regarding
Rwandan society and the role of the state that are the subject of consensus
within the ruling coalition and that form the basis of a strategy to maintain the
coalition going forward. The changes in the ruling coalition around 2000
helped forge this consensus on a set of key paradigmatic ideas. These ideas
can be traced directly to the 1998 Urugwiro process—a series of discussions on
the future of Rwanda—and more broadly to the RPF’s Eight Point Programme
first outlined in 1987, although the exact articulation of these ideas emerged
only incrementally (Reyntjens 2016). These ideas are core to the political
settlement in that there is no space either within or outside the ruling coalition
to contest them (Desrosiers and Thomson 2011; Golooba-Mutebi and Booth
2013; Reyntjens 2013).
The first paradigmatic idea is the need to move beyond the ethnic and
regional divisions that dominated colonial and post-colonial administrations.
According to the RPF, ethnicity is a colonial construction that introduced
previously non-existent divisions into Rwandan society (Desrosiers and
Thomson 2011; Pottier 2002; Reyntjens 2016). The RPF’s aim—going back
to the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), the predecessor of the
³ Drawing on Doner et al.’s (2005) concept, used to explain East Asian developmental states.
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RPF (Prunier 1998)—is to promote a unified national identity in place of
ethnic and regional self-identification and thereby to return to the supposed
harmony of the pre-colonial era. This rationale translates into the rejection of
ethnicity or region as the basis for policy choices (Golooba-Mutebi and Booth
2013); the promotion of re-vitalized ‘customary’ institutions from this har-
monious era; and intolerance for ethno-political mobilization or even ethnic
identification (Reyntjens 2016).
The second idea concerns the need to deliver rapid and inclusive socio-
economic development that gives all sections of the population a stake in the
political settlement (Golooba-Mutebi and Booth 2013). The reference point
for all government strategies since 2000 and an expression of the political
settlement forged at that time is Vision 2020, which aims to make Rwanda a
middle-income country and to eliminate extreme poverty. These targets reflect
an acknowledgement that poverty, land shortages, and population pressure
were among the causes of the genocide (Pottier 2002) and, consequently, that
resolving these problems is key to ensuring it never happens again. As aptly
summed up by former Minister of Local Government, Protais Musoni,
The thinking in Vision 2020 and back to 1997 was that we believe we need a
unified nation to achieve development and provide services to people. But
singing about unity is not enough, we still need the cement that is an
equitable distribution for everybody in order to cement the sense and pride
of a nation . . .With poverty, people can say ‘we have a nation that is unified,
but what is in it for me?’ (int. respondent RG2)
The government’s concern is that the persistence of poverty and inequality
could provide the motivation for those who lose out to return to divisionism
and conflict. As such, poverty and inequality are seen by the government to
pose a direct threat to its post-ethnic vision and, by implication, the ruling
coalition.
The third paradigmatic idea is the importance of self-reliance of Rwanda,
but also of individuals. The focus on self-reliance can be traced back to the
years of guerrilla warfare of many RPF members (Clark 2014; Reyntjens 2016).
More broadly, the need for independence is linked to a distrust of the outside
world from the colonial era and during the genocide (Chemouni 2016;
Hayman 2009). As such, the government is frequently vocal about the need
to move beyond aid dependence in the long-term, and to protect its policy
autonomy in the short-term (Hayman 2009). The importance of national self-
reliance is also mirrored in the focus on individual self-reliance. No one should
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receive services for free for fear of creating a culture of dependency (Chemouni
2018), while the work ethic of individuals is essential to national development.
As President Kagame stated at his inauguration in 2000,
If we can utilize the resources that God has given to us to good effect, we can
eradicate poverty . . .We would like to urgently appeal to the Rwandese
people to work. As the Bible says, ‘he who does not work should not eat’.
(cited in Ansoms 2009: 297)
The fourth foundational idea is the need to avoid political clientelism, which
threatens to undermine developmental efforts and could lead to resurgent
ethno-political mobilization (Chemouni 2014; Golooba-Mutebi and Booth
2013). From this perspective, electoral competition provides incentives for
government officials to resort to clientelism and corruption as means of
securing elected office. Consequently, party competition in local government
elections is prohibited and during the last twenty years the RPF has pursued a
zero-tolerance approach to corruption that has limited patronage politics.
Based on these ideas, the post-ethnic, developmental vision of the ruling
coalition and its political legitimacy are closely intertwined. The possibility of
resurgent sectarian divisions constitutes an existential threat for a regime that
continues to be associated with an ethnic minority, while rapid development
and poverty reduction, alongside the suppression of ethnicity, regionalism,
and clientelism, are seen as the means to transcend these divisions.
While these paradigmatic ideas certainly have their merits, they nonetheless
leave the regime open to criticism (Desrosiers and Thomson 2011; Reyntjens
2016), at least some of it justifiable. For example, critics argue that develop-
mental progress conceals political repression and merely papers over the
divisions that contributed to the genocide, avoiding real reconciliation
(Straus and Waldorf 2011). Meanwhile, others claim that the promotion of
national unity has been used to maintain authoritarian rule and to cover up
the domination of a minority ethnic group (Ansoms 2009; Pottier 2002;
Reyntjens 2013).
3. Vision 2020 UmurengeWithin the Distributional Regime
State social protection in Rwanda dates back to the colonial introduction of a
pension scheme in 1962. However, social insurance only reached employees in
the small formal sector. Under previous governments, support for the rural
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population took the form of agricultural subsidies, as well as health and
educational provision rather than social assistance. The GNU introduced
programmes, including elements of social protection, to respond to specific
issues arising from the post-conflict context, including: the Rwanda Demobil-
ization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) in 1997 to reintegrate demo-
bilized soldiers, including through short-term cash transfers; and the
Genocide Survivors Support and Assistance Fund (Fond d’Assistance aux
Rescapes du Genocide, FARG) in 1998 to provide financial support and
advocacy for genocide survivors.
One of the most politically important challenges facing the ruling coalition
in the 1990s was how to accommodate large numbers of return migrants to
Rwanda. For the RPF, the right of return for those displaced in 1959 was the
key motivation for the civil war, while accommodation of those displaced
during the civil war was central to claims of promoting national unity.
A programme of umudugudu or villagization was conducted to relocate
scattered dwellings into consolidated settlements to make more efficient
use of scarce land. However, the government’s ambitions soon expanded
from re-integrating migrants to relocating the entire rural population into
planned settlements (Hilhorst and Leeuwen 2000).
3.1. Beyond reconstruction: Vision 2020
Vision 2020 outlined the overarching objectives guiding subsequent policies
and strategies. However, the document is short on clear policy prescriptions.
The first strategy to act on this Vision was the 2002 Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP), which focused on the need to raise agricultural prod-
uctivity and invest in infrastructure. The PRSP noted plans to develop a social
protection policy, while in the early 2000s government ministries launched a
range of uncoordinated initiatives related to social protection, although many
were not originally framed as such.
From 1999, the health ministry piloted and then rolled out the Mutuelles de
Santé, a community-based health insurance scheme that achieved unprece-
dented coverage in rural and informal sectors (Chemouni 2018), as well as
formal sector health insurance schemes. Then, Ubudehe was launched as part
of the 2002 PRSP and is one of several programmes that seek to revitalize
‘customary’ practices to address contemporary problems. Ubudehe provides
grants of €1,000 to communities to encourage cooperation in the identification
and achievement of community goals. As part of this process, Ubudehe
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classifies households throughout the country into six wealth categories. The
programme has subsequently been framed as a form of social protection.
In 2003, MINALOC initiated the Labour-Intensive Local Development
Programme (Programme de Développement Local à Haute Intensité de
Main d’Œuvre, PDL-HIMO), building on public works projects going back
to 1978. Although not initially framed as social protection, PDL-HIMO
constitutes a direct precursor to the VUP and a programme with significant
overlap given its objective of combining employment creation with infrastruc-
ture development. Despite enormous ambitions, the programme suffered from
insufficient donor funding and a lack of technical expertise. Labour-intensive
public works have, nonetheless, been taken up by other ministries.
In 2005, MINALOC produced the National Social Protection Policy
(NSPP). This policy was advocated by the World Bank (int. respondent
RG2) and closely followed its Social Risk Management framework. However,
the policy was weak on details and, though it listed Ubudehe, PDL-HIMO, and
health insurance as part of social protection, it was not well integrated with
other government policies. According to former Minister Protais Musoni,
MINALOC lacked expertise in social protection at the time and, by 2007,
‘we were struggling with the ideas and the VUP came and took over’ (int.
respondent RG2). The VUP can therefore be seen as the latest in a series of
social protection initiatives—notably FARG, Ubudehe, and the mutuelles—
that have been politically prioritized over the past twenty years.
3.2. Stalled progress and renewed efforts to meet Vision 2020
Following the devastation of the genocide, economic growth was strong in the
1990s and steady in the first half of the 2000s. However, it became increasingly
evident that growth was leading to rising inequality and making little contri-
bution to poverty reduction. Comparison of the first two rounds of the
Integrated Household Survey on Living Conditions (Enquête Intégrale sur
les Conditions de Vie, EICV) showed that despite average growth of 6.4 per
cent per year between 2000/1 and 2005/6 (MINECOFIN 2007: 5), the poverty
rate decreased by just 3.5 per cent (NISR 2007). Furthermore, because of
population growth, the poverty headcount actually increased, while inequality
increased from an already high Gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2000/1 to 0.51 in
2005/6 (NISR 2007). EICV results also highlighted regional inequalities, with a
significant reduction in poverty in the eastern province, but an increase in the
poverty headcount in the south.
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The result of these discussions was the Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (2008–13), which introduced the VUP. Evalu-
ation of the EDPRS was in stark contrast to the first PRSP. The government
hailed the achievement of a ‘perfect developmental “hat trick” of sustained
economic growth (8% average), poverty reduction (12% points) and a reduc-
tion in income inequality’ (MINECOFIN 2013: ix). These results appear to
constitute a remarkable success, although inequality remained extremely high.
Rapid poverty reduction is attributed to growth in agricultural productivity,
diversification into off-farm activities, and reduced fertility, though the impact
of the VUP itself is unclear (World Bank 2015). These apparent successes led
to renewed optimism in government and even more ambitious targets.
A revised Vision 2020 in 2012 set targets of 11.5 per cent growth per year
and a reduction of extreme poverty from 24 to less than 10 per cent during the
EDPRS2 period (2013–18). Initial EICV4 results for 2010/11–2013/14 show
continued progress, with strong economic growth, and further reductions in
poverty and inequality (NISR 2015).⁴
4. The Adoption and Evolution of the VUP
The VUP policy process can be loosely disaggregated into three phases,
addressed in sections 4.1 to 4.4: the drafting of the original programme
document during 2007; the detailed design phase and piloting in 2008; and
the programme’s evolution during roll-out and discussions on the National
Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) from 2009.
4.1. The initial policy development
The VUP originated in the annual government leadership retreat in February
2007. The Minister of Finance, James Musoni, presented results of the EICV2
to assess progress and plan for EDPRS1. Slow rates of poverty reduction and
rising inequality clearly demonstrated a failing of the government strategy.
The leadership decided that something needed to be done, with several
observers pointing specifically to President Kagame himself, who demanded
swift action (int. respondents RG1, RG3).
⁴ The EICV4 has, however, provoked controversy, with claims that calculation of the poverty line
was manipulated to give a false impression of progress (Reyntjens 2015). If correct, this would raise
questions about the accuracy of official statistics more broadly.
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Government respondents denied that the VUP was a response to specific
demands made by interest groups or electoral pressures, and, unlike the
situation prevailing in most other countries covered in this volume, interviews
suggest there was no concerted donor push to promote social assistance in
Rwanda before 2007.⁵ Instead, persistent high poverty rates and high and
rising rates of inequality represented an emerging political problem that
threatened the government’s narrative of building national unity through
socioeconomic progress—a key feature of the political settlement. Continuing
Protais Musoni’s earlier analogy, the lack of progress threatened to erode the
‘cement’ that held together the government’s strategy and, by implication, the
political settlement itself. The outcome of the retreat was the formation of a
committee comprising members of MINALOC and MINECOFIN, with the
Minister of Local Government, Protais Musoni, given responsibility for devel-
oping a programme within six months. Despite having no policy proposals at
that stage, the president launched the initiative at the Millennium Villages
Project in March 2007 (int. respondent RG1). From the very beginning, the
programme was conceived as one of three core pillars of the EDPRS, with the
goal of ensuring ‘that economic growth rapidly translates into poverty reduc-
tion’ (MINECOFIN 2007: 75). The leadership retreat therefore generated
strong commitment to addressing the problem, but without any clear policy
direction. As such, Protais Musoni was under considerable pressure to deliver
an ambitious programme in a very short timeframe (int. respondent RG11).
In the following months, Protais Musoni held discussions with a MINE-
COFIN advisor, representatives of the World Bank and DFID, andMINALOC
staff. While the original impulse for the VUP was an emerging threat to the
political settlement and the paradigmatic ideas that underpin it, it was through
discussions within this policy coalition that the VUP took shape. The World
Bank and DFID proposed looking at Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Pro-
gramme (PSNP) and paid for state ministers for the economy and local
government to undertake a study tour during 2007 (int. respondents RG1,
RG2, RD4). The state minister for local government also visited Zambia’s
Kalomo cash transfer pilot (see Pruce and Hickey, Chapter 7 of this volume)
with donor support, and the MINALOC team reviewed literature on other
programmes. However, the PSNP and the Food Security Programme (FSP) of
⁵ The reasons are not entirely clear, but appear to be linked to turnover of social development
advisors in DFID Rwanda and the absence of senior, in-country social protection staff at the World
Bank.
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which it is a part was the main foreign policy model that influenced the
Rwandan government (int. respondents RG2, RG9).⁶
The economic advisor seconded to MINALOC drafted the VUP pro-
gramme document in close discussion with Protais Musoni, drawing heavily
on the PSNP/FSP model. Ethiopia’s FSP at that time comprised: the PSNP,
including public works for households with an able-bodied adult and direct
support for households without; a credit and extension programme; and a
resettlement programme. The VUP has three main components; public works,
direct support, and financial services, which includes credit for programme
participants. The VUP was also originally intended to implement large-scale
villagization.
Among the reasons why the PSNP/FSP appealed to the Rwandan govern-
ment was that it enabled them to build on existing policies and ideas. The state
minister who took part in the study tour highlighted that Ethiopia, like
Rwanda, had already launched far-reaching decentralization (int. respondent
RG11), and the VUP was seen as a means of deepening the decentralization
started in 2000, also under Protais Musoni. The Vision 2020 Umurenge
Programme, as the name suggests, was intended to build the administrative
and implementation capacities of each umurenge (sector). Furthermore, pub-
lic works built on MINALOC’s experience with PDL-HIMO. As Protais
Musoni put it, ‘the VUP was not starting from nowhere, we knew exactly
how to do HIMO’ (int. respondent RG2). Likewise, the VUP adopted Ubu-
dehe’s wealth classification to target VUP participants⁷ and built on the
experience of Ubudehe community transfers, in which Minister Protais saw
a precedent for direct support (int. respondents RG2, RG10).
Furthermore, many of the paradigmatic ideas that influenced the Ethiopian
government regarding the PSNP resonated strongly with the paradigmatic
ideas within Rwanda’s ruling coalition. Principally, both governments worry
about creating ‘welfare dependency’ among the poor (int. respondent RG11;
Lavers 2019, Chapter 3 of this volume). In Rwanda, this concern relates to
paradigmatic ideas within the ruling coalition regarding the need for rapid
development and self-reliance. The result is the VUP’s emphasis on ensuring
that all recipients who are able to work should do so rather than being given
⁶ Respondents pointed to donor facilitation of this policy transfer. However, ruling parties in
Rwanda and Ethiopia have close links and direct inter-governmental links may also have been
influential.
⁷ Increasingly government support—including the VUP, health insurance subsidies, and school
bursaries—has been allocated to the poorest Ubudehe categories, transforming the classification from a
community-based poverty mapping tool into a mechanism for resource allocation (Gaynor 2014;
Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015).
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‘handouts’ and a need to provide clear paths to ‘graduation’ for programme
participants.
Despite donor framing of the VUP as a social protection programme, for
Protais Musoni and his team the VUP was never seen merely in those terms.
Instead, for the government the VUP was an integrated ‘Local Development
Program’ that aimed at agrarian and societal transformation in line with the
prioritization of rapid socioeconomic development. The original programme
document reserved the phrase social protection for direct support for ‘the
neediest people who are landless and unable to work’, excluding public
works which was instead intended to ‘revive’ the underfunded PDL-HIMO
(GoR 2007: 22). As such, right from the start the VUP was expected not just to
reduce poverty, but also to contribute to another key EDPRS priority: rural
infrastructure. In doing so, the programme design raises important defin-
itional questions regarding public works as social protection and as an infra-
structure development programme (McCord 2008).
The VUP, as originally conceived, was to contribute to ‘umudugudu-
ization’ or villagization (GoR 2007). Protais Musoni’s visit to the Millennium
Villages project several years earlier had been influential, but he had remained
unsure as to how to scale up the approach (int. respondent RG2). The
influence of the Millennium Villages is evident in the VUP programme
document that envisages using public works to construct planned ‘model
umudugudu’ with improved access to services (GoR 2007). Attempting to
learn from problems with earlier villagization, which tended towards coercive
implementation and faced local resistance (Hilhorst and Leeuwen 2000), the
VUP pursued an ‘incentive-based’ villagization, creating infrastructure and
services first to encourage people to relocate (int. respondent RG5; GoR 2007).
The importance political elites placed on the VUP, based on the perceived
threat to the political settlement, translated into strong pressure on the design
team regarding the pace of the roll-out and expected impact of the pro-
gramme. VUP targets were derived from the gap between Vision 2020 targets
and the slow progress by 2007 (GoR 2007: 6), rather than a realistic assessment
of the programme’s potential. The plan involved an exponential expansion
from thirty pilot sectors to nationwide coverage within five years. The expect-
ation was that after just six months in the programme all participants would be
ready for graduation (int. respondents RD1, RC2, RC4). These objectives
underscore the lack of technical capacity within government at the time and
the political rather than technical drivers of the design process.
The VUP is also notable for relative consensus between the World Bank
and DFID rather than the advocacy of competing social protection models,
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as in some other countries. This may reflect individual organizational
representatives. One donor respondent explicitly noted that she had tried
to learn from past experiences in other countries where donors had been in
competition (int. respondent RD1). It is also clear that with strong govern-
ment ownership of the policy agenda, space for donor influence is limited in
Rwanda (int. respondents RD2, RD6). However, it may also be that the
PSNP/FSP model aided consensus. The World Bank and DFID are among
the main PSNP donors and the model already constituted a hard-fought
compromise (Lavers 2019). Furthermore, there is a clear contrast between
donor support for the VUP and indifference regarding PDL-HIMO, despite
the strong similarities between the two programmes. The VUP’s success
reflects changing donor fashions and the rise of social protection on the
global development agenda (int. respondent RG2). The framing of the VUP
fit a specific moment, in contrast to the limited funding available for public
employment programmes.
In summary, a failure of the distributional regime—namely, persistent high
rates of poverty and inequality—was perceived by political elites as a threat to
the political settlement and the paradigmatic ideas that underpin it. This threat
generated a high level of elite commitment, and strong pressure to take quick
action, but no clear policy approach. The policy coalition of Rwandan politi-
cians and technocrats and foreign donors rushed to deliver a programme
design in a short space of time. This political pressure contributed to an initial
programme document that was enormously ambitious and technically weak,
and that oversold the potential of a programme with which there was little
experience within government. In spite, or perhaps because, of this over-
ambition, the cabinet approved the VUP in August 2007.
4.2. From huge ambitions to designing a social
protection programme
A programme coordinator was hired following cabinet approval and the VUP
was placed within MINALOC’s Common Development Fund (CDF), used to
finance community infrastructure projects. At that stage it was necessary to
translate the huge ambitions and sweeping assumptions in the programme
document into an implementable plan. Given its lack of technical expertise,
MINALOC sought assistance from the World Bank and DFID. Donor repre-
sentatives from that time acknowledge that the programme document had
‘severe limitations’ from a social protection perspective (int. respondent RD1),
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and in early 2008, they hired a team of foreign consultants, including several
social protection experts, to produce programme guidelines.
In selecting consultants the donors turned, in the words of one of the team,
to ‘their PSNP stalwarts’ (int. respondent RC6), deliberately selecting several
people who had worked on the PSNP (int. respondents RD4, RC3, RG9). The
VUP coordinator described how he sat down with these consultants to
examine in detail the activities conducted by Ethiopia’s regional, wereda
(district), and kebele (sub-district) governments and how these responsibilities
might be distributed across Rwanda’s decentralized governance system (int.
respondent RG9). At this stage discussions were focused on technical details.
Nevertheless, one of the consultants was told repeatedly by Protais Musoni
that he was in regular communication with ‘the boss’—President Kagame—
about the design (int. respondent RC5), again highlighting the VUP’s strong
political importance.
During the design and early stages of implementation, relations between
donors and some government officials appear to have become somewhat
strained, especially regarding the original coordinator. DFID, in particular,
placed great importance on direct support for the poorest and most vulner-
able. In return, the programme coordinator repeatedly criticized the negative
effects of European welfare systems on work incentives, while arguing that
some donors were bringing European experiences that were irrelevant to
Africa (int. respondents RG9, RC4, RD1). This perspective clearly fits with
key paradigmatic ideas regarding dependency and self-reliance, discussed in
section 2.2. Nevertheless, certain government concessions were achieved
including an acknowledgement, absent from the programme document, that
the most vulnerable households ‘will never graduate and will continue to
require a level of direct financial support’ (MINALOC 2009).
Public works design also has important implications for the VUP’s contri-
bution to poverty reduction. In Ethiopia, several donors insisted on an agree-
ment regarding the ‘primacy of transfers’: that participants are entitled to
payment for a certain number of workdays regardless of government capacity
to organize public works (Lavers 2019). No such agreement exists for the VUP,
with the result that, like PDL-HIMO, the number of workdays and, conse-
quently, the transfer of resources to the poor depend on the government’s
capacity to organize projects. By design, therefore, the programme is driven by
infrastructure priorities, not just social protection.
MINALOC introduced public works in May 2008, direct support in
January 2009, and financial services in January 2010. This roll-out reflected
CDF’s experience in public works, as well as the management of participant
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expectations, avoiding the perception of the programme as a government
handout (int. respondent RG9). In the first year thirty sectors were selected,
the poorest in each district across the country, with another two or three
sectors per district to be added in each of the following years (int. respondent
RG2). In hindsight, roll-out plans were entirely unrealistic given resource
and capacity constraints (int. respondents RG2, RC2). The roll-out plan was
adapted to add one sector per district each year—still a significant challenge—
that implied a very long-term process. This selection also set aside clear
evidence at the time that poverty, though present throughout the country,
was concentrated in the southern province. As argued above, an important
element of the political settlement is a commitment to transcend past divi-
sions, both ethnic and regional, through inclusive development. This trans-
lated into a rejection of regional criteria as the basis for policy-making,
preventing the prioritization of the poorest province (int. respondents RD1,
RD4, RG10).
The original VUP coordinator left after seven months and the PDL-HIMO
coordinator took over in late 2008. At the end of 2008, DFID also funded three
foreign technical assistants, including a social protection specialist, to help
administer the programme, given the shortage of technical capacity. Several
donor representatives and consultants argued that the original coordinator did
not understand social protection, as the donors saw it, and that bringing in
new management who ‘got it’ was a key step (int. respondents RC5, RD1). It
was therefore during 2008 through the design phase carried out within a policy
coalition of government and donor technocrats—but with strong oversight
from key political figures within the ruling coalition—that the VUP began to
resemble a social protection programme, as understood within the develop-
ment industry. World Bank decentralization funds were used to hire pro-
gramme staff, and CDF’s own funds used to finance public works in the initial
thirty sectors. DFID started contributing in 2009 and the EU, Swedish Inter-
national Development Agency (SIDA), and UNICEF joined subsequently.
However, government funding remained a large proportion of programme
expenditure throughout, averaging 69 per cent over the first three and a half
years (OAG 2012).
Several respondents argued that MINECOFIN and, in particular, Minister
James Musoni were sceptical about the VUP early on (int. respondents RC2,
RC4, RC5, RD1, RD4). That said, there are no suggestions that MINECOFIN
sought to block funding altogether. While some efforts were made to limit
financial exposure, there was commitment to funding the programme. It is
unclear to what extent this was the result of the president’s strong support in
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the face of resistance fromMINECOFIN or of a basic level of cautious support
from MINECOFIN.
The adoption of the VUP therefore created space for a transnationalized
policy coalition to form and discuss policy options. Lack of government
technical capacity enabled donors to shape the problem definition and policy
design, strengthening the VUP’s social protection credentials. However, the
proposals considered within the policy coalition were constrained by the
perceived interests and ideas flowing from the political settlement, strongly
influencing, for example, the productive focus and the emphasis on self-
reliance. As such, the VUP policy coalition differs in important respects
from those in some of the other cases in this volume. The VUP policy coalition
was not bound by a shared set of ideas or the goal of advocating any particular
policy. Rather, the coalition operated as a technical working group, examining
policy proposals and their fit with the incentives and ideas flowing from the
political settlement.
4.3. Reform and continuity within the
social protection strategy
At the end of 2009, a cabinet reshuffle replaced Protais Musoni with James
Musoni as Minister of Local Government. Whatever James Musoni’s earlier
concerns about the VUP, he became a strong supporter at MINALOC (int.
respondents RC2, RD4), overseeing the expansion of the VUP and the drafting
of the NSPS.
By 2008 the 2005 NSPP was already seen as out of date and surpassed by the
VUP. As such, there was a need to bring together the VUP, as the new
centrepiece of the NSPS, with FARG, RDRC, Ubudehe, and social insurance
into one integrated approach (int. respondent RG6). A consultation process
was held involving different levels of government, development partners, and
other interest groups. This NSPS process followed ratification of the 2008
African Union Social Policy Framework (AUSPF). While the AUSPF is noted
in the NSPS, however, it was not discussed at all during Rwandan policy
discussions (int. respondent RG6) and was not mentioned by any respondents
as an influence. Instead, the NSPS was solely attributed to the need for
domestic policy coherence.
The consultation process contrasted with the earlier donor consensus. The
government’s decision to invite discussion and their apparent uncertainty
opened up space for advocacy. UNICEF, Save the Children, and HelpAge
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/10/2019, SPi
      111
advocated a lifecycle approach, drawing on the Social Protection Floor
concept, while the World Bank opposed such an approach, preferring to
build on the VUP (int. respondent RG6). In addition, UNICEF, the World
Bank, and the ILO all paid for government officials to attend training courses
advocating their favoured types of social protection.
An initial draft strategy drew on the Social Protection Floor’s lifecycle
approach, replacing VUP’s direct support with categorical cash transfers for
children, the elderly, and the disabled. The public works component, mean-
while, would be transformed into an Employment Guarantee Scheme, provid-
ing a guaranteed number of workdays to participants. While the foreign
consultant drafting the strategy apparently gained the support of the State
Minister, it was dismissed in pre-Cabinet discussions for being too expen-
sive and a poor fit for Rwanda. In particular, Protais Musoni, then Minister
for Cabinet Affairs with responsibility for reviewing all policy proposals,
felt this new strategy threatened to ‘distort’ and undermine the VUP (int.
respondent RG6). The strategy argued that universal grants for vulnerable
groups would make them easier and cheaper to administer. However,
Cabinet expressed concern that universal grants would foster dependency
and undermine fertility policy (int. respondents RG6, RD6). A new con-
sultant was brought in to revise this draft, and a more modest proposal
built around the VUP was approved in 2011 (int. respondents RG6, RC1).
In contrast to the original VUP proposal, which clearly resonated with
core paradigmatic ideas within the ruling coalition, the proposal to trans-
form the programme was rejected because of the inconsistency between
categorical transfers and core paradigmatic ideas regarding self-reliance
and dependency.
In 2013, the NSPS was revised for consistency with the EDPRS2, which
focused on progress towards the revised Vision 2020. As part of the revision,
the VUP—previously a flagship programme—has been subsumed within the
Rural Development theme, which is dominated by a focus on livelihoods
rather than social protection. MINECOFIN’s Chief Economist expressed
concerns that the VUP had not been able to demonstrate much impact on
poverty to that point:
The EICV3 showed that the VUP did not have much impact . . . Actually
agriculture can be the best social protection programme. If you increase
productivity, you can reduce poverty. In the discussion that we had we
insisted on putting social protection under rural development since agricul-
ture is an important component. (int. respondent RG10)
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While scepticism about the VUP clearly remains within MINECOFIN, this
does not necessarily mean a complete loss of commitment. Rather, the
EDPRS2 commits to further VUP expansion, alongside a re-focusing of efforts
to maximize impact in line with EDPRS2 targets. First, the annual addition of
one sector per district was ended and the decision made to target the poorest
remaining sectors from 2012/13. Though facilitated by improved data avail-
ability in EICV3 (int. respondents RG6, RG7, RD2), this change signifies a
shift from previous concerns regarding geographic impartiality to maximizing
resources for the poorest parts of the country to achieve Vision 2020. Second,
direct support has been fast-tracked and was planned to reach every sector in
the country by mid-2016, while the more logistically challenging public works
component expands more slowly. Respondents expressed differing opinions as
to the origins of these changes, including: discussions in the Social Protection
Sector Working Group (int. respondents RG6, RG7, RD2); a request by some
MPs (int. respondent RC2); and MINECOFIN demands to ensure resources
had the biggest possible impact (int. respondent RG10).
Third, EDPRS2 has a renewed focus on graduation. Although the original
programme document envisaged graduation within six months, over time the
approach had become more realistic, gradually extending intervals between
re-targeting to three years (int. respondent RC2). MINECOFIN pushed
MINALOC to commit to specific graduation targets (int. respondents RC2,
RD2, RG7) because of the escalating costs of the roll-out and what they
considered to be the VUP’s minimal impact in its first five years (int. respond-
ent RG10). As the Chief Economist in MINECOFIN argued,
You cannot have people receiving support for 3–5 years, it is too much . . . a
person who is 30–40 years old who is not disabled, they cannot be in a social
protection programme for 5 years. A success story is when after three years
someone graduates from poverty and we do not need to support them
anymore. (int. respondent RG10)
4.4. Elite commitment and the challenges of implementation
Strong elite commitment to the VUP is indicated by its implementation,
with government financing a significant proportion of the costs, hiring
staff, and institutionalizing the programme. Furthermore, while there have
undoubtedly been corruption cases, there is no evidence of widespread use of
the VUP for patronage, as is evident in some other countries. Regular audits by
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the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG 2012), prosecutions of officials
who misappropriated funds, and exposés of corruption cases in government-
controlled media (Karuhanga 2012; Rugira 2015) suggest intolerance for such
activities, in line with paradigmatic ideas regarding the importance of avoiding
corruption and clientelism.
This does not mean, however, that implementation has always been effect-
ive. Notably, programme participants have consistently received fewer work-
days than government targets, while only 54 per cent of eligible households
actually participated in public works in 2011/12 (MINALOC 2013: 53).
Though poverty reduction was a core concern driving the adoption of the
VUP, these implementation failings point to competing priorities within
the ruling coalition that undermine the programme’s impact on poverty.
Although there are no robust, independent evaluations of the programme’s
impact, interviews, donor-commissioned reviews, and programme statistics
highlight three main implementation challenges.
First, the VUP faces significant financial constraints. CDF receives a min-
imum of 10 per cent of the government budget by law. Social protection
funding has grown over time to account for 40 per cent of this statutory
funding, the majority of which goes to the VUP (int. respondents RG8, RC2).
Nevertheless, low graduation rates and the annual expansion to new sectors
have resulted in resource shortages. Although MINALOC has requested an
increase of 5 per cent of the budget, this has not been sanctioned by MINE-
COFIN (int. respondent RG8). The shortage of finance has led the government
to reduce staff per district responsible for administering the programme,
resulting in capacity constraints (int. respondent RC2). Financial restrictions
also present a partial explanation for the shortage of workdays and the low
rates of participation.
Second, the question remains as to whether poverty reduction is really the
government’s top priority and whether the VUP constitutes an effective form
of social protection. The VUP’s potential to contribute to multiple government
objectives was a key feature of the original programme document and, it would
seem, one reason for strong elite commitment. However, there has been a
recurrent tension within the VUP between the relative importance of poverty
reduction and infrastructure development. The key variable in this respect is
the labour intensity of public works, which determines the proportion of
programme resources transferred to participants.
The VUP has never come close to the target of spending 80 per cent of the
public works budget on wages. Indeed, over time the labour intensity of public
works has reduced and, in 2013/14, was just 38 per cent. Consequently, one
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respondent questioned whether VUP public works could be characterized as
social protection at all (int. respondent RC7). The VUP was originally located
in CDF, which has a mandate to deliver value for money in community
infrastructure projects. The original programme coordinator reported that
CDF management pushed him to use contractors and capital-intensive pro-
duction techniques that undermined the programme’s protective contribution
(int. respondent RG9). These tensions eased when CDF became the Rwandan
Local Development Support Fund (RLDSF)⁸ in 2011 with a broader mandate,
including social protection (int. respondents RG8, RC2). Government
respondents argue that from that point the top priority was to support the
poor and infrastructure development was a secondary concern.
Whatever central government intentions, the VUP remains subject to
competing pressures in local government. While public works projects are
supposed to be selected by communities, there has long been evidence that
government priorities dominate decision-making (Devereux and Ndejuru
2010). Imihigo for local government officials contain a range of targets,
including infrastructure development. The inflow of significant VUP resources
provides strong incentives for local governments to use these funds to meet
infrastructure targets, undermining the VUP’s protective role (int. respond-
ents RC2, RC4). This problem has grown in importance as local governments
have taken on increasing responsibility for planning projects, in line with the
use of the VUP to support decentralization (int. respondents RC3, RC4). This
focus on infrastructure development provides a partial explanation for the low
and falling labour intensity of public works.
The third major challenge concerns targeting. From the initial design
discussions, donors expressed concern about the use of Ubudehe wealth
classifications to select VUP participants. The World Bank repeatedly advo-
cated a proxy means test, without success (int. respondents RD1, RD4, RC4,
RC7). A recent study by Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2015) matched individuals’
Ubudehe classification with household consumption in EICV3—the quantita-
tive assessment used to assess poverty nationally. The results suggest there is
no relationship between the two, with Ubudehe categories evenly distributed
across consumption quintiles. Not only does this represent a challenge for
assessing graduation, but it also raises serious questions about the VUP’s
poverty targeting: 62 per cent of the poorest quintile in the EICV are excluded
from the VUP as they are not in categories 1 or 2 (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015:
108). Growing evidence of these problems prompted the 2014 leadership
⁸ Re-named the Local Administrative Entities Development Agency (LODA) in 2014.
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retreat to demand MINALOC ‘expedite revision of Ubudehe categorization’
(RoR 2014: 1). MINALOC piloted a new scheme in five districts from late
2014. This revised version reduced the number of categories from six to four
and complemented community assessments with a thirteen-question house-
hold asset survey intended to add an objective dimension. The new scheme
was approved for nationwide use in 2016. Several respondents nonetheless
expressed doubts about whether the new questions would provide any basis
for identifying the poorest households.
While there is little evidence to date that clientelism and corruption have
had a major impact on programme implementation, there remain significant
implementation challenges that limit the VUP’s effectiveness. These chal-
lenges result at least partly from the drivers of commitment to social protec-
tion, namely the pressure to use the VUP as a productive investment in rural
infrastructure and to build on existing programmes such as Ubudehe. While
political legitimacy and social cohesion were also vital objectives of the VUP,
further research is required to assess whether the programme has succeeded in
meeting those goals.
5. Conclusion
Respondents from government, development partners, and consultants were
unanimous that the government drove the VUP policy-making process. The
original initiative can be linked to core paradigmatic ideas within the RPF and
the understanding that poverty and inequality constituted a threat to the
political settlement that needed to be addressed. Donors certainly influenced
the programme through the policy coalition by suggesting the PSNP as a
policy model and strengthening the programme’s problem framing regarding
social protection. However, the VUP is an example of existing elite commit-
ment in search of a policy idea, rather than donors advocating a policy and
trying to generate commitment within government, as in several of the other
countries examined in this volume.
While the VUP was a government initiative and significant elite commit-
ment has remained, there are lingering doubts as to quite what the govern-
ment is committed to. While the original initiative stems from the slow rate of
poverty reduction, Cabinet approved the programme based on its potential to
contribute to productive objectives in addition to assisting the poorest. These
multiple objectives have proven to be a recurrent challenge in implementation,
with infrastructure targets, in particular, in tension with those of poverty
reduction. As such, while there is some complementarity between the protective
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and productive objectives of the VUP, this can be over-estimated. While the
programme’s productive goals may have been essential to securing elite com-
mitment within the context of a dominant coalition settlement, they also present
a challenge to the implementation of social protection.
As such, this chapter shows that the adapted political settlements frame-
work provides valuable insights into the Rwandan government’s motivations
for adopting the VUP. While social protection does not yet constitute an
integral feature of the bargains that underpin the political settlement, the
political settlement has shaped commitment to and design of the VUP in
vital ways. The VUP is an example of an elite-driven, top-down initiative to
address a perceived emerging threat to the political settlement and, as such, is
inherently intertwined with the political legitimacy of the ruling coalition.
However, the interests of the ruling elite cannot be neatly separated from
paradigmatic ideas that shape both the orientation of the political settlement
and, as argued here, policy. Core paradigmatic ideas within the political settle-
ment are evident in the government’s commitment to economic growth and
poverty reduction, the emphasis on self-reliance, and the importance of avoid-
ing regional bias. Although the PSNP design and donor advocacy of social
protection were also influential, Rwandan officials assessed these transnational
ideas for the degree of ideational fit with underlying paradigmatic ideas and
adapted these policy ideas to ensure compatibility. The result was the integra-
tion of the VUP into the development strategy—rather than a standalone anti-
poverty programme—and the expectation that the programme should have a
range of productive impacts, as well as providing protection for the poor.
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Interviews Conducted
Government officials
RG1, Deputy Director-General for Social Protection, LODA, Kigali, 19 and 21 May
2015
RG2, former Minister of Local Government, Kigali, 28 May 2015
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RG3, former Minister of Health, Kigali, 29 May 2015
RG4, Director-General, Community Development and Social Welfare Department,
MINALOC, Kigali, 26 May 2015
RG5, Head, Human Settlement Planning and Development Department,
MININFRA, Kigali, 21 May 2015
RG6, former Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, MINALOC, Kigali, 27 May 2015
RG7, VUP Director, LODA, Kigali, 22 May 2015
RG8, Director-General, LODA, Kigali, 22 May 2015
RG9, former VUP Programme Coordinator, CDF, Kigali, 20 May 2015
RG10, Chief Economist, MINECOFIN, Kigali, 20 May 2015
RG11, Vice-Governor, National Bank of Rwanda, Kigali, 7 July 2015
Development partners
RD1, representative of a development partner by Skype, 20 March 2015
RD2, representative of a development partner, Kigali, 27 May 2015
RD3, representative of a development partner by Skype, 1 July 2015
RD4, representative of a development partner by Skype, 24 March 2015
RD5, representative of a development partner, Kigali, 22 May 2015
RD6, representative of a development partner, Kigali, 27 May 2015
RD7, representative of a development partner, Kigali, 27 May 2015
RD8, representative of a development partner, Geneva, 14 May 2015
RD9, representative of a development partner, Kigali, 20 May 2015
Foreign consultants
RC1, consultant on NSPS by Skype, 25 November 2014
RC2, technical assistant to RLDSF/LODA by Skype, 16 April and 25 May 2015
RC3, consultant on VUP design by Skype, 16 March 2015
RC4, technical assistant to RLDSF/LODA by Skype, 18 March 2015
RC5, consultant on VUP design by Skype, 27 April 2015
RC6, consultant on VUP design by Skype, 27 March 2015
RD7, consultant on NSPS by Skype, 2 July 2015
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5
Pushing for Policy Innovation
The Framing of Social Protection Policies in Tanzania
Marianne S. Ulriksen
1. Introduction
In the early 2000s, there was low elite commitment to social protection on
mainland Tanzania.¹ Being a low-income country, Tanzania has high levels of
deprivation and high demand for income security, but limited resources to
address these issues. However, while a general lack of financial resources and
capacity both within government and civil society were compounding factors,
a ‘lack of political will [also explains the state’s] failure to provide adequate
social protection to the poor’ (Lerisse et al. 2003; Mchomvu et al. 2002). In fact,
as late as 2009, Tanzania only spent 0.29 per cent of GDP on social safety nets,
which was much less than any of its neighbouring countries (World Bank
2015).² Thus, although fiscal constraints are considerable, Tanzania still spent
substantially less than other countries on a similar economic level.
Yet, in 2012, the government approved the implementation of the Product-
ive Social Safety Net (PSSN) programme, which is a nationwide conditional
cash transfer (CCT) programme that targets the extreme-poor population.
The programme was estimated to cost US$300 million per year and was
targeted at reaching over 1.2 million households (nearly five million people)
by the end of the initial phase closing 2017 (the programmes extended to 2019).³
¹ Tanzania is a union between the Mainland and the Zanzibar islands. This chapter only focuses on
social protection policies as they have developed on Mainland Tanzania during the period from the
early 2000s to 2015.
² Burundi 4.21%, Kenya 2.73%, Rwanda 2.14%, Uganda 1.02% (although note that some of these
figures are more recent than 2009) (World Bank 2015).
³ World Bank websites: http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P124045/tanzania-third-social-action-
fund-productive-safety-nets-program-tasaf-iii-psnp?lang=en&tab=overview; and http://www-wds.wor
ldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/AFR/2016/01/07/090224b0840378dd/1_0/
Rendered/PDF/Tanzania000Tan0Report000Sequence006.pdf; accessed on 28 July 2016.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
Marianne S. Ulriksen, Pushing for Policy Innovation: The Framing of Social Protection Policies in Tanzania
In: The Politics of Social Protection in Eastern and Southern Africa. Edited by: Sam Hickey, Tom Lavers, Miguel
Niño-Zarazúa, and Jeremy Seekings, Oxford University Press (2020). © United Nations University World
Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198850342.003.0005
The launch of the PSSN was the outcome of a process of policy innovation and
experimentation, which this chapter analyses. The change in elite commitment
to social protection can be indicated in monetary terms, where social protection
spending increased to 2.3 per cent of GDP around 2015 (UN n.d.).⁴
This study asks: what explains the change in elite commitment to social
protection from the early 2000s through to 2015? The argument put forward is
that the push for social protection, specifically CCTs, has been driven by
multilateral institutions (World Bank) in collaboration with domestic policy-
making and -implementing institutions, specifically TASAF (Tanzania Social
Action Fund). These institutions have been resourceful and strategic in their
approach to promoting their favoured policy solution to social protection
through workshops and evidence-based reporting. More importantly, in gain-
ing elite commitment to the PSSN, the institutions have also been able to show
how this social protection policy provides a solution to some of Tanzania’s
main social problems as expressed by the elite.
The chapter follows the theoretical foundation that the incentives and ideas,
which shape elite behaviour, depend on the type of political settlement in place
and that policy-making is a process of negotiation and bargaining between
political and bureaucratic elites. Moreover, in situations where policy areas are
of low interest to elites, there is room for transnational institutions (such as the
World Bank) to promote specific policy solutions. The chapter’s contribution
to the social protection literature lies in the focus on policy promotion and
negotiation by institutions outside, or ‘below’, the elite, and by including not
only transnational actors but also domestic institutions responsible for policy
development and implementation. Hence, it is shown how ideas and strategies
of international and domestic policy institutions influence the politics of elite
commitment to social protection.
The structure is as follows: First, a theoretical framework is provided that
builds on Lavers and Hickey’s approach to explaining social protection expan-
sion in Africa, which combines political settlement theory and discursive
institutionalism (Lavers and Hickey 2015). Second, as the first part of the
analysis, the chapter explores how the Tanzanian elite has outlined its over-
arching goals in order to address the country’s main social problems. Third,
the main part of the analysis narrates how the PSSN was developed and
promoted by transnational and domestic institutions as the policy solution
fitting the elite’s programmatic responses to the country’s social problems.
⁴ Note that the estimates of spending/GDP come from two different sources and may therefore not
be directly comparable.
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Fourth, to critically assess the findings and the strength of the theoretical
framework, the promotion of the PSSN is compared to the attempt to
introduce a social pension over the same period. The conclusion highlights
theoretical and empirical implications of the study.
2. Theoretical Framework: Policy Solutions
by Policy Entrepreneurs
Within a given political settlement, defined as the balance or distribution of
power between contending social groups in a country, there is room for different
policy approaches. Furthermore, in policy domains of less concern to the elite’s
survival and legitimacy—such as social protection in Tanzania in the early
2000s—there is space for other actors to promote their favoured policy solutions
(Lavers and Hickey 2015). Hence, in the case of Tanzania, it is reasonable to
explore the role of institutions outside, or on the margins of, the political
settlement in promoting specific types of social protection policy designs.
Nevertheless, if these institutions want to get the policy implemented, they
need to get commitment from the political and bureaucratic elite, and conse-
quently it is important to understand the nature of the political settlement in
Tanzania.
The political settlement in Tanzania has been defined as a ‘dominant party
ruling coalition’ (Khan 2010), which is characterized by a strong ruling
governing party with a relatively coherent elite group that excludes opposing
elite factions at the horizontal level. Vertically, the elite coalition is reliant on
lower-level factions (party officials at local levels) to maintain legitimacy and
ensure regime survival. In recent years, opposition parties in Tanzania have
gained strength and factions within the ruling party (CCM: Chama Cha
Mapinduz) have become more pronounced, which might indicate a move
towards a ‘competitive clientelism’ political settlement (Khan 2010). How-
ever, thus far, the label as a dominant party ruling coalition seems fitting.
There is agreement among political observers that, although internal factions
persist, the core of the ruling CCM government controls policy-making in a
centralized and top-down manner, which means that the actual and final
policy decisions sits with the president, key ministers, and high-level public
officials (Booth et al. 2014; Hoffman 2013; Lofchie 2014; Therkildsen and
Bourgouin 2012).
According to Lavers and Hickey (2015: 3), ‘the success of attempts by
transnational actors to promote social protection expansion [ . . . ] depend on
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the compatibility of these ideas with existing political settlements, their
underlying interests and [ . . . ] the ideas of powerful factions therein’. Given
the neglect of social protection in Tanzania in the early 2000s and hence social
protection’s limited interest to elite factions, the role of ideas become particu-
larly prominent in convincing the elite of the need for policy change. Critically,
specific policy ideas must fit the elite’s general understanding of the complex
reality and problems facing the country (Lavers and Hickey 2015; Mehta 2011),
as explained in the following.
Ideational approaches to policy analyses typically distinguish between levels
of ideas going from the abstract to the more specific (Hall 1993; Lavers and
Hickey 2015; Mehta 2011; Von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). Hall distin-
guishes between three levels: ‘the overarching goals that guide policy in a
particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals,
and the precise settings of these instruments’ (Hall 1993: 278). The analysis
focuses on the first two levels, which are elaborated upon in the following.
The framework of ideas related to the overarching goals is termed policy
paradigm and is the most abstract level. Policy paradigm provides ‘a relatively
coherent set of assumptions about the functioning of economic, social and
political institutions’ (Beland 2005: 8). In Hall’s words, policy paradigm
‘specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can
be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant
to be addressing’ (Hall 1993: 279). Thus, in the context of Tanzania, problems
in need of being addressed—and from which goals arise—can, for instance,
relate to poverty reduction, economic development, or vulnerability (Lavers
and Hickey 2015). Policy paradigms are quite stable and most likely to only
change when overall policy fields fail (Hall 1993; Von Gliszczynski 2015) or if
the political settlement is disrupted (Lavers and Hickey 2015).
The second level of ideas are policy instruments (Hall 1993), or policy
solutions, which refer to the idea of specific policy schemes provided as the
means to counter social problems (Lavers andHickey 2015;Mehta 2011). There
may be several policy solutions relevant to addressing the defined problems and
meeting the overarching goals. Policy solutions anchored in the higher idea-
tional level of the policy paradigm as defined by the elite will have the greater
chance of getting elite commitment (Von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016).
Whereas, according to Hall, changes of policy paradigms are rare and, when
they do occur, are driven by politicians and the media, civil servants and policy
experts are the primary actors in changing policy instruments.
Regarding the actors involved in policy change, ideational analyses of social
protection primarily focus on the role of transnational actors in promoting
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social protection expansion (Deacon and Stubbs 2013; Foli and Béland 2014;
Kaasch 2013; Kpessa and Béland 2012; Kwon et al. 2014). Yet Lavers and
Hickey point out that ‘successful ideational influence is dependent on the
actions of policy entrepreneurs who lead domestic debate, advocate for change
and build advocacy coalitions’ (Lavers and Hickey 2015: 15), and they propose
that such policy entrepreneurs can include donor agencies, domestic and
international civil society organizations, as well as individuals within the
ruling coalition.
Policy entrepreneurs may thus include a range of international and domes-
tic actors. In order to narrow the concept, I follow Hall who, as mentioned,
regards civil servants and policy experts as the primary drivers of policy
change at the instrumental level. Hall focuses on England and consequently
he does not have an eye for the role of international actors who, however, are
relevant in lower-income countries such as Tanzania. Policy entrepreneurs
therefore refer to international experts and technocrats working for inter-
national organizations, and domestic civil servants and national policy experts.
Although the initial policy ideas and resources may come from the inter-
national partners, civil servants at the lower levels of the bureaucracy are
important as they are active in policy formulation (Sabatier 1988); these
bureaucrats are not necessarily part of the elite political settlement, but they
play central roles in developing and implementing policy. Together these
international and domestic policy entrepreneurs are active in promoting
policy change.
Policy entrepreneurs need resources, expertise, and moral authority to
successfully pursue the development of their favoured policy solutions
(Orenstein 2008), but they also need to use these attributes strategically if
they want to ensure elite commitment to their policy solution and thereby
ensure its political viability. Borrowing from and building on Von Gliszczynski
and Leisering’s (2016) framework for spreading policy models, I suggest that
there are five interrelated strategies, which enable the successful promotion of
a favoured policy solution by policy entrepreneurs:
1. Contextualization: the policy solution is framed to fit the higher idea-
tional level of problems and goals as described by the elite.
2. Presentation: details of the policy (technical aspects, labels, etc.) that are
seen to have political and social appeal are included.
3. National examples: the policy is shown to have worked well in other
countries, although local adaptation and references to earlier practices
are also part of securing political acceptability.
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4. Empirical knowledge: the policy solution is underpinned by references
to empirical evidence provided by experts.
5. Organizational mandate: the policy solution is presented to be within the
institution’s mandate and the institution presents itself as the natural
authority to successfully implement the policy.
To sum up: an ideational approach is applied to analyse what drove the
change in elite commitment to social protection. As social protection in the
early 2000s was of little interest to the Tanzanian elite, there was room for
international and domestic policy entrepreneurs to promote their favoured
policy solutions. The policy entrepreneurs can pursue different strategies,
which are manifested in their resources, expertise, and moral authority. As
policy solutions are more likely to gain elite commitment if they are anchored
in more general ideas (policy paradigm) as described by the elite, the following
analysis starts with highlighting how the Tanzanian ruling government has
described the main goals and the social problems they are meant to address.
The analysis centres on key government documents that describe Tanzania’s
developmental challenges (social problems) as these documents represent the
views of the ruling government. This analysis is furthermore supported by
speeches of various presidents and prime ministers. The analyses on the devel-
opment of the PSSN and social pension are based on interviews,⁵ newspaper
articles, and the study of government documents, policy analyses, and evalu-
ations, as well as research papers and academic articles.
3. Policy Paradigm: Development Challenges and Goals
The Development Vision 2025 (of 2000) and the Tanzania Five-Year Devel-
opment Plan (FYDP) 2011/12–2015/16 (of 2011) are the primary documents
that lay out the government’s approach to development. Both have been
driven by the government, not donors (Ulriksen 2016a), and in this way
they are fit to illustrate the prevailing policy paradigm in Tanzania, which
largely reflects a productivist strategy in ‘realising the country’s aspirations as
stipulated in the Development Vision’.⁶
⁵ List of interviews and references to them in the analysis can be found in Ulriksen (2016b), which
this chapter builds on.
⁶ Prime Minister Hon. MP Pinda, in opening speech at the Annual National Policy Dialogue at
Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012.
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The work on the Development Vision 2025 started under President Mkapa
in 1995 and was unveiled in 2000. The Vision was developed through discus-
sions with a wide range of domestic stakeholders,⁷ which makes it a truly
Tanzanian document. However, in a political settlement described as a dom-
inant party ruling coalition, it reflects more the views of the ruling government
than the Tanzanian population in general. The Vision highlights as the first
impediment to development the ‘Donor-Dependence Syndrome and a
Dependent and Defeatist Development Mindset’. As elaborated: ‘The mindset
of the people of Tanzania and their leaders has succumbed to donor depend-
ency and has resulted in an erosion of initiative and lack of ownership of the
development agenda [ . . . ] The mindset . . . has neither been supportive of hard
work, ingenuity and creativity’ (URT 2000: 8). The Vision suggests the fol-
lowing responses to this state of affairs:
The effective transformation of the mindset and culture to promote attitudes
of self-development, community development, confidence and commitment
to face development challenges and exploit every opportunity for the
improvement of the quality of livelihood is of prime importance. The
effective ownership of the development agenda coupled with the spirit of
self-reliance, at all societal levels, are major driving forces for the realization
of the Vision. Tanzanians should learn to appreciate and honour hard work,
creativity, professionalism and entrepreneurship. (URT 2000: 17; my italics)
Responses to development challenges thus lies in ideas around the need to
strive for self-development within communities and to cherish self-reliance,
responsibility, and hard work. In the analysis of the development of the
CCT programmes, these issues feature prominently in how the policy is
framed. The political elite’s concern with the Tanzanian ‘mindset’ remains
pronounced. Thus, the new President Dr J Magufuli has emphasized the
main drawbacks in Tanzania as corruption, poor management, waste of
public resources, and ‘a culture that encouraged laziness and did not reward
hard work’.⁸
In line with the Vision, the FYDP also highlights the need for people
to ‘move out of the now entrenched dependency mindset’. Instead, ‘every
Tanzanian has the duty and responsibility to play an active part in the
⁷ President BW Mkapa in Foreword to the 2025 Vision (URT 2000).
⁸ Speech by President Dr J Magufuli at the inauguration of the eleventh parliament as cited in The
Citizen, ‘Magufuli: My Priorities’, 21 November 2015.
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development of the motherland’ and ‘to build a culture and attitude of “we can
do” ’. The response is to ‘enhance[e] entrepreneurship and . . . targeted support
for disadvantaged and most vulnerable groups in society’ (URT 2011: 102).
The objective of the FYDP ‘is to unleash Tanzania’s latent growth potentials
[ . . . by] the targeting of strategic priority interventions to move Tanzania to a
higher growth trajectory coupled with a shift from an Agriculture-Based to an
Industry-Based economy’.⁹ Specific strategies include addressing infrastruc-
tural bottlenecks, increasing the pool of skilled labour, improving the business
environment, and enhancing productivity in agriculture.¹⁰ Clearly, the focus is
on engineering productivity and enabling pro-poor growth. Any strategies
aimed at the poor relate to ‘attracting investments, particularly in areas where
the poor are more involved’ (URT 2011: 10). Thus, any growth strategy
including the poor ‘must involve substantial growth of agricultural product-
ivity and allow most of the rural population to benefit from such growth
through selling the increased produce domestic and export markets’; only the
most vulnerable may receive some targeted support (ibid.: 17).
The Tanzanian leaders’ overall vision to address its development problems
prioritizes growth and productivity. Key terms are community development,
self-reliance, responsibility, and hard work. Problems of development and
poverty are framed within an economic rationale, where social protection
policies are regarded as instruments to strengthen the agency of the poor
and allow them to participate in markets. In this ideational orientation, one
can draw links to both Nyerere’s socialist policy, Ujaama, of the 1960s
and 1970s and the subsequent decades of economic liberalization. In the
Arusha Declaration of 1967, the then president, Julius Nyerere, emphasizes
self-reliance and hard work—dedicating a whole section to the ‘policy
of self-reliance’ and dwelling specifically on how ‘hard work is the root
of development’ (Nyerere 1967). These aspects of social idealism continue to
feature in Tanzanian politics, but these ideas nowadays co-exist with liberal
economic views that underscore the importance of the poor participating in
the economic markets in order to escape poverty (Lofchie 2014).
In international aid agencies, productivist approaches to development were
dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, but were subsequently discarded for devel-
opmentalist approaches focusing on improving human capital, institutional
capacity, and increasingly also human rights (Niño-Zarazúa 2016). Hence,
⁹ Prime Minister Hon MP Pinda, in opening speech at the Annual National Policy Dialogue at
Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012.
¹⁰ Keynote speech by President Dr JM Kikwete, at the USAID Forum on Frontiers in Development:
Ending Extreme Poverty, 19 September 2014, Washington DC.
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another current ideational approach to social protection is related to human
rights within which the rationale for social protection is related to the right to
social security and adequate standards of living (Von Gliszczynski 2015).
Other than the mentioning of rights to land, human rights do not feature in the
documents andmay thus beperceivedby the elite tobe anunimportant ideational
basis for development. This is not necessarily surprising in a sub-SaharanAfrican
context, where political elites often stress productionover protection (Hickey and
Bracking 2005). This productivist focus of the Tanzanian government also
follows the general trend in the region, where industry and infrastructure are
now prioritized over social policy (Kjær and Ulriksen 2014). Section 4 explores
how policy entrepreneurs use different strategies to present policy solutions
fitting the government’s ideational approach to development challenges.
4. Social Protection Policy Solution:
The Promotion of the PSSN
In 2012, the Tanzanian government launched the nationwide PSSN pro-
gramme, which is a CCT (including elements of public works and livelihood
enhancement) targeting the extreme poor (calculated as 9.7 per cent of the
population of 50 million (UN, n.d.)). According to TASAF (2015: 1), ‘house-
holds benefit from a combination of basic and conditional cash transfers, cash
transfers through participation in labor-intensive Public Works, and advice
and support concerning savings and investments’. The ambition set in 2012
was to reach at least one million food-insecure households (TASAF 2015). As
described in the following, the PSSN was not an entirely new invention but
instead has its roots in small community development projects implemented
by TASAF in the early 2000s.
The analysis chronologically narrates how the PSSN developed from these
early community-based projects aimed at improving livelihoods and lifting
people out of poverty (the main events and actors related to the development
of the PSSN as well as the old-age pension, which is discussed later, are listed
in Table 5.1). The narrative relates the ideational aspect of the policy solutions
to the policy paradigm of the elite, and I refer to the use of different strategies
by the policy entrepreneurs. The analysis shows, and the discussion in section
5 elaborates on, how the process of developing and promoting the PSSN has
been driven by international and domestic policy entrepreneurs with the
resources, expertise, and authority to present a policy solution, backed by
national examples and empirical evidence, that is fitting to how the elite
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perceive the main social problems. Community development, self-reliance,
responsibility, and hard work were key terms in the early projects and have
continued to feature as the advocated policy solution was transformed to the
PSSN. This strong productivist notion fits well with the ruling government’s
overarching goals as outlined in the Vision 2025 and the FYDP above.
Table 5.1 Development of conditional cash transfer and social pension: main
events and actors
Year PSSN Social pension
Events Actors Events Actors







2005 TASAF II starts;





















2009 CB-CCT pilot starts TASAF,
World Bank
2010–11 Workshops and








2012 Commitment to PSSN Government
(incl. Ministry
of Finance)
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4.1. From community development to CCT pilot
In 2000, the government established a programme to ‘facilitate improvements
in socio-economic infrastructure in rural and peri-urban communities under
TASAF’ (Lerisse et al. 2003). The programme falls under the President’s Office
and was formed as ‘part of the government of Tanzania’s strategy for reducing
poverty and improving livelihoods by stimulating economic activity at the
community level’ (Evans et al. 2014). In wording, the programme falls in line
with the government’s Vision 2025 in which dissatisfaction with previous
attempts at rural development and poverty reduction is expressed, and in
which the idea of self-development is promoted to effectuate transformation
(URT 2000). At this stage, TASAF was more akin to a community develop-
ment programme rather than simply a cash transfer programme. The main
purpose was to oversee smaller projects, which were decided, managed, and
implemented by the communities; such projects included the construction and
improvement of community social services and infrastructural assets. Poor
and vulnerable households were identified by community leaders together
with TASAF officials, and targeted households could become part of public
works programmes (receiving income for work on community assets) or other
smaller income-generating projects; thus active community involvement was
an essential element of the programme (Evans et al. 2014; Lerisse et al. 2003).
TASAF I was followed by TASAF II in 2005, which continued in much the
same way with the aim of ‘empowering communities to access opportunities
so that they can request, implement and monitor subprojects that contribute
to improved livelihoods’ (TASAF 2008). TASAF II covered 121 local commu-
nities in mainland Tanzania and supported the improvement of access to
and use of basic social services, and assisted food-insecure households and
vulnerable individuals through public works subprojects and income-
generating activities (TASAF 2008). According to the UN, TASAF I and II
‘achieved impressive results in facilitating community access to social ser-
vices through infrastructure projects such as schools, health facilities and
water points reaching 7.3 million people in TASAF I and 16.1 million in
TASAF II’ (UN, n.d.).
During TASAF II, the idea of a CCT programme took form. The World
Bank has been the primary funder of TASAF since its inception, and from
around 2005, the Bank organized international workshops and exchange
travels so that TASAF staff and other key stakeholders could learn about
social protection interventions and programmes elsewhere. TASAF officials
learned from other regional programmes such as in Ethiopia and Kenya, but
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they also travelled as far as Jamaica to study different programme designs.
With the assistance of the World Bank, the TASAF started to design a cash
transfer system around 2006–7. The basic elements of the suggested pilot
programme are similar to many other World Bank-supported cash transfers
in the global South (Hall 2007; Von Gliszczynski 2015). Thus, an initial pilot
project should run in a few districts (with already identified control group
communities); the project should—as was already the case within the TASAF
programmes—target the poorest and most vulnerable groups who should
receive a small regular cash transfer based on certain conditions. The pilot
also fitted the ruling government’s policy paradigm as discussed earlier, which
highlights targeted support to only the most vulnerable and emphasizes
community development and responsibility. According to TASAF officials,
the technical policy aspect of including conditionality was regarded as import-
ant politically in a context where the idea of responsibility as a positive
behavioural attribute features prominently, whereas it was feared that cash
transfer programmes could otherwise be perceived as handouts.
In keeping with the spirit in TASAF I of co-responsibility, active engage-
ment, and relying on earlier practices, the targeting of beneficiaries and the
monitoring of the programme were to be done at the community level with
a strong influence of the people living within the community. Thus, CB
(community-based) was added to the abbreviated name of the proposed
project to be CB-CCT. In the proposed design, it was suggested that the CB-
CCT pilot programme would work most cost effectively if building on the
already existing structures that TASAF had built in the communities that had
benefited from previous programmes. In this way, TASAF gave itself the
organizational mandate to implement the pilot programme.
With the World Bank as leader, the policy entrepreneurs had sufficient
resources and expertise to fund the pilot project, provide opportunities for
learning about other examples, set up a project with opportunities for building
empirical knowledge, and present a policy solution with features that had
political appeal. The policy solution was also made attractive through the local
adaptation that cemented the central role of community development, and the
domestic policy entrepreneur, TASAF, was able to present itself as the natural
authority to successfully implement the policy. The centrality of TASAF was
strengthened by its partnership with the resourceful World Bank, but probably
also by TASAF’s institutional placement within the President’s Office, rather
than within a line ministry. The government agreed to the project and it was
initiated in 2009 with the first cash transfer payments completed in January
2010 (Evans et al. 2014).
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4.2. From CCTs to productive social safety nets
The pilot CCT in Tanzania built on community development projects as
implemented by TASAF and with the bulk of funding from the World Bank.
The projects had a specific focus on poverty reduction and included a strong
emphasis on supporting beneficiaries to be capable of helping themselves and
escaping the poverty trap. The ideas of productivity and co-responsibility have
remained strong elements in developing the policy design as the CB-CCT
moved to become a nationwide programme (the PSSN).
As the CB-CCT was a pilot project, monitoring and evaluation were of
course essential components. Some documentation includes internal reports
developed by or in consultation with TASAF for its own internal use and in
sharing with its government counterparts and international development
partners. However, there are also publicly available reports and documenta-
tion that have been shared more widely. The following describes how the
World Bank and TASAF have organized events and disseminated reports in
order to gain support for the upscaling of the CCT programme. Already in
June 2010, the World Bank and TASAF organized an international confer-
ence for participants across the global South to engage in a Public Works
Learning Forum. TASAF was to showcase its public works programmes as
implemented in TASAF I and II and the forum would engage in sharing
knowledge and expertise among World Bank officials and their country-level
counterparts, to ‘catalyse improved understanding and know-how on the
role of public work programs as part [of] national safety net and social
protection agendas’.¹¹
In 2011, the World Bank published a report on Tanzania with the subtitle
Options for a National Productive Safety Net Program. The report ‘explores the
role safety nets and transfers can play in reducing poverty more rapidly in
Tanzania’ (World Bank 2011: i). It is not an evaluation of the ongoing CB-
CCT programme, but instead engages with the question of how a social safety
net system is not just a mechanism to reduce poverty and improve human
capabilities (as in the CB-CCT), but also a means to increase beneficiaries’
productivity so that they can help themselves escape poverty. In advocating for
CCTs with a ‘productivist’ element, the report—not unlike the wording in the
FYDP—suggests:
¹¹ Media Briefing Note circulated by TASAF and the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour
Department for the workshop that took place on 14–18 June 2010.
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. . . the primary focus of reducing poverty clearly needs to remain on
re-engineering growth to reach poor Tanzanians. This means raising
the productivity of subsistence agriculture, improving markets and access,
investing in education and infrastructure, and encouraging smallholder cash
cropping and small business. But judicious transfers to the poor can com-
plement these efforts and hasten reduction of extreme poverty. A central role
of safety net transfers is to equip the poor to participate more fully in this
growth process, and to bridge ‘gaps’ that are preventing them from realizing
potential income gains. ‘Smart’ safety nets can increase their productivity (by
building human and physical capital); allow the poor to take on higher-risk,
higher-return activities (for example using fertilizer); and increase the
returns to their labour. (World Bank 2011: 54)
TASAF officials have emphasized that the idea of ‘productivity’ was important
in building political support for an upscaling of the CCT programme,
which links well with the political leaders’ focus on ‘unleashing Tanzania’s
latent growth potential’, as discussed earlier. The reference to productivity
raises the question whether there has been policy diffusion from other
countries in the region, such as the social protection programmes in Ethi-
opia and Rwanda, which also refer to the term productivity (see Chapters 3
and 4). TASAF officials maintain that the PSSN largely builds on the
experiences stemming from TASAF I and II, but they also acknowledge
drawing inspiration from the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
in Ethiopia.
Gathering evidence from the pilot was another important aspect of ‘selling’
the programme. Although only published in 2014, a World Bank-led evalu-
ation report provided important information about the impact of the CCT
pilot, with a mid-term review in 2011, draft versions of the report, and
presentations of key findings being available earlier (Evans et al. 2014). The
report is extensive and thorough in its assessment of impacts on beneficiary
communities, which can be summarized as follows:
On the whole, the community-based CCT program led to improved out-
comes in both health and education. Households used the resources to
invest in livestock, in children’s shoes, in insurance, and—for the poorest
households—in increased savings. This suggests that the households focused
on reducing risk and on improving their livelihoods rather than principally
on increasing consumption. There is also evidence that the project had
positive effects on community cohesion. (Evans et al. 2014: 8)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
    135
Based on the experiences of the CB-CCT pilot, the evaluations and reports as
exemplified above, as well as lessons learned from other national examples, the
government decided in 2012 to design and implement a countrywide PSSN
programme (UN, n.d.). The PSSN was argued to be ‘fundamentally a condi-
tional cash transfer program, complemented by a seasonal intensive public
works labor program’ (World Bank 2013: 42), which follows well in line with
the CCT pilot and the public works aspects of TASAF I and II. Thus, at this
point, the government committed itself to the PSSN as part of its overall
strategy to overcome the persistence of extreme poverty in the country. This
move was widely championed by the Department of Poverty Eradication
within the Ministry of Finance. Incidentally, the permanent secretary of the
Ministry of Finance was previously the Director of TASAF. Hence, although
the World Bank initially was a strong policy promoter, the role of TASAF staff
and their relations with other civil servants higher up in the bureaucracy were
also essential in pushing for the introduction of the PSSN.
Even though there was a decision to implement the PSSN, the actual
implementation and upscale of the programme countrywide required add-
itional funding. TheWorld Bank had been the primary funder of TASAF I and
II, including the CB-CCT (with some limited government contributions as
well), but was now looking to other donors to be co-funders and to the
government to turn its initial support into actual budgetary commitment
and ownership of the programme. From 2013 to 2015, the World Bank and
TASAF worked hard to get funding commitment from the government and
other donors, as discussed in the following.
In December 2013, the World Bank launched the report Tanzanian
Economic Update 2013 at an event attended by government officials and
donor partners. In the report the World Bank specifically promoted the
idea of ‘lessening extreme poverty by transferring cash directly to the most
vulnerable groups’ and advocated that ‘[t]he scaling up of this program [CCT
to PSSN] to achieve national coverage could result in significant reductions
in extreme poverty without excessively high expenditure’ (World Bank
2013: iii, x–xi). World Bank officials challenged the Tanzanian government
‘to seriously invest in social protection if it really aims to combat poverty’,¹²
and sought to provide good arguments for why the government should ‘give
money to Tanzania’s poor’.¹³
¹² The Citizen, ‘WB advocates cash handouts poor’, 15 December 2013; accessed 23 March 2015.
¹³ The Citizen, ‘Should government give money to Tanzania’s poor’, by Jacques Morriset, World
Bank’s lead economist for Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda, 17 December 2013; accessed 23 March
2015.
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Another important event that can be seen as a clear attempt by the Ministry
of Finance to get domestic political support for the PSSN was the international
conference in Arusha on 15–17 December 2014. The conference was titled
Social Protection: Building Effective and Sustainable Systems for Equitable
Growth and was facilitated by the Ministry of Finance. A range of ministries
related to social protection broadly were represented by their deputy ministers,
who were given the tasks of chairing different sessions and, as such, their active
participation was ensured. The programme included a wide variety of pres-
entations on experiences of social protection programmes internationally,
regionally, and within Tanzania. Most presentations focused on targeted
cash transfers and CCTs, including experiences of combining these with
public works.
Some donors were not particularly keen on certain aspects of the PSSN,
particularly the use of conditionalities. Nevertheless, DFID, USAID, and SIDA
(Swedish International Development Cooperation) joined as the primary
donors alongside the World Bank. The UN bodies also support the PSSN
programme on the fringes with technical assistance and training to strengthen
the capacity of TASAF and other implementing institutions. Some of the main
rationales put forward by the donors to support PSSN were that this was a
programme already in existence and that the government had made it clear
that it wanted the PSSN as the main poverty-reducing social protection
strategy. The programme furthermore fitted with overall donor strategies of
reducing poverty, improving education (especially for girls), and contributing
to employment and income security among the poorest.
Already by May 2014, TASAF was confident of the government’s commit-
ment to the PSSN, whereas the final commitment from some donors took a
little longer to achieve. With the financial requirements of the PSSN estimated
at US$300 million per year, the agreement achieved during 2015 was for the
government to fund US$100 million per year through domestic revenue
finances, US$100 million through credit from the World Bank, and the last
US$100 million per year from development partners.
As should be clear by now, the road to the PSSN has been driven by the
World Bank together with TASAF. Through the implementation of TASAF
I and II and the CB-CCT pilot, the two institutions have built a foundation
on which it seemed only natural that TASAF should implement the country-
wide programme. The nature of the policy solution, with elements such as
co-responsibility (conditionalities) and productive economic activities (public
works), fits with the ruling government’s ideational approach to the country’s
development challenges. TASAF officials emphasize that beneficiaries should
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‘graduate’ out of the programme within three years; they regard social
pensions as problematic and inefficient as one cannot ‘graduate’ and because
a universal pension will also include non-poor beneficiaries; and they see
conditionalities as essential in ensuring that beneficiaries prioritize health
and education and in building political support. With the emphasis on
productive self-reliance and co-responsibility rather than protective entitle-
ments and rights, they have been able to ensure that the PSSN corresponds
with the responses to development challenges as laid out in the FYDP.
4.3. How the policy entrepreneurs achieved elite
commitment for the PSSN
Returning to the specific strategies of policy entrepreneurs as discussed
in section 2, the analysis of the development of PSSN shows how policy
entrepreneurs can build elite commitment to social protection. Initially, in a
context where the domestic elite had little interest in social protection, the
World Bank (a transnational actor) drove the process, strongly helped by the
institution’s availability of resources and expertise as well as being seen as an
authority that drives productive and pro-poor economic development. How-
ever, the World Bank was not the only policy entrepreneur. The analysis
makes evident how domestic policy institutions (here TASAF) are important
partners in designing, implementing, and, in time, advocating for a policy
solution. This alliance of policy entrepreneurs also gained the backing of an
important faction within the ruling government, namely the Ministry of
Finance, which was also partly enforced by the personnel connections
between the Ministry and TASAF.
Specifically, the analysis underlines the following: the PSSN was a policy
solution that fitted with the problem definition and programmatic responses
as defined by the ruling government, which emphasized a productivist
approach to development and featured responses such as community devel-
opment, responsibility, and self-reliance (contextualization). The PSSN
included details that were seen as critical to ensure political support. Thus,
in presentation the policy solution featured targeting of the most vulnerable,
conditionality (e.g. co-responsibility), and public works (production and
hard work).
In promoting their policy solution, the policy entrepreneurs used examples
to show ruling government officials (and other donors) how the policy has
worked in other countries such as in Ethiopia—that the PSSN is not a
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handout, but instead enables poor recipients and their families to become
self-reliant and responsible agents that can partake in the economy (national
examples). The legitimacy of the policy was enhanced by its local adaptation
and use of earlier practices by including communities in the identification of
beneficiaries and monitoring of the programme. The policy solution was
furthermore promoted by presenting empirical evidence by experts in a
range of workshops and publications (empirical knowledge). Finally, as the
policy developed out of TASAF-implemented community projects, TASAF
was able to present itself as the national authority to successfully implement
the policy solution (organizational mandate).
5. Contrasting the PSSN with the Promotion
of the Social Pension
Thus far, we have established that in the case of social protection in Tanzania,
international and domestic policy entrepreneurs have played a critical role in
getting the ruling government to endorse social protection in the form of the
PSSN. In order to scrutinize the theoretical framework further, I discuss in this
section the concurrent attempt by other policy entrepreneurs to promote an
old-age pension, again linking the idea of policy solutions to the policy
paradigm of the governing elite.
Initially, during the 2000s, the idea of a non-contributory old-age pension
was promoted by international NGOs, the ILO, and some international donors
through internationally funded pilot projects, workshops, and reporting that
included examples from elsewhere and empirical evidence. According to one
study in the early 2000s, ‘the elderly are the least supported’ with only the
international NGO, HelpAge, paying attention to ‘the impoverishing forces
facing the elderly’ (Lerisse et al. 2003: 69). With the assistance of HelpAge
International and REPSSI (Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative), the
KwaWazee pension fund was started in the Nshamba villages in the Muleba
District, north-western Tanzania, at the end of 2003. The project initially
started small scale with the intention of learning about the lived realities of
elderly people and identifying ways to respond to their needs. However, as
more funds became available, KwaWazee developed into a cash transfer
programme with the aim of providing poor and vulnerable people over the
age of sixty, including those caring for children without parents, with regular
cash payments in the form of pensions and child benefits (Hofmann et al.
2008; Kessy 2014).
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Although the KwaWazee project has remained rather small scale in reach,
the project has played an important role in documenting and evaluating the
impact of regular cash transfers for the wellbeing of pensioners and their
families. An evaluation of the project was published in 2008 with a strong
justification of its value for policy-making: ‘There is very little documentation
in Tanzania on social pensions or social assistance for older people. Thus, the
KwaWazee scheme can be regarded as a step towards the introduction of more
such provisions in Tanzania’ (Hofmann et al. 2008: xiv). In line with other
studies of social cash transfers elsewhere (e.g. UNDP and ILO 2011), the
evaluation report documents a range of positive impacts of pensions on
older people and recommends the consideration of a universal pension
scheme (Hoffman et al. 2008).
The civil society organizations involved with the KwaWazee project have
continued to put the importance of an old-age pension on the agenda. Other
stakeholders have added their voices too. In 2006, the UK’s Department of
International Development (DFID) funded an ILO-led feasibility study
(Gassmann and Behrendt 2006). The study provided a micro-simulation for
Tanzania and Senegal to test different social policy options and their potential
impact on poverty at household levels. For Tanzania, it was argued in the
report that a combination of universal old-age pension and child benefit
‘would achieve a reduction in poverty rates of 35 per cent, with even more
substantial effects for individuals living in households with children and
elderly (a drop of 46 per cent), which face the highest poverty risk’
(Gassmann and Behrendt 2006: vi).
The ILO was also involved when in 2008 the Ministry of Labour, Employ-
ment and Youth Development undertook a social protection expenditure
performance review. In this study, it was highlighted that the feasibility of a
universal non-contributory old-age pension should be investigated as there
was a high rate of poverty among households containing older people (ILO
2008). Based on that recommendation, the labour ministry, in collaboration
with HelpAge International, and with funding from the German Federal
Ministry of Economic Cooperation, embarked on a study to assess the feasi-
bility of introducing a universal old-age pension (Ministry of Labour 2010).
The study offered an analysis of the costs, fiscal sustainability, and
financing options for an old-age pension and included inputs from a broad
range of government, parastatal, non-governmental, and private institutions.
A number of scenarios were offered on cost and age eligibility, which
estimated that a universal old-age pension could cost the government
between 0.26 and 1.28 per cent of GDP (ibid.).
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Around the same time, the independent research institution Research on
Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) published a report, which analysed the material
wellbeing and living arrangements of Tanzanians sixty years of age and older
and assessed the affordability of a universal pension. In line with the report
from the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development, this
report also argued that an old-age pension would substantially decrease
poverty—that it could ‘lift over 3 million Tanzanians out of poverty’ and
that it would be affordable (Mboghoina and Osberg 2010). In the years that
followed, HelpAge and its partners in the KwaWazee project continued to
lobby for an old-age pension and to provide evidence of its value, for instance
with an evaluation report published in 2014 (Heslop and Hofmann 2014).
Furthermore, the SSRA (Social Security Regulatory Authority) under the
Ministry of Labour was tasked with running additional feasibility studies
and designing the programme.
It is evident from the above that the promotion of the old-age pension
largely focused on showing the various positive impacts of the pension and
estimating its (limited) costs. The policy solution is framed to help achieve
poverty reduction and realize Tanzania’s development potential but does not
otherwise speak to the ruling government’s problem definition and program-
matic responses in the way that the PSSN does. From one ideational perspec-
tive, the promotion of social pensions can be advocated as an instrument
to meet basic human rights (Von Gliszczynski 2015). However, most of the
reports only refer to human rights in passing and in a recent report there is no
rights argument presented to support the case of an old-age pension (Heslop
and Hofmann 2014).
Given that the ruling government has not put any emphasis on human
rights in its primary development documents, it is perhaps not surprising that
policy entrepreneurs have tried to focus on other ideational frames to promote
their policy solution. Instead, the potential of the old-age pension to reduce
poverty, its wide reach, and its limited costs have been expressed as positive
attributes of the policy. However, the proposed pension has also met with
criticism that follows the programmatic development approach of the govern-
ment. Thus, the pension is argued to be ineffective in addressing poverty, as it
will also reach the non-poor elderly. Also, unlike the PSSN, which already
reaches the elderly in vulnerable households, there are no ‘productivist’ elem-
ents in the policy design that relate to support for asset investment and
graduation out of poverty.¹⁴
¹⁴ Interviews and conversations with TASAF and World Bank officials, May and December 2014.
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Despite such misgivings, the finance minister announced in December 2014
that the government was in the initial phases of introducing a pension system
for the elderly. While there had been some lobbying for an old-age pension,
particularly by HelpAge International, the announcement still came as a
surprise to many and, theoretically, this policy solution does not appear as
well anchored to the ruling elite’s problem definition and programmatic
responses. Specifically, the proposal to make the pension universal, rather
than means-tested, seems to be at odds with the government’s policy orienta-
tion of social protection.
Rather than discrediting the role of ideas, however, it is possible that the
initial policy space for policy entrepreneurs in social protection has been
closed as the ruling government has taken a stronger interest in the role that
social protection policies can play in legitimizing their rule. Certainly, it is
telling that the pension was announced by the Ministry of Finance, and not its
erstwhile promoter—the Ministry of Labour—and that the proposal came
within a year of the recent parliamentary and presidential election in October
2015. The political interest in announcing an old-age pension before the
elections is quite obvious: the ruling CCM was under pressure from increased
competition from opposition parties (Gray 2015) and a pension with its wide
reach can be expected to give an electoral ‘bonus’ to the incumbent govern-
ment. While the policy announcement supported electoral interests, it is less
certain—in the current post-election context—whether the promise will be
transformed to actual budgetary commitment by the government. At the time
of writing, an actual old-age pension scheme has not come into place. There
are nevertheless indications that the speed and scale of implementation of the
PSSN accelerated in 2015 (Jacob and Pedersen 2018), which again suggests
that once the programme is in place, the government will see its instrumental
value in the elections.
By contrasting the promotion of the old-age pension with the PSSN, there
are some clear similarities in the types of policy entrepreneurs involved and
the strategies used. In both cases, international policy entrepreneurs were the
initial and primary promoters of policy solutions. That the World Bank
sponsored CCTs and that the ILO and HelpAge International advocated for
social pensions is in line with the general global trends (Von Gliszczynski
2015). Policy entrepreneurs also similarly used national examples, pilots, and
empirical evidence as strategies to promote their policy. The theoretical
framework also endorses the different success rates in the two cases. The
ILO and HelpAge International have not had the same resources and ability
to fund projects in Tanzania as the World Bank have. In addition, the World
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Bank had stronger domestic partners in the TASAF and the finance ministry,
whereas HelpAge International have partnered with a smaller NGO (KwaWazee
project) and the less centrally placed labour ministry. Importantly, in con-
textualization and presentation the World Bank and TASAF provided a
policy solution that better fitted the elite’s problem definition and programmatic
responses, which was not entirely the case with the pension policy. That an old-
age pension has now been announced suggests the possible theoretical limits of
ideational approaches vis-à-vis the role of political interests. Section 6 highlights
some theoretical and empirical implications of the study.
6. Conclusion
This chapter took as a starting point that within a given political settlement
and in a policy area of little interest to the elite, there is room for policy
entrepreneurs to promote their favoured policy solutions. Thus, in this con-
text, ideas take a prominent role in explaining policy development. Yet, it
appears that the space for policy entrepreneurs outside or on the margins of
the elite to shape policy may be closing as social protection has now got the
attention of the ruling government. Consequently, interest as an explanatory
factor may again become the primary focus of analyses.
The theoretical framework, based on ideational approaches, proved valu-
able in explaining how specific types of social protection policies have devel-
oped in Tanzania. Of broader relevance, the study showed how not only
transnational actors but also domestic institutions at the lower levels of
government shape specific policy solutions. The policy entrepreneurs can
use different strategies to promote their policy, but it seems particularly
important that the policy fits the elite’s understanding of the country’s chal-
lenges and possible responses thereto.
Fitting the ruling government’s productivist approach to development, the
PSSN programme represents an economic rationale for social protection in
which the policy’s aim of poverty reduction is achieved by enhancing the
agency of the poor to participate in the market. Yet a government committing
to a programme promoted by policy entrepreneurs does not alone ensure its
long-term sustainability. First, the Tanzanian government has showed limited
actual budgetary commitment, so far leaving the bulk of funding to inter-
national donors. Second, while policy entrepreneurs promoted ideas of self-
reliance, responsibility, and hard work, the PSSN is still largely a cash transfer
programme, and if the Tanzanian discourse turns against this because of a
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
    143
predominant perception that cash transfers are ‘handouts’, the continued
existence of the PSSN may be challenged. These are the themes analysed and
discussed in a study that follows the developments of the PSSN programme
where this chapter ends.¹⁵
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6
Policy Diffusion, Domestic Politics, and
Social Assistance in Lesotho, 1998–2012
Maria Granvik Saminathen
1. Introduction
In the 2000s interest in the use of cash transfer programmes grew across much
of sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia andMoore 2012; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012), and
unconditional cash transfers began to replace food aid as the central form
of social transfers in many African countries (Devereux 2012). Hanlon,
Barrientos, and Hulme (2010) have described this as a paradigmatic shift in
thinking about development towards a ‘welfarist’ approach.
Policies are often replicated and adapted from one country to another. In a
review about policy diffusion, Obinger et al. (2013: 112) concluded that
‘nation-states do not act independently of each other’ and that ‘interdepend-
encies exist between countries which, in conjunction with domestic factors,
account for policy outcomes’. The conventional wisdom about reforms in sub-
Saharan Africa is that there have been two models of policy diffusion: a
‘Southern African’ or ‘middle-income country’ model (present in South
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius, and the Seychelles)
and a ‘Middle Africa’ or ‘low-income country’model (present in, for example,
Zambia and Kenya) (Garcia and Moore 2012; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012).
Yet, unlike the ‘donor-driven’ middle African/low-income countries, in the
southern African/middle-income countries, the diffusion of South African
policies (e.g. social pensions) to its neighbours has been said to play a critical
role in welfare reform (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012).
Diffusion often takes place through policy makers such as international
agencies (for instance, UNICEF, ILO, World Bank) and donor organizations
such as the UK’s Department for International Development, DFID (see, for
example, Hickey et al. 2009). The global literature on policy diffusion empha-
sizes, however, that external ideas rarely resonate in the absence of favourable
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local conditions (including possibly political incentives for local policy makers).
For instance, donor pressure on the Zambian government in the 2000s failed
to convince the latter that the donor-driven pilot programmes should be
rolled out nationally (Kabandula and Seekings 2014). In Uganda, a donor-
driven social assistance initiative also ran aground in the 2000s (Grebe and
Mubiru 2014).
Lesotho, a small lower-middle-income country characterized by poverty
and extreme vulnerability, appears to be a strong candidate for this narrative of
policy diffusion. Similar to its neighbour South Africa, the elderly and children
have been the foci for social assistance in Lesotho, and the introduction of
Lesotho’s old-age pension (OAP) programme is widely seen as part of a general
diffusion of the South African model to its neighbour. Although existing studies
(Barrientos 2009; Devereux 2013; Pelham 2007) emphasize that the introduction
of the OAP was a response to domestic factors as well as an example of policy
diffusion, there is a lack of clear evidence on the importance of domestic factors.
In order to investigate to what extent Lesotho is indeed an example of such a
‘diffusion narrative’, this study re-examines two of the country’s cash transfer
programmes, the OAP and the child grant programme (CGP), by means of
novel primary data. This chapter argues that there is no evidence of any direct
‘diffusion’ effects from South Africa (although the absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence, especially with regard to a weak regional demonstration
effect). Rather, in line with Lavers and Hickey (2016) who have analysed social
protection in the light of political settlement frameworks, the Lesotho case
seems to confirm that the implementation of social assistance programmes in
developing countries is in some cases more strongly shaped by political
settlement dynamics than donor pressure or policy diffusion. A society’s
political settlement presents a foundation for development, solving the prob-
lem of violence, and entails both formal and informal processes, agreements,
and practices that help consolidate politics (Kelsall 2016). Thus, the instigation
and implementation of social protection programmes are linked with the
dynamics of a country’s political settlement (Lavers and Hickey 2016).
Accordingly, this study suggests that the introduction of the OAP in Lesotho
was facilitated by a political shift that brought about a rare period of stability,
with a relatively dominant government led by Prime Minister Mosisili¹ who
¹ Mosisili became prime minister after the elections in 1998, and won two further elections in 2002
and 2007, but was unseated by a coalition of opposition parties after elections in 2012. Mosisili was
once again appointed as prime minister in 2015, a few months after the second round of fieldwork for
this case study took place. Yet, in the (early) 2017 elections he was defeated by Thomas Thabane and
the All Basotho Convention.
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was in favour of a dormestic response to socioeconomic change and the
rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet, the OAP was not part of a strategic
distributional regime. In contrast, the case of the CGP involved donors who
laid the foundation for a social cash transfer policy coalition in Lesotho. This
donor-initiated programme faced initial government scepticism, although
the Lesotho government quickly took control (and assumed financial respon-
sibility). This programme has since become an important element of recent
progress towards a systemic and inclusive social protection system (Pellerano
et al. 2016).
2. Methodology
This case study is based on semi-structured interviews with sixteen key
informants conducted in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho (as well as written
correspondence with two key informants who were unavailable during field-
work), in April and August 2014.² Key informants were recruited through
phone calls and e-mails to various relevant organizations as well as informal
visits, for example to the Department of Pensions. Finally, the study relied
heavily on snowball sampling, as it was particularly difficult to reach more
senior informants without a referral. All interviewees were briefed about the
study, and each informant signed a consent form before the interview.
3. Politics, Poverty, and Social Protection in Lesotho
in the Late 1990s
Lesotho is a ‘parliamentary representative democratic constitutional mon-
archy’, with the king as formal head of state and an elected prime minister as
head of government. Since Lesotho’s independence, a number of post-
election crises have arisen, primarily due to the inadequacy of the ‘first-
past-the post’ system to reflect the number of popular votes secured by
political parties in the allocation of parliamentary seats. Through support
from the Commonwealth, the South African Development Community
(SADC), and other partners, the country went through electoral reform in
2002, introducing a ‘mixed member proportional’ (MMP) electoral model to
² See Granvik (2016) for a more detailed account of the study’s methodology as well as a list of key
informants.
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limit post-electoral contestations and make parliament more inclusive
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2012).
By the early 2000s it had become evident that Lesotho had not succeeded at
turning economic growth into improvements in the wellbeing of the poor
(May et al. 2002: 6). Lesotho has been a beneficiary of international food aid
since the 1930s, a trend that has persisted because of environmental factors
such as droughts (Makenete et al. 1998). The World Food Programme (WFP)
has supported the country in the form of disaster risk reduction and provision
for Lesotho’s school-feeding programme (World Food Programme 2016).
Further, there have been a number of food-for-work programmes in the
more recent past that were used to distribute food aid, mostly financed by
the WFP (World Bank 2013). Lesotho has also implemented public works
programmes, for instance in the context of the Integrated Watershed Man-
agement Project, but there has not been an integrated system of such pro-
grammes (Olivier 2013b). Increasingly, cash transfers have become major
tools of social assistance in Lesotho (Olivier 2013a). Lesotho’s first cash
transfer, the Public Assistance Grant, was introduced in the 1970s to support
the ‘destitute’, although with very limited coverage and benefit levels.
4. The Old-Age Pension—Another ‘Mosisili’?
Considering the rather precarious socioeconomic conditions and fiscal ability,
Lesotho has made substantial progress towards developing initiatives to pro-
vide minimum levels of protection, introducing social assistance measures
such as the OAP and the CGP to target the impoverished and vulnerable
(Olivier 2013a). Lesotho’s ‘National Vision 2020’ (Government of Lesotho
2004) presented the foundation of development in the country, and several
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and National Strategic Development Plans
have subsequently been released. Mosisili, who had become prime minister
after the 1998 elections, came to play a leading role in the poverty-reduction
strategies that were introduced in the Vision 2020.
As a result of the strong positive impacts of social protection initiatives, the
provision of so-called ‘social pensions’ has become an encouraged social
protection strategy in southern Africa (ILO 2014; Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012).
Lesotho’s influential neighbour South Africa had implemented a social pen-
sion in the 1920s (although with benefits based on ‘race’ until the end of
apartheid) and Namibia started such a programme in the 1970s. However, the
Lesotho pension was a one-off reform at the time, and not part of a coherent
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social agenda (Pelham 2007). Further, the age threshold of the Lesotho
pension was set higher than the South African one (seventy years, compared
to sixty-five for men and sixty for women in South Africa at the time), and the
benefit levels were significantly lower (M150/US$20 per month), distinguish-
ing this programme from its South African predecessor.
The proportion of elderly is higher in Lesotho than in other sub-Saharan
African countries, reflecting the outmigration of young people and the begin-
ning of a demographic transition towards an older society. Today, approxi-
mately 83,000 citizens over the age of seventy years receive the OAP, which
currently consists of M500 (US$37) per month (Pension Watch Database
2018). The programme is administered by the Pension Division of the power-
ful Ministry of Finance, and benefits are paid in cash on a monthly basis.
Today, Lesotho spends approximately M436 million (US$37.1 million) on the
OAP annually, which represents around 3 per cent of total public expenditure,
approximately 1.3 per cent of GDP (Pension Watch Database 2018).
4.1. The role of the HIV/AIDS crisis
Lesotho’s generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic has affected every sector of society
and the combined effects of poverty and inequality underscore the reality
of the social and economic impact of HIV and AIDS in Lesotho (Owusu-
Ampomah et al. 2009; Mugomeri et al. 2017). Based on the literature and
interviews with key informants, the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS
appears to have been a critical incentive for the government to (re-) consider
a cash transfer scheme for the elderly.
During the time that the OAP was implemented, Lesotho was confronted
with an HIV prevalence rate of 31 per cent. In 1999 it was estimated that
80 per cent of those affected by HIV/AIDS were between twenty and thirty-
nine years (UNAIDS 2004), which resulted in a heavy burden on the older
generation, who needed to care for orphaned children (Casey and McKinnon
2009). The Department of Pensions³ highlighted that the fact that the elderly
are increasingly ‘forced to take care of their grandchildren’ was a ‘point that
was raised throughout the conversation [in 2004]’. Similarly, the former
Principal Secretary of Public Service⁴ explained that ‘the original thought
behind the pension was to reward the elderly’, but as the AIDS epidemic
³ Interview, bureaucrat, Department of Pensions, Maseru, April 2014.
⁴ Interview, former principal secretary, Public Service, Maseru, August 2014.
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became more acute, ‘the government itself felt that it was important to provide
an income for grannies who were taking care of orphans’. The significance of
the OVC (orphans and vulnerable children) crisis was also confirmed by
Mosisili:⁵ ‘The epidemic played a pivotal role in influencing the decision [in
2004]. We were generally looking at vulnerable groups, and the OAP was
combining the two [the elderly and OVC]’.
The HIV/AIDS crisis undoubtedly warranted an urgent national reaction.
Thus, a social pension could have offered a meaningful policy response during
this time. However, ostensibly, it was only after a political shift enabled by the
2002 electoral reform that the circumstances were stable enough for the
Mosisili government to act on such a social assistance programme.
4.2. A political shift
Scholars (Barrientos 2009; Pelham 2007) seem to agree that the prime minister
at the time was the driving force behind the OAP, although the pension
scheme was not assessed as having presented a critical election issue. Accord-
ing to Pelham (2007), a social pension had appeared on the manifesto of the
ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) as early as 1993, but the literature is
inconclusive regarding why the pension was only finalized eleven years later,
and what eventually prompted its very sudden introduction (Barrientos 2009;
Devereux and Cipryk 2009; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; Pelham 2007). Further,
authors such as Pelham (2007: 11), Barrientos (2009: 4), and Niño-Zarazúa
et al. (2012: 20) have all suggest that the existence of a social pension in South
Africa played a significant role in the formation of a universal pension in
Lesotho through policy diffusion in the region. While the South African
pension may have served as inspiration, the Lesotho’s OAP does appear to
be ‘home-grown’ in many respects. It was eventually enabled by a period of
political stability under a dominant prime minister, as section 4.3 will discuss
with the support of new primary data.
Lesotho’s political history has been shaped by conflicts, despite the absence
of significant ethnic, religious, and ideological differences among contesting
parties (Rosenberg and Weisfelder 2013). Considering the political instability
that shaped the 1990s in Lesotho, the long delay of the pension is essentially
not very unexpected, and several key informants referred to the political
⁵ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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challenges that the incumbent government(s) were faced with between 1993
and 2002. For example, Dr Thahane,⁶ the finance minister at the time, recalled
that ‘the budget moved to security matters. We had to think about survival
first!’ While the idea of a pension still appeared to be ‘on the table’ in the late
1990s, a 1998 government-commissioned consultancy study⁷ had determined
that granting a social pension in Lesotho would be too costly (Hagen 2008).
In 2002, multi-party competition and democratic stability seemed to have
emerged in Lesotho after the new electoral system had been instigated (Rich
et al. 2013), and Mosisili led the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) to a
substantial and peaceful victory (Rosenberg and Weisfelder 2013; Weisfelder
2015). Finally, Lesotho thus found itself politically stable and free of post-
election conflicts—the opposition parties had been given some representation
and visibility, but failed to attain a strong opposition towards the dominant
LCD. Applying Khan’s (2010) political settlement typology (2010) as
employed by Lavers and Hickey (2016), Lesotho’s political setting after the
2002 elections could thus be classified as ‘dominant’. Accordingly, the leading
position enjoyed by Mosisili and the LCD is likely to have facilitated the swift
introduction of a social pension.
4.3. Emergence of a policy
As mentioned above, a certain interest in a social policy to support the elderly
had already been established in the early 1990s. Prior to the 2002 elections, a
plan for a pension had reappeared on some political programmes, most clearly
on the manifesto of the winning LCD (Hagen 2008: 13). Mosisili’s LCD had
thus promised a pension, but with the condition that the financial resources of
the government were sufficient to implement a universal scheme. The Depart-
ment of Pensions⁸ explained that during the first two years following the 2002
elections, ‘the budget could not sustain a pension due to the aftermath of the
1998 turbulence’. However, according to Mosisili,⁹ a pension was on the
agenda of the new government at this time: ‘It had to be implemented! In
2002, for the first time, there was post-election peace. Now we could focus on
⁶ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
⁷ This study has been mentioned by Hagen (2008) and was also confirmed by David Croome during
an August 2014 meeting, but no further evidence regarding the timing of this study (i.e. whether it took
place before or after the 1998 elections) has been identified.
⁸ Interview, bureaucrat, Department of Pensions, Maseru, April 2014.
⁹ Interview, B.P. Mosisili, Prime Minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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development, not just extinguishing fires’. The former principal secretary of
finance¹⁰ recalled that ‘he [Mosisili] chaired a Cabinet meeting in 2004
that directed that we test the affordability and sustainability again . . . when
government’s fiscal position seemed quite strong. Playing around with unit
pay-out and age produced several options from which an affordable and
sustainable one was found, presented to Cabinet and approved within two
days’. A long-term bureaucrat in the pensions department¹¹ recalls that
‘Mosisili sold the idea [of a pension] to parliament’. Finally, in his 2004/5
budget speech, Lesotho’s finance minister (Thahane) announced the intro-
duction of a universal social pension for all citizens aged seventy and older.
Parliamentary debates on the pension were held shortly before registration
began. As the former Commissioner of Pensions¹² underlined, ‘it was imple-
mented purely on the budget statement, without any policy document as a
foundation’. Following a month-long registration process, the first pensions
were delivered in November 2004 without a (customary) pilot phase.
There had been some media publicity about the pension prior to the
registration process, but there was no public consultation or community
involvement. Apart from the advocacy of the Maseru Women’s Senior Citi-
zens Association (MWSCA), there was no widespread campaigning for the
implementation of a social pension (Pelham 2007). During an interview for
this case study, the founder of the MWSCA¹³ described how the MWSCA
tried to push for the pension to finally be implemented by writing letters
and even meeting with the prime minister himself. Mosisili¹⁴ admits that
this advocacy ‘was useful, but they were preaching to the converted’. Thus,
while this lobbying may not have been decisive per se, it may have acceler-
ated the process. However, a bureaucrat in the Department of Pensions¹⁵
explained that ‘unlike South Africans’, who had been ‘promised services’ by
the African National Congress (ANC), there had been no ‘demand’ from the
Basotho for a pension. According to the former principal secretary of
finance,¹⁶ ‘the announcement [of the OAP] was welcomed, in as much as
it was a surprise to many. After many years of non-fulfilment there had not
been any expectations’.
¹⁰ Written correspondence, former principal secretary, Ministry of Finance, August 2014.
¹¹ Interview, bureaucrat, Department of Pensions, Maseru, April 2014.
¹² Interview, former commissioner of pensions, Maseru, August 2014.
¹³ Interview, founder MWSCA, Maseru, April 2014.
¹⁴ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
¹⁵ Interview, bureaucrat, Department of Pensions, Maseru, April 2014.
¹⁶ Written correspondence, former principal secretary, Ministry of Finance, August 2014.
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Hence, based on the evidence from the literature and testimonies from key
stakeholders, the political instability in the 1990s appears to have been a
major obstacle to the realization of the promised pension. However, the
former finance minister¹⁷ suggested that the initial proposal of a pension in
1993 had also been poorly thought through. ‘Political manifestos outline
what parties would like to have. It [a pension] is easy to conceive, but
difficult to finance and administer. That is where it got stuck’. It is possible
that Mosisili’s appointment of the very experienced economist Thahane as
finance minister provided for strong teamwork with Mosisili and thus
enabled a professional and credible assessment of a pension to be carried
out. Also, the capacity of Thabo Thulo, the Commissioner of Pensions at the
time, may have played a role. Thulo undeniably succeeded in the demanding
task of swiftly designing a pension scheme, registering beneficiaries, and
ensuring that the first payments were made only eight months after the
pension had been announced. Thulo himself ¹⁸ admitted that he was caught
off guard by the announcement of the OAP in 2004: ‘I was surprised!
I thought, “my office will have to oversee it” ’. It is likely that the confidence
of both the Lesotho parliament and the Ministry of Finance in Thulo’s
ability to administer a universal pension may thus have contributed to the
relatively straightforward policy process behind the pension, and its prompt
completion.
As previously mentioned, existing literature indicates that Mosisili was the
main driver and thus ‘the champion’ of the OAP (Pelham 2007; Devereux and
White 2008; Barrientos 2009; Olivier 2013). Undeniably, political elites tend to
hold certain ‘policy space’ to implement their own ideas and policies (Lavers
and Hickey 2016). With regards to countries that present with a dominant
type of political settlement such as Lesotho in the early 2000s, Lavers and
Hickey (2016) suggest that the top-level leadership tends to determine a
policy. Typically, there is no subsequent debate or attempts to undermine
the policy. Correspondingly, Pelham (2007: 12) indicates that Mosisili’s ‘per-
sonal style of government’ may have ‘afforded him the ability to make
decisions and have them acted upon without the political turbulence
or lengthy administrative procedures that may hinder other democracies’.
Mosisili’s ‘personal style’ is certainly evident in the unremitting association
of social welfare with his name. Children who have attended Lesotho’s free
¹⁷ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
¹⁸ Interview, former commissioner of pensions, Maseru, August 2014.
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primary schools are called ‘bana ba Mosisili’ (‘Mosisili’s children’) and the
elderly who receive the OAP are said to ‘collect their Mosisili’. Consequently,
while the initial proposal of a social pension may not have directly affected the
outcome of the 1993 election (Matlosa 1997), and the introduction of the OAP
may not have been a desperate attempt to remain in power, Mosisili’s strong
association with the social policies mentioned implies that the implementation
of the OAP ultimately benefited the incumbent government’s position.
4.4. Politicization of the OAP
Lavers and Hickey (2016) propose that political feedback and popular pres-
sures matter once social policies have actually been implemented—this is a
phenomenon that has been observed by the authors in the context of social
protection initiatives in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. This
was also the case in Lesotho during the 2007 elections—once the OAP had
finally been introduced, the programme did come to present an election issue
(Devereux and White 2008). The opposition party All Basotho Convention’s
(ABC’s) pledge to raise the monthly pension payment if they were elected
prompted Mosisili’s governing party (LCD) to promise a reconsideration of
the pension payment level if they were re-elected. After the LCD’s victory in
coalition with the National Independence Party (NIP), the finance minister
announced a 33 per cent increase in the monthly pension in the first budget
speech after the elections, adhering to the LCD’s election promise. Lesotho’s
OAP thus exemplifies the idea of ‘positive politicization’ (Devereux and
White 2008), as the popularity of this programme forced the government
to respond positively to opposition campaign pledges to raise the payment
level. Further, the introduction of the OAP, and, to a lesser extent, the
decision to make primary education free were the overwhelming reasons given
for voting for the governing party in 2007 (Croome et al. 2007; Devereux and
Cipryk 2009).
While these circumstances alone do not substantiate to what extent the
intentions behind the OAP were in fact political, it is likely that the LCD’s
decision to ‘thank’ the elderly through a universal pension may have benefited
Mosisili and his party, at least in the short term, based on the broad approval
of the OAP in Lesotho. The prime minister may have been aware of the
potential ‘reciprocity’ effect (Baez et al. 2012) of introducing a cash transfer
to a vulnerable population group, thus the OAP could, at least to some extent,
have been part of a political strategy.
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4.5. The financing of the OAP
While the decision to provide a pension was clearly politically unopposed in
Lesotho, the capacity to finance the pension was nonetheless not self-evident.
Financing social pensions can present a significant challenge for low-income
countries. As the case of Zambia has shown (Kabandula and Seekings 2014),
the judgement of the Ministry of Finance may ultimately decide whether
social protection programmes such as cash transfers are ultimately priori-
tized or not. In this case, a donor-driven attempt to provide cash transfers to
poor households failed to become ‘owned’ by government (Kabandula and
Seekings 2014).
In Lesotho, on the other hand, the Ministry of Finance did not present an
obstacle to the OAP (or, later, the CGP). The fact that Thahane was recruited
by Mosisili himself, and was said to have worked closely together with the
prime minister, may have shaped his attitude towards social policies such as
the OAP, and thus motivated him to cooperate with Mosisili’s plans. The
views that Thahane¹⁹ expressed towards ‘welfare’ during his interview corres-
ponded with Mosisili’s and the LCD’s: ‘Welfare can keep you alive, so that you
can do something sustainable. We felt that the elderly are a legitimate target’.
The former principal secretary of the finance ministry²⁰ highlighted that
Thahane’s financial management experience encouraged trust in the Ministry
of Finance: ‘Cabinet tended to accept the lead of the professionals in the
Finance Ministry’.
The period after the change of the electoral system in 2002 brought unpre-
cedented GDP growth (Maleleka 2009), creating a favourable time for invest-
ing in a social programme such as the OAP. Fiscal reprioritization finally
enabled the government to shoulder the burden of expenditure. The OAP has
largely been funded through Southern African Customs Union (SACU) rev-
enues received by Lesotho, which indicates the government’s willingness to
find and increase fiscal space (Hagen 2008), even during times of global
economic crisis.
Ultimately, it seems clear that the Lesotho OAP is largely financially feasible
because the benefits are comparatively small and the age for entitlement is
relatively high. Although the monthly value increased from M150 (US$23) to
M500 (US$47) over ten years, the practical extent of this increase is rather
limited. Taking inflation into account, M500 in 2014 would have been
¹⁹ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
²⁰ Written correspondence, former principal secretary, Ministry of Finance, August 2014.
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equivalent to merely M273 in 2004. In 2018, the monthly benefit still consisted
of M500. By comparison, the age threshold of the South African social pension
is sixty years and the current monthly-level benefit payment is ZAR1,420
(US$107) (Pension Watch 2018). As time passed, the former Commissioner
of Pensions²¹ explained that ‘the government had to consider whether to lower
the qualifying age, or to increase the benefit rates. Also, increasing the benefits
will benefit children. It is better to give more to fewer people’. Mosisili²²
explained that ‘we were careful not to bite more than we could chew . . .We
will grow it with time’. This decision to ‘give more to fewer people’ (although
many elderly citizens below seventy years of age may be just as destitute as
those who currently do receive the OAP) is noteworthy, as it may have
implications for the ‘developmental’ objectives behind the pension. Further,
the Lesotho OAP is not targeted based on socioeconomic position, unlike the
South African ‘older persons’ grant’ that is subject to a means test that
excludes the wealthy elderly. Thus, higher benefits make the transfer more
effective for the beneficiaries, but at the same time the exclusion of the elderly
below seventy years and the lack of a means test does not correspond with a
‘classic’ poverty-reduction strategy.
4.6. Absence of transnational encouragement
Another striking aspect of the Lesotho pension is the absence of the inter-
national arena, which also stands in contrast to the origins of the child grant,
which will be discussed in section 5. The process behind the OAP in Lesotho
has certainly gone against Bonnerje’s (2003: 29) prediction that ‘in the initial
stages of setting up such arrangements [social pensions] in other countries of
the region [sub-Saharan Africa], major international donors would have to
play a lead role’.
According to Mosisili,²³ the government purposely did not involve foreign
donors: ‘We were very clear that this was an initiative that we were coming
up with as government . . .We will start this on our own, with limited
resources . . .We will not make it a foreign aid-driven initiative’. He also
acknowledged international donors’ scepticism: ‘The IMF and the World
Bank appreciated the problem that we were grappling with, but they were
²¹ Interview, former Commissioner of Pensions, Maseru, August 2014.
²² Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
²³ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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worried about sustainability’. Of course, it may have been a potential refusal by
the World Bank to support the government’s endeavour of installing a uni-
versal pension that ignited the government’s later emphasis on donor inde-
pendence, but there is no indication that the government had actively pursued
external funding for the OAP. According to Pelham (2007), donor agencies
generally expressed interest and overwhelming support for the pension, but they
had very little knowledge about it. Regardless, the absence of external assistance
contributes to the uniqueness of the policy process behind the OAP, which
further supports the argument that this initiative was mostly ‘home-grown’.
4.7. Back to the roots
A remaining question mark surrounding the pension concerns the roots of
the idea for a universal cash transfer for the elderly. Mosisili²⁴ insisted that ‘the
idea for an OAP stemmed from the BCP’s ideology, it was very people-
oriented. It was clear that people in the private sector²⁵ and subsistence
farmers were vulnerable once they reached old age. The majority of people
can no longer fend for themselves . . . they are dependent on their children.
With time, it became clear that we can no longer rely on that’. Yet, where did
the BCP look for inspiration for such a policy, even if it had not yet been very
well ‘conceived’ in 1993? Barrientos (2009: 79) has asserted that the presence
of social pension schemes as the dominant form of welfare provision in
neighbouring countries exerted an influence on Lesotho. Similarly, Pelham
(2007: 11) suggests that the introduction of a social pension in Lesotho in 2004
was ‘a product of regional geopolitics and a concern for equity’ in order to
provide the elderly in Lesotho with an equivalent to the social pension in
neighbouring South Africa. Yet, Pelham’s (2007) study also acknowledges the
lack of advocacy for a social pension from civil society, and the absence of a
public reaction to the introduction of the OAP.
The low level of anticipation among the elderly was highlighted by a
bureaucrat at the Department of Pensions²⁶ who has been involved with the
OAP since its commencement: ‘they [the government] had been saying it over
and over again [that there would be a pension]’. Upon registration, many
²⁴ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
²⁵ Mosisili used the word ‘private sector’ here to highlight that before the OAP was introduced, only
former civil servants received a government pension (thus anyone who was not in the ‘public sector’ did
not receive any government pension).
²⁶ Interview, bureaucrat, Department of Pensions, Maseru, April 2014.
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elderly ‘did not believe’ that a pension would actually be paid—apparently
there was even some ‘resistance’ at first, as some people assumed that it was a
‘trick for the next elections’. Once the first round of pensions had been
distributed, this disbelief was overcome and the elderly Basotho increasingly
began to register for the pension. This response was confirmed by Mosisili:²⁷
‘We had talked about introducing a pension since 1993, but nothing had
happened. So when we announced it in 2004, there was a lot of doubt as to
whether we would really carry it through’. This evidence could possibly
indicate that the Basotho did not expect their government to provide such a
grant for the elderly, which weakens Pelham’s argument that the Basotho felt
that universal pensions were a ‘right’ of the elderly based on the South African
example, prior to the introduced of the social pension in Lesotho.
4.8. A diffusion effect?
Barrientos (2009) concludes that even if the OAP in Lesotho was indeed an
effect of regional ‘diffusion’, ‘it is hard to see the example of Lesotho [ . . . ] as
indicative of more general trends [ . . . ] in low-income countries’ (Barrientos
2009: 79). Consequently, while the pension is likely to have been prompted by
the South African (and possibly other countries’) welfare model(s) to some
extent, Lesotho seems to have created its own version of a social pension,
possibly with a somewhat different objective in mind. Undoubtedly, the small
benefit, the high age of qualification, and its universal nature make the Lesotho
pension considerably different from the South African social pension.
Perhaps not too unexpectedly, none of the key stakeholders interviewed
affirmed any ‘connection’ between the Lesotho OAP and the South African
social pension. Some appeared rather surprised by this suggestion, such as the
former Principal Secretary of Public Service.²⁸ Correspondingly, Mosisili²⁹
very firmly stated that ‘I would not attribute it to the example of South Africa
in any way’. Thahane³⁰ reacted rather strongly to the question regarding a
possible diffusion effect. ‘They think we have no brains! The pension is home-
grown, like the free primary education. It’s like saying that Sweden invented
Volvo only because there were cars in other countries’. For a small, poverty-
stricken country like Lesotho that is highly dependent on South Africa,
²⁷ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
²⁸ Interview, former PS of Public Service, Maseru, August 2014.
²⁹ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
³⁰ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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programmes such as the OAP may thus be highly symbolic of the country’s
increasing ability to ‘help itself ’. Evidently, Lesotho did not discover the
concept of a ‘social pension’, but the insinuation that Lesotho may have simply
‘copied’ the pension from South Africa could still be perceived as offensive by
its implementers, who consider their pension scheme ‘unique’.
4.9. The right to a pension
While the OAP is unquestionably a legal entitlement based on the 2005 Old-
Age Pension Act (Government of Lesotho 2005), the common reference to
OAP as a ‘right’ (Pelham 2007)—as opposed to merely ‘support’ or ‘welfare’—
may point to a potentially unique incentive behind the pension, since far from
all social protection programmes are framed in this manner. The Minister of
Finance at the time, Dr Tim Thahane,³¹ recounted: ‘We felt that the elderly are
a legitimate target. We wouldn’t be where we are if it hadn’t been for them.
The pension gives them dignity’. The rights-argument was also strongly
emphasized by Prime Minister Mosisili,³² who explained that ‘a pension is
something that one qualifies for on the basis of age. Anybody can get a grant.
Also, a pension is something one deserves. We are not doing them a favour’.
Yet, it is unclear if Mosisili expanded on a policy discourse that had already
been created by the BCP in 1993, or if Mosisili himself decided to present the
pension as ‘a right’ of the people of Lesotho. It is also intriguing that the social
pension in Lesotho is in fact called a ‘pension’, although it is non-contributory.
This choice of word may reflect the idea that the Lesotho OAP was truly a
gesture of appreciation and respect towards the elderly from the Lesotho
government, and less a simple ‘imitation’ of the existing South African set-
up. As the former finance minister³³ highlighted, ‘The pension is an entitle-
ment. You deserve something, you have worked for the country. A grant you
can stop at any time’.
Yet, as Pelham (2007) and Croome et al. (2007) have asserted, the small
amount of the pension is insufficient to sustain an entire household. Further,
considering that almost two-thirds of the OAP went to non-poor households
in 2013 (World Bank 2013), the introduction of the pension cannot be
understood as a strategic developmental response to extreme poverty, per se
³¹ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
³² Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
³³ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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(Casey and McKinnon 2009: 97). This does not essentially discredit the
potentially developmental purpose of the pension, but it is questionable
whether it is able to make a substantial difference to the livelihood of an
impoverished elderly citizen who is caring for orphaned grandchildren. Thus,
perhaps the pension should indeed be understood as a ‘token of thanks’ to the
elderly, whose purpose may be more complementary and symbolic than
effectively ‘developmental’. Nonetheless, it appears that the domestic process
that prompted the OAP may have been the first step towards developing a
‘social contract’ (Pelham 2007). The alleged positive impact of the OAP
(Croome et al. 2007) and the programme’s popularity among the Basotho
may have shaped the Lesotho government’s affirming attitude towards cash
grants for vulnerable population groups. The positive responses triggered
through the OAP process may further have ‘opened a window of opportunity
for donor influence’ in the field of social assistance (Lavers and Hickey 2016)
and thus paved the way for the subsequent rather smooth introduction of the
child grant only a few years later.
5. The Child Grant—An African Success Story?
The Lesotho CGP was the second major social assistance reform under
Mosisili’s LCD government. However, unlike the OAP, this cash transfer is
an example of a social assistance programme that is based on transnational
ideas about social protection for vulnerable populations promoted by donors
(Lavers and Hickey 2016). The CGP took off as a donor-funded ‘pilot’ cash
transfer programme that gradually expanded and became ‘government-
owned’ (Davis et al. 2015). In 2013 this means-tested programme provided
a quarterly transfer of between M360 and M750 (US$36–US$74) to poor
households with children. According to the World Bank (2013), the CGP is
‘one of the few programmes [in Lesotho] that make a systematic effort to
identify the most vulnerable’. Unlike the OAP, the CGP purposely attempts
to target the poorest households. Initially it was financed by the European Union
(EU), with the technical support of UNICEF, and was originally implemented
by the former Department of Social Welfare. Today the programme is run by
the Ministry of Social Development, which was established in 2012.³⁴ Since
³⁴ After the 2012 elections, Thomas Thabane (not to be confused with former finance minister, Tim
Thahane) succeeded Mosisili as prime minister with his ABC party by building a coalition government
with the support of two opposition parties.
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October 2013, all the benefit costs of the grant have been funded by the
government. In the year 2017, 27,000 households with about 80,000 children
benefited from the CGP (UNICEF 2017).³⁵
5.1. A donor-driven policy coalition
The CGP has followed a very different policy process compared to the
OAP, although it was initiated only three years later and under the same
government. However, by 2006, the LCD hegemony had begun to decline
(Likoti 2009). In order to win the 2007 elections, Mosisili’s LCD had to enter
an alliance with the NIP, and from this point on, coalitions started dominating
Lesotho politics (Booysen 2015). With regards to the development of a
distributional regime, building on existing programmes such as the OAP,
this changing power balance may have undermined Mosisili’s opportunities
to pursue his preferred policies (if he had any such plans). Further, the
years after the 2007 elections were shaped by political turmoil. Hence, griev-
ances regarding access to power and succession to party leadership
(Weisfelder 2015) may further have distracted the LCD from policy-making,
creating a fresh space for transnational actors to step in, particularly as
Lesotho found itself in a fragile economic period.
The CGP is part of the EU project, ‘Support to Lesotho HIV and AIDS
Response: Empowerment of Orphans and Vulnerable Children’ that was
initiated in 2006 as a reaction to the absence of an effective support system
for OVC in the HIV/AIDS context (Thomson and Kardan 2012). The aim of
the programme was to enhance the living standards of OVC by reducing
malnutrition, improving health status, and increasing school enrolment.
A second objective of the programme was to eventually strengthen the cap-
acity of the government to deliver cash grants to households with children
(Blank 2008). As the National OVC Strategy highlights, the traditional prac-
tice in the rural communities vis-à-vis orphaned children was based on
community involvement; yet, predictably, these mechanisms had become
overstretched.³⁶ Since there are many ‘non-poor’ orphans and many other
children who are not orphans but are nonetheless living in extreme poverty
and vulnerability in Lesotho, the CGP targets ‘orphans and vulnerable
³⁵ Table showing the progression of the CGP available in Granvik (2016).
³⁶ Another transfer programme that specifically targets OVC is the OVC Bursary Scheme that
provides bursaries to OVC in secondary school, yet prior to the CGP there was no initiative
that supported the general needs of OVC and their families.
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children’. The programme defines OVC as orphans (having lost one or both
parents), or those children who are HIV positive, or those living without
adequate adult support (World Bank 2013).
As the former Department of Social Welfare lacked the capacity to admin-
ister a complex means-tested social assistance programme, UNICEF was
selected to take on the role of delivering technical assistance to the government
in order to build its competency to independently run the CGP (World Bank
2013). A community-based targeting system was developed and studies on
appropriate delivery mechanisms were commissioned. First payments were
made to households in one pilot district in April 2009 and by January 2010 the
programme had reached 1,000 households, caring for over 2,700 OVC with
quarterly payments of M360 (Thomson and Kardan 2012). By early 2010, the
CGP pilot was expanded to an additional three community councils. An
external consultancy company that specializes in cash transfer programmes,
Ayala Consulting, was brought in to complete the technical design and to
develop technical guidelines and computer models. Further, a National Infor-
mation System for Social Assistance (NISSA) was created to register informa-
tion on all households, to be used for the selection of the CGP beneficiaries.
5.2. The role of the Lesotho government
The information provided by the EU Delegation to Lesotho and by Thomson
and Kardan (2012) indicates that the EU was the main driver of the CGP. By
the early 2000s, assistance to children in Lesotho had been primarily delivered
through a WFP school-feeding programme or through small programmes by
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) (e.g. World Vision). Some efforts that specif-
ically acknowledged children’s vulnerability had previously taken place in
the context of temporary international emergency relief, for instance
during several natural disasters during the 2000s, such as the 2002 drought.
According to a World Vision Lesotho employee,³⁷ voices regarding the need
for targeted assistance to OVC were first raised through government social
workers. Similarly, the Ministry of Social Development³⁸ stated that ‘the
government went looking for funding’ after concerns regarding OVC had
been identified. According to the former principal secretary of the former
³⁷ Interview, manager, World Vision, Maseru, April 2014.
³⁸ Interview, manager, Ministry of Social Development, Maseru, April 2014.
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Department of Social Welfare,³⁹ the child grant was ‘the government’s idea in
the context of HIV. There was a need for the Department of Social Welfare to
come up with a programme to assist OVC’.
Mosisili⁴⁰ expressed uncertainty regarding the roots of the CGP: ‘I cannot
quite say whose idea it was’. However, he emphasized that ‘it was something
we saw the need for’. Mosisili explained the involvement of external stake-
holders as follows: ‘We didn’t have the resources . . .We were being assisted’.
Further, he disclosed that ‘the availability of funding came at a time when we
were still grappling with teething problems with the OAP’. Thus, challenges
faced with the OAPmay have discouraged the government from attempting to
initiate another (much more advanced) social assistance programme. Accord-
ing to key stakeholders,⁴¹ such challenges included general issues with fraud
and corruption, the difficulty of the overlap with the pension for civil servants,
and the lack of capacity to deliver cash to remote areas. Overall, Mosisili’s
personal vision⁴² of the state as a provider of social protection appeared
affirmative: ‘It [state support to vulnerable groups] makes sense, it is the
right thing to do, to make sure that children have a chance. The more we
invest in our people, the better chance we have to break the cycle [of poverty].
The government will have to make provision for it’. Based on his statements,
Mosisili appears to perceive social assistance as a necessary ‘stepping stone’ to
economic and social development. Yet, it must be kept in mind that it is not
very surprising that a former (and, with hindsight, aspiring) prime minister
would want to take ‘credit’ for the poverty-reduction programmes that his
government implemented.
Elite commitment to social protection is essential (Lavers and Hickey 2016),
and it is possible that Mosisili’s views regarding the assistance of vulnerable
groups shaped the government’s willingness to adopt and implement pro-
grammes such as the CGP, even if accompanied with imminent financial
obligations for the government. Conversely, Mosisili does not appear to have
been as closely associated with the CGP as he was with the free primary school
education and the OAP that were implemented a few years earlier. It is likely
that the much more limited and ‘targeted’ coverage of the CGP had limited the
general population’s level of awareness about this cash transfer. Also, the fact
that the grant was initiated and initially funded by a foreign donor may have
³⁹ Written correspondence, former PS, Ministry of Finance, August 2014.
⁴⁰ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
⁴¹ Interviews with bureaucrat in the Department of Pensions, April 2014; project manager at Ayala
Consulting, August 2014; and former commissioner of pensions, Ministry of Finance, August 2014.
⁴² Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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prevented Mosisili and other politicians from ‘personalizing’ this programme
for political gains.
Nonetheless, according to the EU Delegation to Lesotho,⁴³ ‘the Lesotho
child grant is distinctive in as much that it has been directly implemented by
the government, with strong technical support from UNICEF. The Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare has had a strong involvement from the beginning
and this has certainly facilitated the transition from a fully donor-funded
project to a national programme, a unique success story of this magnitude
in the sub-Saharan continent’. Mosisili⁴⁴ recounted: ‘The understanding
has always been there that the government would take over’. The effective
cooperation between the funder and the government is confirmed by the EU:⁴⁵
‘The Government of Lesotho has been praised for the commitment shown up
to now and for having allocated the required financial resources for the Child
Grant Programme in its 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 budgets’.
5.3. Convincing the sceptics
The ultimate willingness of the government and the rather powerful Ministry
of Finance, led by Dr Thahane, to agree to take on the CGP during an
economically insecure time is noteworthy, especially considering the earlier
reluctance to involve foreign donors with the OAP. According to the key
informants, includingMosisili, the finance ministry did not stand in the way of
this programme. However, Pellerano et al. (2016: 269) report ‘criticism from
key stakeholders’ such as the finance ministry in the early stages of the CGP,
‘grounded in the lack of evidence that the CGP was an affordable and
beneficial intervention that the government could integrate into its budget’.
The authors also mention that donors faced ‘ideological resistance to cash
transfers’ (Pellerano et al. 2016: 268).
Certainly, during the interview, Dr Thahane⁴⁶ expressed more caution
about the child grant than when discussing the OAP: ‘The Ministry of
Finance reacted cautiously. We had not yet built up a model that would
support it. Money was needed for such an investment—can we sustain it?
Also, how do you administer it?’ Further, the scepticism about donor
⁴³ Written correspondence, programme manager, EU Delegation to Lesotho, August 2014.
⁴⁴ Interview, former prime minister, Maseru, August 2014.
⁴⁵ Written correspondence, programme manager, EU Delegation to Lesotho, August 2014.
⁴⁶ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
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involvement that Thahane⁴⁷ had revealed regarding the implementation of
the OAP was evident in the CGP context as well: ‘UNICEF, FAO [Food and
Agriculture Organization], and the World Bank, they do their separate
thing. We need investments that lead to long-term results, and that will
increase the tax-base. The finance ministry looks at the total needs of the
country’. The former principal secretary of the finance ministry⁴⁸ who
worked with Thahane at the time also implied that the ministry felt some-
what ‘run over’ by donors: ‘Assuming the responsibility for the child grant
was inevitable and known in advance. Donors tend to catalyse policies that
would otherwise not receive attention based on single year fiscal consider-
ations. On the other hand, they can elevate donor priorities to be assumed
into the budget without much fiscal analysis’. According to Pellerano et al.
(2016), the EU and UNICEF addressed government scepticism by provid-
ing rigorous evidence through evaluations, and study tours to other coun-
tries operating cash transfer systems at a large scale. This was confirmed by
the EU representative.⁴⁹
As conveyed by Pellerano et al. (2016: 268), ‘the broader political dimension
mattered’, and the government’s commitment to contribute to the CGP was
primarily achieved through an agreement with IMF ‘for bridging funds and
support to its budget’. This circumstance suggests that the Government of
Lesotho (GoL) was to some extent pressured to commit domestic resources to
this cash transfer programme, regardless of the government’s initial concerns
about dependency (Pellerano et al. 2016: 268), for instance. Further, the
administrative difficulties associated with the OAP and the weakness of the
Department of Social Welfare may have contributed to the realization that
external technical support was indispensable, even if it would require the
involvement of transnational actors.
Consequently, it may have been a combination of the increasingly acute
situation created by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country, the ability of the
EU and UNICEF to ‘sell’ the programme to the government, as well as
pressure by the IMF that enabled the relatively straightforward conception
and expansion of the CGP. Mosisili’s self-reported favourable views towards
the protection of the vulnerable may also have played a role, but they are
unlikely to have been decisive. Thus, while the popularity of Mosisili’s OAP
may have facilitated the gradual acceptance of a cash transfer benefiting OVC,
⁴⁷ Interview, former finance minister, Maseru, August 2014.
⁴⁸ Written correspondence, former principal secretary of finance ministry, August 2014.
⁴⁹ Written correspondence, programme manager, EU Delegation to Lesotho, August 2014.
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this programme has followed a very different trajectory than the social
pension. Nevertheless, although the CGP initiative was undoubtedly primarily
donor-driven, both with regards to ideas and technical expertise, its success
would have been unlikely without governmental commitment to the long-
term provision for such an initiative.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
While the Lesotho OAP and the CGP certainly differ in terms of their origins
and perhaps also in their purpose, both cash transfers provide assistance to
destitute groups and have become significant elements of Lesotho’s social
protection landscape. It can be concluded that both programmes have
emerged and grown as the result of an explicit political will to invest in social
protection programmes, highlighting the significance of a country’s political
settlement dynamics as advocated by Lavers and Hickey (2016).
This study suggests that it was the political shift in the early 2000s that
facilitated the implementation of a social pension in Lesotho. While interviews
with key informants were not able to unambiguously provide an explanation
for why the OAP was not put into practice until 2004, or uncover why a social
pension was added to the political agenda in Lesotho in the first place, the
regime change in the early 2000s appears to have been significant. Firstly,
Mosisili was an ideological leader holding strong electoral legitimacy. Faced
with the HIV/AIDS crisis and its socioeconomic consequences, he appears
to have been dedicated to finally initiating the long-promised social pension,
having appointed a capable Minister of Finance to support him. Further, there
was no debate prior to implementation or attempts to undermine this policy
(Lavers and Hickey 2016), corresponding with Khan’s ‘dominant coalition’ type.
Ultimately, the commitment to the OAP does not appear to have been
triggered by threats to regime stability but rather by the shift in the power
balance from ongoing political conflict to relative stability. Further, this shift
and the elite cohesion within the Mosisili government is likely to have
improved state capacity to effectively implement social protection pro-
grammes, similar to the case studies presented by Lavers and Hickey (2016).
Further, the insistence on defining the pension as a right of the elderly and
something that one ‘deserves’ signals that the Lesotho social pension is not
simply perceived as a typical ‘social welfare’ or poverty-reduction initiative.
Thus, the strong association of the OAP with former prime minister Mosisili
completes the image of a consciously home-grown initiative, particularly since
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the process behind it deviates significantly from the subsequent donor-driven
initiation of the CGP, which lacks such political ‘champions’.
The CGP was certainly driven by transnational actors and the GoL may
have had to ‘give in’ to donor pressure to commit domestic funding to the
programme. This circumstance strengthens the argument that the CGP devel-
oped primarily through a transnational process. Yet, as examples from other
African countries show, even donor-driven programmes such as cash grants
for OVC require political commitment from the national government in order
to succeed long-term. Pellerano et al.’s (2016) account of the extensive efforts
required to consolidate the CGP in the government agenda reveal that it was
not self-evident that the government would see the value of a CGP and
eventually take over the programme. Once again, Lesotho’s political stability
and rather dominant government may have worked to the advantage of the
donors involved in promoting this social protection initiative.
In conclusion, the case of Lesotho indicates a broader preference of some
African governments to focus on social assistance for the elderly, as opposed
to allocating state funds to similar programmes that are more poverty-focused
and specifically target vulnerable groups such as OVC. Firstly, many govern-
ments may not have the administrative and technical capacity that is required
to carry out complex means testing, so that universal programmes are con-
sidered more feasible. Further, the elderly tend to be a rather small group in
most sub-Saharan African countries, thus limiting the costs of such pro-
grammes. It is also worth bearing in mind that universal (or near-universal)
programmes such as the OAP are likely to arouse more enthusiasm among the
general population than poverty-targeted ones. Accordingly, as Peyre Dutrey
(2007) has suggested, targeted poverty alleviation programmes (as opposed to
providing universal support) can even undermine political backing, as the
population receiving benefits becomes smaller and less powerful, which may
not result in any significant ‘political benefits’.
Examples such as Lesotho may thus provide valuable guidelines for foreign
donors attempting to collaborate with sub-Saharan African governments
when initiating social protection programmes. Kelsall (2016: 3), for instance,
proposes that a political settlement analysis can be valuable when distinguish-
ing between country contexts and identifying priority areas in which to work
and with whom to partner. Unless supporters of social protection manage to
‘get the politics right’ in a particular country, as Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012: 32)
have emphasized, it is doubtful whether a proposed social cash transfer
programme will obtain government ownership and thus become sustainable,
regardless of the target group.
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In 2015, after a few years in opposition, Pakalitha Mosisili was once again
declared prime minister (as the head of a coalition) after early elections that
followed an attempted military coup that had once again triggered a political
crisis (The Commonwealth 2016). Thus, Lesotho again found itself in a fragile
democracy, while also facing economic hardship (Weisfelder 2015; World
Bank 2016a, 2016b). In light of the country’s political and financial challenges,
the sustainability of the current social cash transfer programmes and the
feasibility of their expansion are unclear. Not only has the development budget
decreased, partly because of the unstable political situation (UNICEF 2017),
but both the OAP and the CGP are still battling with a lack of efficiency, which
undermines the impact of these programmes. For instance, 56 per cent of OAP
beneficiaries are believed to be ‘ghost’ pensioners (UNICEF 2017), and Leso-
tho social assistance transfers have yet to be adjusted for inflation, eroding the
practical value of the transfer for its vulnerable recipients (UNICEF 2017). The
future of social assistance in Lesotho will most likely continue to depend on
political commitment to creating fiscal space for such programmes and their
development. Yet, as long as initiatives that aim to relieve poverty and create a
foundation for long-term development are overshadowed by inter-party con-
flicts (and potential donor withdrawal), the odds of the prioritization of such
initiatives seem ominous.
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The Politics of Promoting Social Cash
Transfers in Zambia
Kate Pruce and Sam Hickey
1. Introduction
In 2013, Zambia’s then Minister of Finance announced that there would be
a 700 per cent increase in the budget for what was then a pilot social cash
transfer programme. The move took everyone by surprise, including the
coalition of international donors, government officials, and civil society actors
who had been responsible for promoting the pilot programme and who had
been calling for its scale-up, amidst support for a broader social protection
agenda in Zambia for nearly a decade. Over roughly the same period, barely
any progress had been made on other elements of this agenda. By mid-2016,
the social cash transfer scheme had received another boost, with the 2015
budget being further increased by two thirds, from 180 million kwacha to just
over 300 million kwacha, enabling a scale-up from fifty to seventy-eight
districts by the end of the year.
In seeking to account for the shifting politics of commitment to social
protection in Zambia, this chapter goes beyond the focus on elections and
institutions within mainstream accounts of how social protection is likely to
emerge in Africa, and draws attention instead to the underlying dynamics of
politics and power that shape elite commitment. This chapter focuses on social
cash transfers (SCTs) as themost rapidly expanding aspect of Zambia’s National
Social Protection Strategy, and argues that their rise reflects the interplay of
transnational advocacy with the shifting dynamics of Zambia’s ‘political settle-
ment’, as primarily shaped by the incentives and ideas of ruling elites.
These insights emerge from our employment of a new conceptual approach to
understand the political economy of social protection in Africa (Lavers and
Hickey 2016). This approach incorporates insights from the literature on
welfare state development and social protection in both industrialized countries
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and the global South (Huber and Stephens 2012; Kpessa and Béland 2013; also
Barrientos and Pellissery 2012; Hickey 2007; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012); the
politics of development, with a focus on power relations (DiJohn and Putzel
2009; Khan 2010); the role of ideas in shaping political behaviour and institu-
tional change (Hay 2011; Schmidt 2008); and the role of transnational actors,
including global policy networks (Stone 2008). The framework is explained
further in Lavers and Hickey (2016) and also in Chapter 1 of this book.
The policy case examined here helps illustrate the potential of this new
approach for understanding how welfare regimes may be emerging in Africa.
We demonstrate that struggles to promote social protection in Zambia have
occurred both within and between the policy coalition promoting SCTs and
the national ruling coalition. This is taking place in a transnationalized context
in which global actors and flows of both resources and ideas are embedded
within these coalition-building processes. For example, the efforts of a trans-
national policy coalition to promote SCTs over the 2000s had been heavily
contested by officials and politicians, particularly the Minister of Finance who
stated that poverty did not exist and that SCTs encouraged laziness (Hickey et al.
2009; Kabandula and Seekings 2016), reflecting a view that the main policy
priority should be growth (Barrientos et al. 2005). By 2012, advocates had made
some inroads into this opposition, producing a wealth of evidence in support of
cash transfers and undertaking extensive informal lobbying. In 2011 a new
political party came to power with a mandate to distribute resources to poorer
groups. However, our analysis shows that the actual decision to scale up govern-
ment support in 2013 came about not from these enabling factors per se but
from the shifting dynamics of Zambia’s political settlement, and in particular
a perceived crisis within existing means of distributing resources to rural areas.
This narrative, which we set out in more detail below, emerges from our
adoption of a process-tracing methodology that seeks to identify the causal
mechanisms leading to specific observed outcomes, through a theoretically
based historical explanation of a sequence of events (George and Bennett 2005).
In this study, the observed outcome is the political decision to scale up SCTs
in Zambia. This investigation involved documentary analysis and over thirty
semi-structured key informant interviews with the main stakeholders involved
in the process, including government representatives, both politicians and
technocrats; Zambian organizations ranging from civil social organizations to
think tanks and consultancies; representatives of co-operating partners, mainly
the multilateral and bilateral donors engaged in the process; as well as key
individuals who are currently unaffiliated. The interviews were conducted
during fieldwork undertaken in Zambia in April to May 2015.
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The chapter proceeds by outlining the shifting political settlement in
Zambia from independence to the present day. It then sets out the process
through which the transnational policy coalition sought to promote SCTs
from the early 2000s, before providing an analytical discussion through the
lens of our political settlements framework, and finally a conclusion.
2. The Political Settlement in Zambia
Zambia’s political settlement, understood here as ‘the balance of power
between contending social groups on which any state is based’ (Di John and
Putzel 2009: 4), has undergone a series of shifts in the decades since inde-
pendence. Strongly informed by the legacy of colonial rule, under which
projects of state formation and governmentality took shape around the con-
struction of ethno-linguistic groups, the efforts of successive ruling coalitions
to enforce a stable set of institutions capable of delivering an acceptable
distribution of rents have been influenced by this balance of power (Khan 2010).
Colonial rule saw the country divided into five ethno-linguistic groupings:
Bemba (43 per cent of the population), Nyanja (18 per cent), Tonga (includ-
ing Ila and Lenje, 19 per cent), Lozi (8 per cent), and the north-west region
(12 per cent) (Scarritt 2006). As Scarritt (2006: 239) notes, ‘these linguistic
groups were constructed before they were politicised through conflicts
within the nationalist movement and post-independence parties’ with the
north-west region, where none of the four major languages predominate,
‘constructed . . . in response to the politicisation of the other groups’ (ibid.).
With no single group able to dominate alone, the politics of forming ruling
coalitions in post-colonial Zambia has been shaped by efforts to form
coalitions across these groups, with a tendency to seek ‘inclusive or over-
sized rather than minimum winning coalitions’ (Scarritt 2006: 234).
Following Khan (2010), forming such coalitions involves navigating the
balance of power both in horizontal terms, regarding relations between elite
factions, and also vertically, regarding the relationship between elites and
wider social groups. We now set out the historical character of the political
settlement in Zambia since independence until the current moment, with a
focus on the shifting balance of power along these dimensions and the
dominant incentives and ideas that have prevailed within different ruling
coalitions over this time period. Although this history includes the shift
from the single-party tendencies of Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Inde-
pendence Party (UNIP) to the return of multi-party politics in 1991, our focus
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on the underlying logics of how ruling coalitions are formed enables the
analysis to move beyond the limits of formal institutional analysis in examin-
ing the deeper politics of development in Zambia.
2.1. Inter-elite relations and coalition-building
in post-colonial Zambia
In the early independence period, the strategy of building inclusive ruling
coalitions, the related discourse of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’, and modernist
narratives of development as part of the nationalist, state-building project led
by Kaunda (Larmer et al. 2014) all helped underpin an often progressive
period of economic and social development. Boosted by high copper prices,
the initial political and development strategy had positive pay-offs in terms of
generating stability, a sense of nationhood, and a degree of human develop-
ment (Noyoo 2010). However, the centralization of power within the presi-
dency and the emergence of a system of neopatrimonialism, both to satisfy
the demands of factions and for personal gain, undermined bureaucratic
capacity and autonomy, and reduced public sector efficiency (Erdmann and
Simutanyi 2003). The inclusive strategy also proved costly, including through
the establishment of numerous ministerial positions and the nationalization
of several economic enterprises in the late 1960s, primarily as a means of
allocating rents between dominant groups (Lindemann 2011: 1852). The
falling prices of copper during the 1970s threw this politics of development
into sharp relief: drastic reductions were made to expenditure on social
services, the greater proportion of which was spent on personal emoluments,
such as salaries and expenses for staff, with only 2.3 per cent being spent on
programmes in 1980 (Dixon 1987).
This mode of governance would also have political ramifications for
Zambia’s first ruling coalition, in part because it failed to align itself fully
with the country’s resource-based political economy. The centrality of the
Copperbelt to the extractive strategies of the colonial administration led to
widespread in-migration into the area and the formation of socio-political
identities along class rather than ethnic lines. As a result, ‘the multi-ethnic
Copperbelt gave rise to a broad-based nationalist movement’ (Lindemann
2011: 1848), generating urban and unionized factions that closely shaped the
politics of independence in Zambia but which gained very little from Kaunda’s
use of ethno-linguistic ties as the basis for political inclusion. Importantly, it
was these groups, along with businessmen, churches, and intellectuals, which
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
         179
would eventually depose Kaunda through the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD) in 1991 (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).
The reintroduction of multi-party politics at this time changed but did not
fully transform how politics works in Zambia. Once in power, successive
governments would seek to cement inclusive coalitions, deploying a strategy
of ethno-regional balance in the allocation of key positions within the execu-
tive, administration, military, and parastatal sector (Lindemann 2011).
Although successful in terms of maintaining stability, the rapid growth of
ministries and the civil service that this strategy entailed would once again
undermine the country’s development prospects. As Lindemann (2011: 1864)
notes, ‘while the civil service as an important bastion of the elite bargain was
protected, expenditure cuts were implemented in public investment and social
spending, with obvious implications for economic development’ (ibid.: 1864).
This mode of elite incorporation, with appointments given on the basis of
identity rather than expertise, helped feed expectations amongst citizens that
the primary role of their representatives in power was to secure their support
through the vertical distribution of rents, particularly through public sector
employment and agricultural food subsidies (see section 2.2).
The incentive to forge an inclusive coalition inevitably directs a great
deal of energy inwards to managing competing factions within the ruling
coalition, thus reducing the level of elite cohesion and focus on development
(Levy 2014). There was also an important ideational element to this apparent
reluctance to redistribute resources in a systematic way. A survey of Zambia’s
elite in the first decade of independence found that they tended to emphasize
equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome, a tendency that
seems likely to have reduced their preference for redistributive policies
(Scarritt 2006). More recent findings (Scarritt 2010) reveal that Zambia’s
political elites tend to prioritize the acquisition of status over concerns with
equality. This helps to explain their emphasis on maintaining status through
centralized processes of capturing rents and inter-elite bargaining regarding
the horizontal balance of power amongst elites, rather than putting in place
effective mechanisms of rent distribution to manage the vertical dimensions of
power within Zambia’s political settlement.
The extension of political space offered by the return of multi-party politics
has arguably intensified this tendency by creating a clearer exit option for
elites dissatisfied with their status within the ruling coalition. The incentives
for dissatisfied elites to leave and form their own challenger parties are
further raised by the presidentialist character of the political system in
Zambia, whereby the president holds significant personal powers concerning
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appointments and rents. This centralization of power has created numerous
problems in Zambia, including deficits in political accountability and a
weak parliament that struggles to make meaningful policy changes without
executive turnovers (Evans 2018). Importantly, it creates a strong incentive
for internal squabbles over party leadership and succession issues (Scarritt
2006: 240), and raises the attractiveness for elites of leaving and forming their
own party as a basis for running for office. This occurred during Frederick
Chiluba’s push for a third term (Lindemann 2011: 1860), which saw MMD
Minister Michael Sata leave and form his own party, the Patriotic Front (PF)
(Scarritt 2006: 249).¹
2.2. The increased importance of vertical power relations
under multi-party politics in Zambia
The broad-based coalition of economic and social interest groups that brought
the MMD to power soon splintered. This was partly due to Chiluba’s brand of
presidentialism and partly because ongoing processes of economic and polit-
ical liberalization were undermining the productive and organizational basis
of key socioeconomic groupings in ways that limited their role in governance
(Rakner 2003). Increasingly closely fought elections further increased the
vulnerability of the MMD ruling coalition over the 2000s. With the political
loyalties of lower-level factions now up for grabs within the new political
marketplace, certain forms of clientelism intensified, particularly in the form
of agricultural subsidies, mainly fertilizer and maize seed (Mason et al. 2013).
The MMD’s distribution of agricultural subsidies during the 1990s and
2000s was highly politicized. Universal subsidies were replaced by more
targeted approaches, ostensibly on cost-cutting grounds but in ways that
enabled government to target them politically. According to Mason et al.
(2013: 2) ‘the scale of the programs . . . has increased dramatically over the
last decade, e.g. from 48,000 metric tons (MT) of fertilizer in 2002 to 184,000
MT in 2012’, with households in constituencies won by MMD in the last
presidential election receiving an average of between 16.2kg and 23.2kg more
subsidized fertilizer compared to households in areas thatMMD lost. Just before
the September 2011 elections, ‘Banda dramatically scaled up Farmer Input
¹ Which, contrary to earlier history (Scarritt 2006), proved to be an electorally successful strategy in
the end, perhaps as Sata worked out how to mobilize a different kind of coalition based on urban
support, as MMD did when they gained power in 1991.
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Support Programme from 100,000 MT in 2009/10 to 178,000 MT in 2010/11.
The move proved insufficient to secure a victory, however, and Michael Sata
(Patriotic Front) defeated him by nearly seven percentage points’ (ibid.: 4).
Politics took on a more populist character in Zambia over this time period
(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010), not least in the pursuit of the urban vote
which has become increasingly crucial to the electoral turnovers (Rakner and
Helle 2012) that help define Zambia’s competitive clientelism. When MMD
took power in 1991 they gained 95 per cent of seats in urban areas, and urban
voters would again be critical in bringing the PF to power in 2011. Under
Michael Sata’s leadership the PF would promote a distinctive brand of ‘ethno-
populism’, aimed at wooing urban voters and challenging the sense that the
party was over-reliant on support from Bemba voters (Cheeseman and Larmer
2015; Larmer and Fraser 2007). A focus on generating support amongst urban
working classes and the intelligentsia led to a leftist policy agenda focused on
the labour market: minimum wages, labour relations, and being tough on
businesses (Rakner and Helle 2012: 11). Sata’s strategy also included messages
on social inclusion and anti-elitism to attract the urban poor (Resnick 2014).
Its appeal to rural voters was also populist in tone, with broad claims to be
‘pro-poor’ and promises to ‘put more money in people’s pockets’. In electoral
terms, this strategy helped enable the PF go from gaining 3 per cent of the vote
in 2001 to winning the 2011 election (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015), and
brought into power a ruling coalition more directly oriented towards subor-
dinate groups than its predecessors.
Meanwhile, the formal institutional aspects of democratization in Zambia
seemed to be stalling. The vibrant independent media and civil society that
initially flourished in the transition to multi-party politics struggled to become
institutionalized. Although civil society recorded an historic victory in pre-
venting President Chiluba from amending the constitution in order to allow
him to stand for a third term (Gould 2006), later campaigns around the
constitution in 2007 and democracy in 2012 largely failed. Given the defining
influence of clientelism over state–society relationships, observers noted that
the influence of the citizen voice over the delivery of public goods and services
tended to flounder (Harland 2014; Kuss 2015).
3. The Rise of Social Cash Transfers in Zambia
Efforts by external actors to promote a government-owned social protection
agenda in Zambia from the early 2000s encountered a challenging environment,
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not only in terms of the political settlement dynamics at the time but also with
regards to the country’s institutional and ideational context. From 1975
onwards, reform and structural adjustment programmes had promoted the
role of market, rather than state, as the mechanism for allocating resources in
Zambia (Mhone 2004). Along with declining civil service performance, this led
to a wide range of non-state actors, including NGOs and church organizations,
playing an increased role in delivering services (Duncan et al. 2003). The
influential role of international agencies over social policy at this time further
underlined the growing ‘externalisation of social provision’ within Zambia’s
‘welfare regime’ (Larmer et al. 2014).
Despite Zambia experiencing a significant decline in living standards over
this period, the ‘social protection agenda’ was virtually non-existent beyond a
residual Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) (Harland 2014). Estab-
lished in the 1950s, PWAS is an unconditional in-kind transfer with the aim of
meeting the basic needs of people unable to support themselves, which was
redesigned and relaunched in the late 1990s in response to the country’s
experience of one of Africa’s worst HIV/AIDS pandemics. While PWAS and
the first SCT pilot both aimed to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS on
households with limited labour capacity and high dependency ratios, this
factor did not emerge as being central to the strategy to influence government
to adopt social protection in this case. Importantly, the pandemic did not lead
to the crisis of governance that some predicted at the time (deWaal 2003), and
therefore had relatively little impact on the functioning and character of the
political settlement in Zambia.
More broadly, Zambia’s high levels of indebtedness had led it to sign up to
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper experiment in 2001. Although this
would provide a window through which donors could start promoting social
protection, there was strong opposition from within government to pursuing a
redistributive agenda which was at odds with both the then government’s
‘growth-first’ approach and longer-standing elite ideas around deservingness
and equality, such that: ‘the prevailing political discourse in Zambia tends to
favour the “productive” segment of the population’ (Hickey et al. 2009: 77).
This was reflected in programmes being targeted at ‘vulnerable but viable’
farmers and the productivist, infrastructure-oriented character of Zambia’s
Fifth National Development Plan that replaced the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers in 2006.
Towards the end of the 2000s, however, it was increasingly clear that
Zambia’s impressive rates of growth of 5–6 per cent had not translated into
poverty reduction. The number of people falling below the poverty line
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remained stubbornly high at 60.5 per cent in 2010, with the number in
extreme poverty standing at 42 per cent (Central Statistical Office 2011).
This convergence between questions being raised over the growth-first strat-
egy and the ascent to power of the PF in 2011 on a pro-poor agenda raised
hopes that Zambia’s national development planning would become more
focused on poverty reduction, including social protection.
By the time of this promising convergence, international development
agencies had spent nearly a decade trying to promote social protection in
Zambia. This effort unfolded through three main phases: the first involved the
introduction by the German Development Agency (GTZ) of a pilot cash
transfer scheme in 2003 which catalysed a concerted effort by donors to
promote social protection through building a broader constituency of support
behind this new policy agenda. Once a scaled-up SCT programme was agreed
with the Zambian government in 2010, the next phase involved donors
building the capacity of the government to deliver SCTs alongside a continued
advocacy campaign. Finally, the current phase of expansion and roll-out began
in 2013 with the announcement of a 700 per cent increase for SCTs in the
national budget and adoption of a national social protection strategy.²
This increased financial commitment from the government, from a base of
17.4 million kwacha to 150 million kwacha, meant that the government
displaced donors as the main financier of cash transfers and would enable a
further expansion to fifty districts by the end of 2014. Section 3 describes how
these phases unfolded before section 4 analyses the political drivers of these
shifts through the political settlements framework introduced earlier.
3.1. Promoting social protection and cash transfers in Zambia
In 2003, GTZ approached the Ministry of Community Development with the
suggestion of a pilot cash transfer scheme. The GTZ model was designed to
respond to high levels of food poverty and labour constrained households,
exacerbated by the burden of HIV (Schubert 2005). Despite requests from
relevant officials that the pilot scheme be integrated within the scaled-up
² In June 2014 the Zambian government published a National Social Protection Policy that
encompassed a range of instruments, including the scaled-up SCT programme, a new social health
insurance scheme, and proposed reforms to public sector pensions. This umbrella approach was
proposed by a Cabinet sub-committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and the various stakeholders
had little choice but to support it, despite some disagreements between the Ministries of Community
Development and Health, and their respective co-operating partners, regarding which of their pre-
ferred policy instruments should be pursued as a priority.
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PWAS, which the then finance minister supported (ZK1), the project was
designed as a separate entity, with GTZ focusing its assistance only on the
structures and capacity needed for implementation in a small part of Kalomo
district (Harland 2014). This scheme would go on to generate what one
respondent referred to as ‘Kalomo mania’ (ZK1), forming a key reference
point in the wider transnational effort to establish social protection as a global
policy agenda (Hickey and Seekings 2017). Meanwhile, the resources and
attention directed to the new national PWAS dwindled (Harland 2014).
In late 2003, social development advisors from the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and the World Bank proposed to the
government that they establish a Sector Advisory Group on Social Protection.
This would be chaired by the Ministry of Community Development and
directly inform the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper review process. The
two agencies were not always in accord: they strongly disagreed about the
use of conditionality in low-income African countries (Schubert and Slater
2006), and the Bank promoted its ‘social risk management’ approach whilst
DFID chose a consultant associated with an alternative perspective on social
protection as transformation to write the strategy paper for the new sector
(Hickey et al. 2009). A chapter on social protection nonetheless formed part of
what became the Fifth National Development Plan, and although the numer-
ous programmes listed there received little funding or political attention, social
protection had been established on the policy, if not the political, agenda.
By 2007, variants of the Kalomo scheme were operating in parts of five
districts, reaching some 12,000 beneficiary households, with funding from
DFID (Harland 2014). Delivery was undertaken by the Ministry of Commu-
nity Development with assistance from GTZ (Schubert 2005), CARE Inter-
national, and HelpAge International. Meanwhile, the shifting dynamics of aid
enabled DFID to take a lead on policy advocacy and development. Zambia’s
adoption of the Joint Assistance Strategy in 2007, informed by Paris Declar-
ation principles concerning harmonization, led both GTZ and the Bank to
leave the social protection sector, clearing the way for DFID to take a lead
alongside like-minded donors such as UNICEF and Irish Aid.
DFID’s efforts to promote social protection in partnership with the Ministry
of Community Development enabled it to strongly influence policy develop-
ment and build a cadre of committed civil servants. An account of this process
in Zambia drawing on insights from practitioners attests to the strengthening
of Zambian technical assistants vis-à-vis their international counterparts
between 2005 and 2010 (Quarles van Ufford et al. 2016). However, this
did not lead to increased government ownership of the agenda, given the
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ministry’s marginal role within the Zambian government and strong opposition
from more powerful ministries (Hickey et al. 2009), particularly the finance
ministry (ZG9). From 2005 onwards, DFID Zambia started to adopt a more
politically informed approach to building a constituency for social protec-
tion, informed in part by their commissioning of a ‘drivers of change’ study
(Barrientos et al. 2005). This strategy had both technical and political elem-
ents, from building the evidence base for social protection through to study
tours (including to Kalomo, South Africa, Lesotho, Brazil, and Chile) and
informal meetings, increasingly targeted at powerful players within the
finance ministry and the political elite.
3.2. Strengthening and scaling up
By 2009, DFID had been joined by UNICEF as co-leads of the social protection
co-operating partners group and succeeded in gaining government support for
the Social Protection Expansion Programme. This included a gradual expan-
sion of SCTs targeting the poorest and most vulnerable households made up of
the elderly above the age of sixty, children under the age of five, and adults who
are chronically ill, affected by HIV/AIDS, or living with disabilities, to be
increasingly funded by GRZ. At the meeting scheduled for signing this agree-
ment, the Minister of Finance (Dr Situmbeko Musokotwane) was ‘very ner-
vous’ that DFID were proposing a programme of £32 million over only seven
years, after which the responsibility for its continuation would fall to the
government. He therefore requested that DFID commit for ten years, which
it duly did to the tune of £38 million (ZC2). This marked a significant shift
regarding the ministry’s erstwhile opposition to social protection. The previ-
ous finance minister, N’gandu Magande (2003–8), opposed SCTs, with objec-
tions that were ‘rooted in his own personal narrative of hard work and
determination’ (Kabandula and Seekings 2016: 23) but which were also char-
acteristic of the political elite in Zambia (Scarritt 2006). Committed to the
trickle-down model of growth, Magande believed that SCTs would encourage
dependency (ZG1, ZG9), rather than upwards mobility (ZC2), and had
declared that ‘poverty did not exist in Zambia’; rather, the problem was
‘laziness’ (Barrientos et al. 2005).
Like Kabandula and Seekings (2016), we identify Magande as a significant
barrier to the expansion of SCTs because of his ideological resistance to the
programme and critical role in the policy process as Minister of Finance.
When President Mwanawasa passed away in office in 2008 and Rupiah
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Banda was elected as his replacement in the presidential by-election, the
resulting Cabinet reshuffle led to Magande’s replacement by a finance minister
less ideologically opposed to cash transfers. It was under this new minister that
the DFID agreement was signed. However, where they use this case to
demonstrate the limits of donor power and suggest the failure of the political
advocacy undertaken by the pro-social protection policy coalition (Kabandula
and Seekings 2016), we note that this coalition was successful in attracting
meaningful support from lower-level officials within the finance ministry that
would later prove beneficial. In particular, and in line with the ‘best-placing’
logic of the thinking-and-working politically approach (Booth and Unsworth
2014), coalition members worked hard to identify and persuade fast-rising
finance ministry officials of the economic benefits and moral case for cash
transfers. When the political window opened in 2013, it was these officials,
now operating at more senior levels within the ministry, who were able and
willing to draw the president’s attention to the SCT pilot programme as a
mechanism for achieving certain campaign promises.
From 2010 onwards, there was a concerted effort by the policy coalition to
build a stronger evidence base in support of SCTs. This went beyond the initial
evaluations of the Kalomo pilot (MCDSS and GTZ 2007; Wietler 2007), which
lacked a control group, and focused on randomized controlled trial (RCT)
evaluations carried out by independent consultancy firms (ZG1). This
approach was considered more politically persuasive: ‘they certainly like
evidence, ministers love it, they’re all doctors so they love RCTs’ (ZC2).
Nonetheless, the process of getting the evidence in front of senior government
figures required a significant, and largely informal, backstage effort by a senior
Zambian consultant who had been hired by DFID to deploy his long-
established elite-level networks to generate awareness of and support for social
protection in Zambia. This ‘broker’ managed to convene a high-level work-
shop in 2012 during which the results of both the RCT studies and a recent
World Bank assessment of SCTs were delivered and discussed with senior civil
servants from all key ministries, including finance, and with the Cabinet
secretary chairing.
The impact evaluations refuted the belief that recipients of cash transfers
would work less, and offered clear evidence that the transfers could reduce
poverty and contribute to the economy (ZG1). Importantly, the World Bank
report revealed how badly other interventions, including agricultural subsid-
ies, were faring in comparison to SCTs, both in terms of their cost-
effectiveness and success in reaching poor people. This evidence base was
particularly critical to gaining support within the finance ministry.
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3.3. Government budget increase for SCTs
When the PF gained power in 2011 on a pro-poor ticket, including a
manifesto commitment to rolling out ‘social transfers’, this raised hopes
that social protection would now become a political priority. Nonetheless,
the Minister of Finance’s announcement on 11 October 2013 that the 2014
budget would increase government financing for SCTs by 700 per cent and
that a national social protection policy would be prioritized (Chikwanda
2013) came ‘out of the blue’ (ZC2) to proponents of the programme. The
commitment exceeded both the co-financing agreement within the Social
Protection Expansion Programme and the budget request from the Ministry
of Community Development for that year, which was only 53 million
kwacha (ZG2).
This announcement flowed directly from a scandal that broke in 2013
concerning massive overspending on the budget lines for the Farmer Input
Support Programme (FISP) and the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) (ZC6, ZK2).
This crisis led to a public announcement by Sata that resources would be
channelled to ‘the very poor citizens of our society’³ with some funds redir-
ected from agricultural subsidies to the SCT programme. The amount allo-
cated to the SCT programme at this point was still tiny compared to such
subsidies.⁴ Programmes such as FISP and FRA continue to pull significant
resources away from other forms of social protection, with budgeted amounts
for FISP actually increasing in 2014–15. When the SCT budget failed to
increase as expected in 2015 there were fears that the scale-up would stall,
not least as President Sata, apparent champion of cash transfers, passed away
in 2014. These fears seemed to be confirmed when the Medium-Term Expend-
iture Framework (MTEF) for 2015–17 indicated that the budget for SCTs
would remain at 150 million kwacha per year until 2016/17 (Ministry of
Finance 2014). These concerns have since been allayed by renewed govern-
ment promises to progressively increase the SCT budget allocation, supported
by the new MTEF for 2016–18 in which the domestically financed contribu-




⁴ In the 2015 budget, 1.3 billion kwacha is included for social protection, which is 2.7 per cent of the
total budget, but the majority is for the Public Service Pension Fund. The amount allocated to SCTs,
180 million kwacha, is only 0.4 per cent of the total budget (Chikwanda 2014). A further 1.1 billion
kwacha (2.3 per cent of the total budget) has been allocated to FISP.
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4. Transnational Policy Coalitions, the Political
Settlement, and the Role of Ideas
Our investigation suggests that elite commitment to social protection in
Zambia has been shaped by the interplay of a transnational effort to form a
policy coalition in favour of the agenda, political settlement dynamics, and the
cross-cutting role of ideas. This section analyses the relative progress of the
SCT policy reform in relation to these key elements of the conceptual frame-
work outlined in Lavers and Hickey (2016).
4.1. Transnational policy coalitions and local wars of position
The formation of policy coalitions has become increasingly deployed as a
strategy for achieving policy reform in developing countries (Leftwich 2012),
perhaps reflecting the reduced capacity of donors to directly influence policy-
making in fast-developing countries.⁵ In Zambia, this involved international
donors trying to shift the balance of power between the ‘civil society tendency’
(involving social sector ministries, certain donors, and civil society organiza-
tions) and the finance ministry tendency, with its often paradigmatically
opposed ideas about development (Kanbur 2001), a divide that reflected the
global level ‘wars of position’ being fought over social protection at this point
(Deacon 2007).
Informed by a political economy analysis of the policy process in Zambia,
donors deployed a mixture of technical and political strategies within this
struggle. This went beyond producing and disseminating evidence and offer-
ing technical assistance for programme design, to directly targeting rising stars
within the finance ministry (two of whom would become Permanent Secretary
and Director of Planning) and ensuring that the Ministry of Community
Development had a desk officer in the Ministry of Finance. The use of a
‘broker’ with high-level political and bureaucratic connections and the skills to
facilitate discussions across competing tendencies assisted this process.
This politically attuned strategy was further enabled by the nature of the
development advisors and agencies involved. Two of the key proponents
⁵ Assistance to the budget from traditional donors has declined in recent years from around 60 per
cent in the early 1990s to less than 30 per cent in 2009, with official development assistance down to
11.2 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2009 (BTI 2012). This reflects debt relief and
economic growth and the growing role of new donors such as China and private foundations (Faust
et al. 2012).
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working for DFID and UNICEF were strongly rooted in the Zambian context
and remained in their posts much longer than is normal within the develop-
ment industry’s usual three-year posting cycle. This, and their close working
relationship, helped to further improve the level of donor co-ordination after
the departure of the World Bank and GTZ in 2007.⁶ Strong support from the
country leads and headquarters of each agency was also important here.
The relative power of the government protagonists in this struggle was also
significant. For most of the 2000s the Ministry of Community Development
and Social Services was ‘not seen by more powerful ministries as a particularly
convincing policy champion in the field of poverty reduction’ (Barrientos et al.
2005: 10). Under the PF government, the ministry was renamed the Ministry
of Community Development and Mother and Child Health (MCDMCH).
With its new remit over a significant proportion of the health budget and
health sector personnel, the ministry became the second biggest-spending
ministry after education, and was seen as a more credible home for new policy
initiatives and increased budgetary allocations (ZG2, ZK1).⁷ The Ministry of
Finance also underwent important shifts, most notably in terms of ministerial
appointments and a growing appreciation of the limits of its neoliberal
growth-first strategy.
4.2. Political settlement dynamics in Zambia: the deepening
of competitive clientelism and enduring importance
of rent distribution
Whilst the efforts of the transnational policy coalition helped turn SCTs into a
credible policy instrument, the dramatic funding increase in 2013 directly
reflected the wider workings of Zambia’s competitive clientelist political
settlement, particularly in terms of the shifting nature of the ruling coalition
and a crisis of rent distribution to rural areas. In their account of the 2013 SCT
scale-up, Quarles van Ufford et al. (2016) argue that there was a combination
⁶ The re-entry of the World Bank into the social protection sector in 2012 has raised concerns that
earlier disagreements will resurface and undermine the coherence of the policy coalition. However, the
critical 2013 workshop revealed the benefits of having the convening power of this ‘knowledge broker’
onside, not least as the Bank has so far been the only agency brave enough to tackle the Zambian
government concerning its use of agricultural subsidies (ZC2).
⁷ However, this realignment has now been reversed with responsibility for maternal and child health
moved back to the Ministry of Health; it remains to be seen whether the increased status and capacity
brought about by the larger mandate are retained.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
190     
of influential factors, with no single factor sufficient to trigger the decision.⁸
We have shown above that the increase in funding for SCTs was directly
informed by a public scandal in 2013 concerning massive overspending on the
FISP and the FRA (ZC6, ZK2). Elected on a pro-poor policy platform, this led
the PF president to actively search out alternative policy instruments which
could help him to fulfil this pledge,⁹ whereupon finance ministry officials with
access to the evidence on SCTs cited above advised that funds currently going
towards FISP should be moved to the SCT programme (ZG18).
Despite a commitment to ‘social transfers’ appearing in the PF’s 2011
Manifesto, the president had taken no steps to meet this promise. More
directly concerned with urban and formal sector workers, one senior insider
reports that Sata had actually used red ink to strike out any mention of cash
transfers from the first draft of the Manifesto (ZG19). It was later reinserted by
another senior member of the PF Cabinet who was closely connected to a
leading player within the transnational policy coalition. Siachiwena (2016)
argues that there was a programmatic shift in policy under PF, influenced by a
‘social democratic’ faction within the party. While he rightly points out the
close links between the PF and the policy coalition promoting social protec-
tion, the fact that this centred on one leading figure in the party whose partner
was a key player in the policy coalition seems to underline the personalized
rather than programmatic tendencies of policy-making in Zambia. The inclu-
sion of cash transfers in the PF manifesto without Sata’s approval, acknow-
ledged by Siachiwena in his paper, and the lack of fit between SCTs and the
main constituency-building strategies adopted by the PF at the 2011 elections
(as discussed in section 2.2), further question the existence of a programmatic
faction in support of SCTs.
The timing of the budgetary boost to SCTs in relation to the FISP scandal
suggests that it was an opportunistic reaction to the crisis of how to keep social
goods flowing to rural areas to maintain the broader political settlement,
rather than a programmatic commitment to poverty reduction. This reflects
the wider sense in which the PF has focused strategically on the unmet
demands of distinct social groups rather than a particular ideology (Larmer
and Fraser 2007). Resnick (2014) highlights Sata’s populist strategies leading
up to the 2011 elections, including programmatic messaging around social
⁸ They identify these factors as momentum on the political agenda; a context of sustained criticism
of Zambia’s subsidy programmes for fertilizer, maize, and fuel; the consultation process on the National
Social Protection Policy; and the timely release of the impact evaluation reports, accompanied by
advocacy and networking activity (Quarles van Ufford et al. 2016).
⁹ https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=10654.
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inclusion. However, while there is no doubt that Sata employed a ‘pro-poor
brand’ (Siachiwena 2016), this does not adequately explain the increased
investment in SCTs under the PF government. Firstly, Sata specifically tar-
geted the urban poor (Resnick 2014), while the SCT programme is predom-
inantly targeted at rural areas. The expansion of SCTs to some urban districts
that are not among the poorest only highlights the continuation of patronage
seen under previous governments (Siachiwena 2016). Secondly, the SCT
programme existed before the PF government came to power and only gained
Sata’s attention when it proved useful, as outlined in section 3.3. In addition,
the government’s expenditure priorities in the first two years after gaining
power were tilted towards delivering highly visible public infrastructure that
the PF deemed would be electorally popular, particularly roads and new
universities, rather than redistributive measures to enhance livelihoods.
Nor did the increased budgetary emphasis on SCTs reflect a strong
commitment to tackle political clientelism in favour of more effective and
rules-based distributive mechanisms. Although Sata publicly condemned the
profligacy of the agencies responsible for FISP and food relief, he lacked the
capacity to challenge the interests vested in these programmes at multiple
levels of governance and spending levels for these programmes were soon
re-established.
Programmes such as FISP and FRA still pull significant resources away
from other forms of social protection, with budgeted amounts for FISP
actually increasing in 2014–15. Despite compelling evidence that these sub-
sidies, especially FISP, are not a cost-effective way of reducing poverty among
the poorest as those who benefit are mostly larger, non-poor farmers (Tesliuc
2013), ‘social protection’ in Zambia, as a form of state-subsidized support to
rural areas, remains conceived of primarily in terms of agricultural and food
subsidies. This is underpinned by the configuration of power within Zambia’s
political settlement, whereby these subsidies are protected by powerful vested
interests. They constitute ‘an animal on its own, too big to challenge, very
much a political programme’ (ZC2), with SCTs not yet politically popular
enough to displace them (ZC7, ZO4). The so-called ‘maize mafia’, which
controls and benefits from the distribution of fertilizer and collection of
maize in rural areas, includes national-level companies and a widespread
network of local bureaucrats, security officials, and politicians (ZC2, ZK2).
Studies show that agricultural subsidies in Zambia are used primarily to
reward loyalty amongst the ruling party’s voter base, particularly among
wealthier households, although interestingly they do not have an impact on
the share of votes won by the incumbent (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert 2013;
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Mason et al. 2013).¹⁰ This form of political clientelism reflects the kind of
decentralized rent-seeking that is characteristic of competitive clientelist set-
tings and which is particularly difficult to rein in or render developmental
(Kelsall 2013).
This underlines the importance of framing social protection interventions
in relation to their role in sustaining a particular distribution of power, rather
than as a development intervention per se (Lavers and Hickey 2016). Growing
support for the SCT programme amongst parliamentarians—according to one
former member of the current government, ‘The rural MPs loved the idea, it
was largesse without any bullshit, you just give money away’ (ZG19)—may
herald a longer-term shift here, although it is notable that there is as yet little
evidence of strong demands for SCTs from voters. In terms of the distribu-
tional regime required to maintain ruling coalitions in power in Zambia, the
SCT initiative has struggled to gain pre-eminence vis-à-vis other redistributive
policies that have already secured a political constituency of support and
which play a role in sustaining the current political settlement.
4.3. The role of ideas
Although political settlement dynamics and the interests of powerful actors
within the ruling coalition are clearly a determining factor in the uptake of
social protection, ideas have also played a role here. This includes issues of ‘fit’
between the normative policy ideas of dominant players in the ruling coalition
and the role played by more cognitive forms of evidence concerning problems
of poverty with the potential of social protection to act as a solution (Schmidt
2008). As illustrated in section 3.2, the capacity of the policy coalition to
mobilize both normative ideas and a credible evidence base directly shaped
the progress and the form of social protection, at least as a policy agenda. This
was particularly evident at the level of problem-framing (e.g. the rise of
poverty rates in the mid-2000s) and policy solutions (e.g. evidence that SCTs
could work in Zambia).
The initial design of SCTs in Zambia was directly influenced by the German
development consultant Bernd Schubert and his ‘10% model’ which, with its
focus on targeting ‘incapacitated’ households, was directly aligned with elite
¹⁰ In the same paper Mason et al. (2013) also demonstrate that poverty reduction gains more votes
than agricultural subsidies and on this basis recommend that the government invests in programmes
that reduce poverty and inequality.
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concerns over creating dependency amongst able-bodied people. Other
donor-influenced models, including a UNICEF-backed child grant, were also
piloted but later resisted. Although the results of the evaluation for the child
grant programme were particularly strong, a separate targeting assessment
conducted by external consultants in 2013 found that this model was unpopu-
lar in communities as it is not in line with perceptions of poverty based on
labour constraints (Beazley and Carrero 2013). On this point we concur with
Quarles van Ufford et al. (2016) that the impact evaluations have helped
promote the merits of SCTs in general, but have been less influential over
the design process, which has been shaped more directly by elite and popular
perceptions of which groups deserve to receive transfers.
More broadly, however, there is little sign that social protection has traction
within the normative, paradigmatic views of political elites in Zambia. The
SCT programme was not a significant issue during the 2014 presidential by-
election campaigns, and when questioned directly on their policy agenda
around social protection during a pre-election radio debate, presidential
candidates revealed either a lack of awareness or outright hostility (ZO2).
Our own interviews with opposition leaders suggest that members of the
political elite see SCTs as a ‘foreign-grown programme’ and as a form of
dependency on the state (ZG7), with one leader stating, ‘I hate that stuff ’
(ZS1). The evidence we present in section 4.2 regarding the ‘programmatic’
nature of Sata’s apparent commitment to cash transfers suggests that his pro-
poor messaging may have been used as legitimation for a decision that was
actually triggered by the agricultural subsidy crisis. Framing SCTs as a more
effective and pro-poor alternative to subsidies then may have been a form of
‘communicative discourse’ to persuade other stakeholders and the public
(Schmidt 2002), particularly as it is a predominantly rural programme unlikely
to appeal to the PF’s urban constituency.
Some close observers have argued that there is scope to link social protec-
tion in Zambia to longer-standing notions of welfare, particularly the ‘human-
ism’ that emerged under Kaunda. Harland (2014) argues that this still
resonates in Zambia, particularly through the continued use of the ‘One
Zambia, One Nation’ rhetoric, and could offer the basis on which a future
welfare state might be built. However, our respondents contrast these former
attitudes with young professionals and decision makers who today are ‘non-
chalantly happy to denounce poor people’ for their poverty (ZC3). This echoes
earlier analyses of negative attitudes towards the poor amongst Zambia’s
political elite, and runs counter to the kinds of ideas that have historically
been aligned with stronger elite support for social protection, particularly the
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notion that structural forces rather than the poor themselves are to blame for
persistent poverty (Hickey 2012).
Moreover, the most pervasive developmental paradigm in Zambia has been
less concerned with social welfare than with ‘modernity’, which is where
Zambia, with its high rate of urbanization and processes of class formation,
seemed to be heading in the 1970s (Ferguson 1999). This still prevails today:
‘Zambians have not stopped thinking about the potential for both national
development and personal transformation in decidedly modernist ways’
(Larmer et al. 2014: 899). Neither the humanism nor the Christian ideals
played on by certain leaders have gained the same degree of social and political
salience as this discourse. As such, one of the reasons why social protection has
yet to become more fully established in Zambia may flow from the sense in
which the discourse on social protection has not tapped into the deeper
paradigmatic ideas (Schmidt 2008) that underpin the political settlement in
Zambia, or fundamentally challenged elite ideas about dependency and
deservingness.¹¹
5. Conclusion
Our argument that elite commitment to social protection in Zambia needs to
be understood in relation to the interplay of political settlement dynamics and
transnational advocacy represents a challenge to mainstream accounts of how
welfare states are likely to emerge in developing countries. The formation of a
transnational policy coalition was critical to developing and promoting social
protection as a credible policy agenda, but the agenda only gained political
traction when there was a shift in political settlement dynamics which led
social protection to become more aligned with the interests and ideas of a new
ruling coalition. The key dynamic here was not the ascent to power of a
programmatic political party per se, but rather an opportunistic response to
a crisis within the existing system of rent allocation.
While the pro-poor, urban-based PF has to some extent played to lower-
level factions through its populist approach, the horizontal distribution of
power between elite factions in Zambia has ensured that it remains more
clearly focused on maintaining the settlement through a ‘maximum coalition’.
This practice heralds a continuation of existing political and developmental
¹¹ See Lavers and Hickey (2016) for a fuller elaboration of Schmidt’s (2008) schema of ideas and how
this relates to the interaction of policy coalitions and political settlements.
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strategies, rather than a significant rupture in the way in which power is held
and legitimized, including through processes of resource allocation. The shift
towards a pro-poor agenda marked a shift in ideational rhetoric that provided
some space for the social protection agenda to gain ground, but only to a
certain degree, and without having the power to displace more deeply embed-
ded interests, policies, and rent-allocation practices. Neither have proponents
of social protection as yet managed to either align the agenda fully with the
paradigmatic ideas that prevail in Zambia or to challenge these ideas.
How the politics of social protection plays out in the future remains to be
seen. There are some signs that tensions are growing concerning the always
fused technical and political aspects of this kind of programme, with parlia-
mentarians increasingly perceiving the political benefits of the programme. If
SCTs start to generate higher levels of localized support amongst voters, it is
difficult to see them being removed. What remains to be seen is whether they
may start to challenge the clientelistic basis of resource distribution within
Zambia’s current political settlement, in line with the broader claims that the
National Social Protection Policy heralds a paradigm shift that will ‘enhance
access to justice for the poor’ (Ministry of Community Development, Mother
and Child Health 2014). As things stand, the conditions do not yet exist for
social protection to be institutionalized as part of a new social contract in
Zambia, with government and recipients alike both seeming to perceive cash
transfers through the idiom of a gift rather than a right.
Interviews Conducted
Government representatives
ZG1, SCT Unit, MCDMCH, Lusaka, 13 April 2015
ZG2, Director, MCDMCH, Lusaka, 14 April 2015
ZG3, Accountant, MCDMCH, Lusaka, 14 April 2015
ZG7, Opposition party leader, Lusaka, 15 April 2015
ZG8, Senior Officer, MCDMCH, Choma, 27 April 2015
ZG9, Provincial Officer, MCDMCH, Choma, 27 April 2015
ZG10, District Officer, MCDMCH, Monze, 28 April 2015
ZG11, Member of Parliament UPND, Lusaka, 29 April 2015
ZG12, Member of Parliament UPND, Lusaka, 30 April 2015
ZG13, Member of Parliament PF, Lusaka, 30 April 2015
ZG14, Member of Parliament MMD, Lusaka, 30 April 2015
ZG15, Member of Parliament PF, Lusaka, 30 April 2015
ZG16, Senior official, MCDMCH, Lusaka, 6 May 2015
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ZG17, Director, MCDMCH, Lusaka, 7 May 2015
ZG18, Desk Officer, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka, 7 May 2015
ZG19, Politician, Lusaka, 17 and 30 April 2015
Zambian organizations (CSOs, think tanks, consultancies)
ZO1, CSO representative, Lusaka, 13 April 2015
ZO2, CSO representative, Lusaka, 13 April 2015
ZO3, Consultant, Lusaka, 13 April 2015
ZO4, Consultant, Lusaka, 14 April 2015
Co-operating partners
ZC1, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 13 April 2015
ZC2, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 14 April 2015
ZC3, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 14 April 2015
ZC4, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 15 April 2015
ZC5, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 15 April 2015
ZC6, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 16 April 2015
ZC7, representative of co-operating partner involved in SP, Lusaka, 20 April 2015
ZC8, representative of co-operating partner involved in SCT, Lusaka, 21 April 2015
Key individuals
ZK1, Consultant and former co-operating partner representative, 17 April and 8
May 2015
ZK2, Consultant, Lusaka, 13–17 April 2015
Public speeches
ZS1, Hakainde Hichilema, Cape Town, 5 June 2015
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The Politics of Promoting Social
Protection in Uganda
A Comparative Analysis of Social Cash Transfers
and Social Health Insurance
Badru Bukenya and Sam Hickey
1. Introduction: Researching the Politics of Social
Protection in Uganda
This volume seeks to explain the uneven progress of the social protection
agenda across different countries within sub-Saharan Africa, particularly those
in its eastern and southern regions. This chapter contributes to this effort by
exploring the extent of elite commitment to social protection in the case of
Uganda. However, it goes further by asking why certain parts of the social
protection agenda have spread further than others within the same country.
To date, most efforts to understand how this phenomenon has played out
within sub-Saharan African countries have focused solely on the spread of
cash transfers (e.g. Cherrier 2014; Lavers 2019a). The smaller number of
studies into the spread of social health insurance in Africa, including within
Ethiopia (Lavers 2019b) and Rwanda (Chemouni 2018), tend not to adopt a
comparative focus with regards to focusing on more than one policy instru-
ment within the same context.¹ Our comparative approach can offer a more
rigorous test of frameworks designed to understand how far social protection
policies are taken up by low-income countries, including those deployed
within this volume. By holding both the timeframe and the country context
constant, our comparative study of how two different policy initiatives in
¹ The working paper by Pruce and Hickey (2017) on Zambia is an exception here.
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Uganda have fared helps to specify the key factors that explain the variable
progress of different social protection initiatives.
Specifically, we examine whether the focus on transnational policy coalitions
and political settlement dynamics can help explain why some policy ideas on
social protection take root in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa whereas others
don’t. The conceptual framework, which was introduced in Chapter 1 and
elaborated fully in Lavers and Hickey (2016), is inspired by three bodies of
literature that focus on the politics of development, of building welfare regimes
in the global South (Huber and Stephens 2012) and of global policy transfer
(e.g. Stone 2012). The approach helps to go beyond the current literature
which has tended to either underplay the role of politics by emphasizing the
influence of donors (Cherrier 2014) and income levels (Niño-Zarazúa et al.
2012) or by focusing only on formal aspects of politics, such as democracy and
good governance. Such approaches tend to obscure the significance of infor-
mal relationships between elites and between elites and their followers, and
how these interact with transnational processes of policy transfer. Of particu-
lar importance here is the ‘political settlement’, defined as ‘the balance or
distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on
which any state is based’ (Di John and Putzel 2009: 4). A political settlement
analysis seeks to identify the underlying drivers of elite commitment to
development by examining how changes in the distribution of power amongst
elites, and between elites and their followers, can (re)shape incentives around
particular policy agendas (Whitfield et al. 2015). To capture the influence of
transnational actors, we focus on how they seek to render new policy ideas
legible within particular contexts through forming policy coalitions with
domestic actors (Peck and Theodore 2015; Hickey and Seekings, this volume).
The questions we seek to explain through this framework are, first: to what
extent has political commitment to social protection emerged in Uganda?
Second, why have some social protection initiatives gained greater traction
in Uganda than others? Specifically, we explore why efforts to promote social
cash transfers have been relatively more successful than efforts to promote
social health insurance. Although efforts to promote each instrument in
Uganda have been active since the early 2000s, the government has moved
more swiftly and extensively to provide social cash transfers (SCTs) for old-age
pensioners. The national roll-out of the senior citizens’ grant that the Presi-
dent called for in 2013 is now being implemented, whilst as of late 2018 the
national health insurance scheme (NHIS) remained unfunded and subject to
continued debate. We do not argue that the government of Uganda has made a
significant investment in SCTs: it certainly trails behind other countries
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discussed in this volume in terms of the extent of coverage and budgetary
allocations to social assistance. However, it has moved notably further with
this than with social health insurance. We argue here that the limited level of
commitment to social protection in Uganda, and the variation that exists
within this policy domain, can be explained by the interaction between
transnational policy coalitions and the domestic political settlement.
The chapter draws on primary research conducted over March to May
2014, May to July 2015, and January 2016 in Kampala. This involved over
fifty key informant interviews with representatives from all of the major
stakeholders that have played a role in promoting and resisting our two policy
initiatives, including government officials, donor agency staff, parliamentar-
ians, private sector employer associations, insurance companies, donor agen-
cies, labour unions, and wider civil society actors. Our methodological
approach involved identifying key moments within each policy process, and
then systematically tracing these back to their drivers followed by comparative
analysis across the two policy cases (George and Bennet 2004). The chapter
proceeds by briefly introducing the nature of Uganda’s transnationalized
political settlement and how this shapes the politics of development. It then
discusses the process through which each policy has been promoted in Uganda
from the early 2000s until 2016 before analysing this through the conceptual
framework identified above and concluding with reflections on the future
politics of social protection in Uganda.
2. The Politics of Development in Uganda
The National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime that took power in
Uganda in 1986, and which under President Yoweri Museveni has led the
country ever since, initially demonstrated a clear commitment to development
through a mixture of presidential patronage and programmatically informed
policy reforms. Following a successful guerrilla struggle during the early
1980s, the NRM forged a ruling coalition that was sufficiently inclusive,
and powerful in military terms, to impose political stability on the majority
of the country (Lindemann 2011). This ‘dominant-developmental’ political
settlement,² within which opposition was muted through the abolishment of
multi-party elections, introduced a series of policy reforms that had largely
² For further details on the nature of the political settlement in Uganda see Golooba-Mutebi and
Hickey (2013, 2016), Kjær (2015), and Whitfield et al. (2015).
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progressive outcomes, particularly for the NRM’s key constituency of the rural
poor. Pro-poor policies were introduced after successive presidential elections
in 1996 (universal primary education) and 2001, most notably the abolishment
of health user fees, which some have framed as an initial foray into the social
protection agenda (Yates et al. 2006). Certain donors were highly influential
during this period, particularly the international financial institutions and
some European agencies, although there was a strong sense that the main
impetus behind the reforms came from domestic rather than external sources
(Kutesa et al. 2010; Hickey 2005).
From the early 2000s onwards, the ruling coalition became increasingly
vulnerable to pressure from excluded elite factions that were seeking political
power, and from lower-level factions seeking to ensure the extension of
patronage (Whitfield et al. 2015). The re-introduction of multi-party politics
in 2006 helped deepen an increasingly populist and personalized approach to
development policy, with the President undertaking ‘poverty tours’ through
which hand-outs and promises of investment in local projects were made in a
highly personalized and populist manner. Social sector ministries that had
previously benefited from technocratic leadership, such as Health, were
handed to party big-men to be used as avenues for rent-seeking and building
patronage networks as opposed to promoting service delivery (Bukenya and
Golooba-Mutebi 2019). The ruling coalition’s need to fund closely fought
election campaigns and to underwrite Uganda’s particular mode of ‘inflation-
ary patronage’ further reduced the fiscal space for addressing development
priorities (Barkan 2011; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2016). Importantly, the
global political economy context for development in Uganda also underwent a
series of shifts from around 2005–6, with Uganda graduating from the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, discovering commercial quantities of oil,
and signing the Sino-Africa Agreement (Hickey 2013). These shifts reduced
the power of western donors and encouraged a major spending focus on
infrastructure and energy projects at the expense of social sectors. The pro-
grammatic focus on poverty reduction became displaced by the agenda of
‘Prosperity for All’ and structural transformation, reflecting a prevailing pol-
itical discourse that tended to favour the ‘economically active’ segment of the
population (Hickey 2005).
It was into this generally unpromising context that the social protection
agenda started to be promoted by international development organizations
during the early 2000s, in line with a broader shift within the emerging post-
Washington Consensus (see Hickey and Seekings, this volume). Early movers
here included the World Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for
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International Development (DFID), and various United Nations agencies. On
paper, they encountered a favourable legislative and policy context: the 1995
Constitution has an explicit focus on provisions that protect the rights of the
poor and vulnerable groups in society, which is in turn supported by legisla-
tion that includes Acts for Children (1997), Workers (2000), and Persons with
Disabilities (2006). A wide range of policies have flowed from these acts,
including the National Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children Policy
(2004); the National Policy for Older Persons (2009); the Uganda Gender
Policy (2007); and the National Policy on Disability 2006. However, inter-
national development agencies, working in particular with bureaucrats in the
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD), were keen to
ensure that the government of Uganda adopted a specific national policy on
social protection. This was eventually achieved in 2015 when the government
approved a new Uganda National Social Protection Policy, after over five years
of research, consultations, benchmarking, and drafting. The policy identifies
six policy priorities: extending social security coverage to the informal sector;
expanding access to direct income support for vulnerable groups in need;
strengthening family and community capacity to provide and care for vulner-
able groups and individuals; reforming the Public Service Pension scheme;
expanding coverage of formal social security including affordable health
insurance; and enhancing the institutional capacity for provision of compre-
hensive social protection services (GoU 2015). However, whilst Uganda is
renowned for being an early adopter of developmental policies, its record of
implementation is considerably weaker (Andrews and Bategeka 2013;
Bukenya and Muhumuza 2017). There has been a great deal of variation
with regards to which elements of this social protection agenda have actually
been adopted and implemented in Uganda. This chapter examines the politics
behind how two of these priorities—namely, social health insurance (SHI) and
direct income support via SCTs—have been promoted, and compares their
relative fortunes in relation to the ideas, incentives, and actors that predom-
inate within Uganda’s transnationalized political settlement.
3. Social Health Insurance in Uganda
There is some evidence of elite-level commitment to adopting a national
health insurance scheme in Uganda, in rhetorical terms at least. The policy
formed part of the ruling party’s manifestoes for the 2006, 2011, and 2016
elections, albeit with a decreasing emphasis in the latter, and the second
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National Development Plan (2015/16–2019/20), promised that the government
would ‘fast-track the implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme’
(GoU 2015: 217). However, as of late 2018, theNational Social Health Insurance
Bill in Uganda remains stalled; despite the Ministry of Finance finally agreeing
to fund the scheme in 2017, subsequent budgets have failed to include any
allocation for the scheme.Here we set out the process throughwhich the scheme
has been promoted and contested over the past two decades.
3.1. The contested process of promoting social
health insurance in Uganda
The first proposition of a NHIS in Uganda came in the 1987 Health Policy
Review Commission report. Formed to advise government on reconstructing
the country’s collapsed health system after two decades of political instability
and conflict, the Commission suggested cost-sharing and social health insur-
ance as funding alternatives. Both proposals were initially unpopular among
the political elites, with cost-sharing rejected by parliament in 1990 after
legislators argued that ‘the population was already paying for their health
through taxes and therefore there was no need for extra payment for the health
services’ (Kivumbi and Kintu 2002: 65). In 1993 the Ministry of Health (MoH)
nonetheless introduced cost-sharing via a loophole in the Local Government
Act that gave district authorities revenue-raising powers. The policy lasted
until 2001 when it was abolished by a presidential decree in an electoral
commitment to ‘free’ healthcare.
This move triggered a small group of MoH officials to promote a NHIS as
an alternative means of meeting the huge gap in financing. Most of the officials
had undergone World Bank training about health financing options during
the structural adjustment era of the late 1980s, and were sceptical about the
President’s free healthcare policy from the outset (interviews with a senior
MoH official and WHO official, 12 May 2015). MoH officials were further
encouraged by assurances from the Bank that it would fund the initial costs for
setting up and operationalizing the scheme (Talemwa 2009), and its funding of
study tours to learn from existing health insurance schemes in Thailand,
Vietnam, and China. Armed with evidence from these trips and two feasibility
studies done in 1996 and 2001, the latter by academics from Harvard with
World Bank support, the MoH argued that the systematic fall in poverty rates
during the 1990s meant that many people could afford to pay premiums. In
2006, Cabinet encouraged MoH to devise a health insurance scheme, which
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they embarked on via the creation of a National Health Insurance Scheme
Secretariat within MoH, albeit with funds for only two staff members.
The bill was drafted and presented to Cabinet in 2007. Recognizing the need
to secure presidential support for the bill, officials from MoH sought an
audience with the President. He declined and instead met with private sector
representatives who were strongly opposed to the scheme, claiming that it
would gravely hurt their businesses and that they had not been consulted
(interview with MoH official, 7 May 2015). In a frustrated tone, one MoH
official recounted that,
. . . the Uganda Manufacturers Association, which was not totally in agree-
ment with our proposals, met the President and complained about the
potential increase to the cost of production. The President listened to them
and wrote to us to halt the process. He asked us to make more consultations.
(Interview, 7 May 2015)
Cabinet advised the Ministry to undertake a more participatory process for
drafting a revised insurance bill that would be agreeable to all parties. In 2009
the MoH established a multi-sectoral National Task Force, which included
representatives from trade unions, employers’ organizations (e.g. the Feder-
ation of Ugandan Employers, the Private Sector Foundation, the Uganda
Manufacturers Association, the Uganda Insurance Commission and Insurers
Association), and both the WHO and the World Bank. The Task Force
developed a number of detailed documents, including the draft NHI Bill,
proposals for the organizational aspects of a NHIS and its provider payment,
and accreditation systems for providers. However, our interviews with mem-
bers of the Task Force reveal that these documents were highly contested
amongst members.
In parallel, the President shared the draft NHI Bill and implementation
plans with the Medicines and Health Services Delivery Monitoring Unit
(MHSDMU). This then powerful Unit reported back that the parlous state
of the country’s health infrastructure meant that the NHIS would only be
viable within Kampala and bigger towns, where health facilities could feasibly
qualify for accreditation. The President was warned that launching a health
insurance scheme before addressing infrastructural and human resource gaps
in the public health system would mean that his core rural constituents would
suffer (interview with former MHSDMU staff, May 2015). Perhaps coinciden-
tally, the Minister of Health from 2011 to 2013 instructed MHSDMU
to investigate the NHIS Secretariat for alleged corruption. According to one
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ex-member of the Secretariat, ‘the Medicines Monitoring Unit descended on
us. We lost morale. The few staff we had, after being cleared by CID [Criminal
Investigations Department of the Uganda Police], just resigned’ (MoH official,
7 May 2015). Out of the team of five technical staff at the Secretariat, the
investigations left only Dr Runumi in charge; they also lost the Director
for Planning and immediate supervisor of the Secretariat to retirement,
Dr Lawrence Kaggwa, who had both the technical and political connections
required to push the scheme forward. The new Minister for Health, a leading
figure in the NRM with close links to the President, failed to submit a single
memo to Cabinet on the scheme (former NHIS Secretariat staff, 14 May 2015),
claiming that his approach was ‘deliberately slow to allow for wider consult-
ations and learning’ (MoH 2014).
The process was also stymied by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and
Economic Development’s (MFPED’s) refusal to provide the necessary finan-
cial support, which was critical given the absence of donors willing to fund the
scheme. The NHIS was expected to start in the 2012/13 financial year. In 2013
MoH submitted the application to MFPED for a certificate of financial impli-
cations, which MFPED kept until April 2014 before requesting that MoH
reformat the document following new MFPED guidelines. MoH resubmitted
in November 2014, and MFPED again stalled the process until the following
April (2015), when they wrote to MoH saying that the submission had been
declined because the costs were too high: ‘They advised that we should start
small. Once this is done it will be resubmitted’ (male MoH KI, 7 May 2015).
MFPED officials were particularly concerned with the capital required to
establish a semi-autonomous agency to administer the scheme, which would
amount to 50 per cent of the current government annual allocation to the
health sector (Munabi 2015: 35).
The finance ministry was also concerned with the proposed design of the
scheme. The health ministry had proposed to introduce the scheme to differ-
ent population groups in a phased manner. This approach reflected the need
to move slowly to allow expertise in managing the scheme to develop
(Nabyonga and Zikusooka 2010), but also the hierarchical ordering of citizen-
ship in Uganda. The scheme would enrol public servants initially during the
first three years, then formal private sector workers over a second period of
three years, with enrolment of the informal sector and indigents poised to start
in year seven; universal coverage would be achieved within fifteen years
(Basaza et al. 2013). The premium of the poorest of the poor or indigents,
estimated at 25 per cent of the population, would be paid for using a propor-
tion of contributions by formal sector workers (public and private) as well as
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subsidies from government and/or donors. For people in formal employment
the scheme required a total contribution equivalent of 8 per cent of the
employee salary, with employee and employer contributing 4 per cent each.
The proposed benefits to members included virtually all inpatient and out-
patient care provided within Uganda.
This approach was opposed both by MFPED as unaffordable and also by
private sector actors who lobbied hard against their proposed 4 per cent
contribution. In 2016/17 MoH eventually revised the plan to placate these
two powerful opponents (see Table 8.1). A major change was the shift from a
single scheme to three sub-schemes running concurrently, namely: Social
Health Insurance for formal sector workers, Community-Based Health Insur-
ance (CBHI) for informal sector workers, and Private Commercial Health
Insurance for private citizens. The level of contribution required from both
government and private sector employers was reduced from 4 per cent to 1 per
cent, with the government not making any contribution towards subsidizing
premiums for indigents and informal sector workers (indigents would instead
benefit from SHI and CBHI contributions). Although these revisions were
enough to persuade MFPED to issue MoH with a certificate of financial
implications in 2017, there remains no official budgetary allocation for
national health insurance in Uganda.
3.2. Stakeholder analysis of the struggle over
social health insurance
. . . there is nowhere in the world where health insurance has been
welcomed by vested interests. It is always a firm decision from the
political class to say that we have to move.
(Trade Union Representative, 12 May 2015)
Table 8.1 Comparison of national health insurance scheme provisions before and
after the 2017 revisions
Contributor category Old monthly contribution Revised monthly contribution
GoU 4% 1%
Public servants 4% 4%
Private employers 4% 1%
Private employees 4% 4%
Pensioners Not catered for 1%
Self-employed individuals Not catered for UGX 100,000 per annum
Indigents 0 0
Source: Authors’ construction.
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. . . fundamentally there is no political champion. It has to be a political
issue for it to move. If you take Tanzania, Ghana, and Rwanda, their
presidents really see this as the way to go. In Uganda I don’t think the
government is supportive, they are sitting on the fence . . . The NRM
just [stops at] making this on paper, but they are not championing it.
NHIS is a MoH thing, not government.
(World Bank official, 28 May 2015)
Any major policy initiative in Uganda requires the personal support of the
President, who has dominated the political and policy agenda since coming to
power in 1986. However, President Museveni has been reluctant to offer
public support for national health insurance, preferring instead to champion
the case for the ‘free’ healthcare policy he introduced in 2001. This lack of
executive commitment to social health insurance has undermined the possi-
bility of any sustained support for it from within the government, including
the key ministries of finance and even health itself. Technocratic leaders of the
health ministry, who had supported the Secretariat to promote the scheme,
including Alex Kamugisha and Richard Nduhura, had their tenures cut short
in the 2011 and 2013 Cabinet reshuffles, respectively. As noted above, subse-
quent ministers actively frustrated the process.
Support from donors has clearly played an important role here. However,
the level and type of support have been limited in nature, with only the
Bank and WHO playing a significant role (the largest provider of finance to
Uganda’s health sector, USAID, has been a notable absentee). The approach to
policy advocacy followed a standard pattern. From 2007, a mixture of donor
and government funds were used by MoH to send officials, and in some cases
members of the parliamentary health committee, on fourteen foreign trips to
visit countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Thailand, Israel, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Vietnam, Germany, and China, and also the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) in Switzerland. WHO provided support for a combined team from
the ministries of health and finance to develop robust estimates for NHIS
revenue and expenditure (Basaza et al. 2013), with further studies undertaken
with the support of the Providing for Health (P4H) alliance.³ However, donors
were unwilling to fund a pilot scheme, with one key official noting that most of
the donors are on the fence, waiting to see what the government will do
(former NHIS Secretariat staff, 14 May 2015). They were also reluctant to
³ P4H includes four European governments (Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and France), two
multilateral organizations (World Bank, African Development Bank), and two United Nations agencies
(the ILO and WHO).
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engage in a wider effort to build political support for health insurance, with
one donor official noting that whilst ‘adopting health insurance is a political as
opposed to a technical issue’ for some, ‘for us we look at the technical side’
(interview with World Bank official, 28 May 2015).
Civil society actors have opposed the scheme, albeit from different perspec-
tives. Those claiming to represent the poorest criticize the phased approach,
whereby ‘it is those most in need of this health insurance who will benefit
from it last’ (Barthelemy 2015: 14). Others raised more practical concerns,
noting that since salaries in the public sector are low, then collections during
the first phase will be too low to support a benefit package of reasonable
quality (Nabyonga and Zikusooka 2010: 5). The two workers’ unions in
Uganda represented on the NHIS taskforce were supportive of the scheme,
but argued that contributions should come from employers rather than
workers directly (civil society representative, 5 June 2015). Associations
with a stronger middle-class base have also lodged their opposition on the
basis that formal sector workers are already paying taxes for services and
should not be overburdened with further payments (Insurers Association
official, 11 May 2015).
However, the main opposition for the introduction of NHIS in Uganda
(beyond MFPED) emanated from the private sector, particularly from private-
for-profit health providers, health insurance providers, employers’ associ-
ations, and manufacturers’ associations. Whereas most of the private sector
representatives we interviewed for this research agree in principle that all
employers should be mandated to provide medical insurance to their
employees, they argue that the original proposal to levy a 4 per cent equiva-
lent of each employee’s gross salary would increase their costs of doing
business in an unsustainable manner. Noting that they already contribute
10 per cent on every employee’s salary to the retirement fund in the National
Social Security Fund (NSSF), they argued that funding for health insurance
should come from this source (Employers’ Association official, 12 May 2015),
something the powerful leaders of NSSF successfully opposed. The Presi-
dent’s response is understandable given the role of the private sector within
Uganda’s political settlement. Private sector firms provide some of the
electoral financing required by the NRM and are central to the neoliberal
vision of development the government has largely pursued since the early
1990s. Consulted regularly, private sector actors were able to convince the
President that NHIS might negatively impact on the environment of doing
business in Uganda. Their opposition stopped the scheme in its tracks in the
late 2000s and then forced major revisions whereby the latest plan reduces
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the contribution to be made by employers from 4 per cent to 1 per cent (see
Table 8.1).
There remains a pressing need to reform the health sector in Uganda.
However, it is not clear that national health insurance enjoys popular support
despite the crisis that is currently afflicting the existing model of financing the
health system. The largest proportion of health expenditure is borne by
individuals: Uganda’s out-of-pocket expenditure is 41 per cent of total health
care expenditure (MoH 2018), way above the 15 per cent recommended by
WHO. A significant proportion of households suffer from catastrophic
expenditure as they often resort to distressed sale of productive assets to pay
for health services, thereby driving their members deeper into poverty. The
system is unable to provide adequate coverage. Uganda’s core health profes-
sionals only numbered 1.85 per 1,000 people, well below the minimum WHO
target of 2.5/1,000 and the 4.5/1,000 required to attain universal health
coverage (MoH 2018: 57). These problems damage the case for a NHIS,
eroding public trust in the health system and reducing the possibility of
persuading citizens to invest their money or entrust their healthcare to it.
4. Social Cash Transfers in Uganda
4.1. Getting cash transfers on the policy agenda
Advocacy for social assistance started somewhat later than it did for social
health insurance in Uganda, and was driven more directly by donors than
domestic actors.⁴ The first mover was the World Bank in 2002, which at this
point was promoting the notion of ‘social risk management’ via training
programmes with government officials in a range of low- and middle-income
countries. A DFID Social Development advisor attended the training sessions,
which were targeted primarily at officials within the MGLSD, and decided that
DFID should both get behind the agenda and seek to extend the focus beyond
‘risk’ towards a more holistic agenda (interviews with donor officials in
Kampala, October 2005). Academics with expertise on social protection in
Africa were hired to help encourage different sectors to adopt social protection
as part of their strategic approach, which would in turn feed into the next
national Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2005–8). Some efforts were also
⁴ The more detailed story of how SCTs rose to the policy and political agenda in Uganda can be
found in Hickey and Bukenya (2016).
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made to undertake a wider advocacy campaign through some civil society
organizations (CSOs) and the media. Various social protection measures did
indeed figure within the next Plan, but none attracted significant funding or
became priorities thereafter (Hickey et al. 2009).
Encouraged by DFID adopting a stronger strategic focus on social cash
transfers in the mid-2000s (see Hickey and Seekings, this volume), DFID
officials in Uganda stepped up their promotional activities. The concurrent
move towards donor harmonization under the Paris Declaration principles
helped generate a more coordinated and coherent policy coalition: with the
World Bank taking up leadership responsibilities in other sectors, DFID was
able to lead the campaign alongside more like-minded donors such as
UNICEF. Moreover, DFID started to approach the promotion of social pro-
tection as a fundamentally political challenge rather than as a more techno-
cratic process of policy transfer (Stone 2012).
During 2006–7, DFID commissioned a political economy analysis of social
protection in Uganda, to try and identify the key sources of support and
opposition for the agenda. This then informed a more targeted and politicized
campaign that included sending senior officials and politicians on study tours,
lobbying ministers over breakfast meetings, and encouraging sympathetic
politicians to deliver briefings on social protection at ruling party conventions
and Cabinet retreats (interview with development agency officials, March
2014). Efforts to secure the support of civil and political society were extended,
with the formation of the Uganda Social Protection Platform in 2008 and the
subsequent establishment of a parliamentary forum on social protection.
A technocratic focus remained: research papers and evaluations were produced
to persuade officials and politicians of the effectiveness of social protection and
fiduciary risk assessments undertaken to offset concerns around corruption.
However, this was now directed in a more politically informed direction, with a
particular focus on senior figures within the finance ministry, especially on the
technocratic side, which constituted the primary locus of opposition. At this
stage, the President and Cabinet more broadly shared MFPED’s opposition to
SCTs, seeing them as an unaffordable handout that would create dependency
(interviews with MFPED and MGLSD officials, March 2014).
Nonetheless, towards the end of the 2000s the pressure was starting to tell.
Donors had secured a Memorandum of Understanding to undertake the
piloting of cash transfer schemes in 2006 and then gained agreement from
the government to move into the design phase in 2007. MFPED initially
blocked attempts by donors to transfer funds for the pilots, but by 2009
it had agreed to the scheme and in June 2010 Cabinet approved the
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establishment of the Expanding Social Protection (ESP) programme, a new
secretariat within MGLSD with responsibility for rolling out SCTs. The move
was informed in part by the decision by international donors to focus mainly
on an old-age pension, which helped alleviate ruling elite concerns over the
‘deservingness’ (interview with ESP official, 12 March 2014). However, the
breakthrough owed as much to serendipity as to strategy: the new finance
minister who signed off on the agreements, and who was appointed in 2008,
had been gender minister and was both knowledgeable of and sympathetic
towards the social protection agenda.
4.2. From the policy to the political agenda within
Uganda’s shifting political settlement
Once established, the ESP Secretariat moved swiftly to capitalize on the
initial sign of political support. Pilot projects involving two social assistance
programmes—a senior citizen’s grant (SCG) worth roughly US$10 per month
for all aged over sixty-five and a livelihood support programme for vulnerable
households—were established in fourteen districts. From the start the ESP
Secretariat operated not only as a project delivery unit but also as the strategic
centre of an ongoing advocacy effort. According to one donor official involved in
the process, ‘The ESP programme has been extremely strong in both areas:
implementation has been really strong. And then they’ve twinned that with the
focus on the politics and really building political support’ (interview with
authors, 18 February 2014). A particular focus was on ensuring that influential
politicians and bureaucrats were taken to see how the pilot projects were actually
operating on the ground in Uganda. However, the next and major breakthrough
came through an unforeseen route, whereby community members from Yumbe
in northern Uganda, a district that bordered one of the pilot districts, decided to
lobby the President directly to be included in the social pension scheme. In
August 2013, after the group had visited the President at his rural retreat,
Museveni wrote a letter to the gender minister stating that Yumbe would be
the next district to receive the social pension and that she should prepare to roll
the programme out nationally (interviews with various stakeholders, March to
April 2014).
Even with the President now on board, the policy coalition involved in
promoting SCTs still faced opposition. Senior officials in MFPED, supported
by their new Minister of State, actively sought to limit the pace of any further
roll-out of the project by drawing attention to the significant costs involved
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and the constrained nature of the budgetary envelop (interviews with MFPED
officials, March 2014). This worked until the 2015–16 Budget when, with an
election looming in February 2016, the policy coalition launched a compre-
hensive advocacy campaign demanding that the government honour its com-
mitments to co-financing the roll-out. Donors directly lobbied the President
and his wife, threatened to withdraw their support for the SCG, encouraged
MPs to put pressure on parliament, and funded a highly visible media
campaign. The campaign eventually worked, with MFPED increasing their
budgetary allocation from two to nine billion Uganda Schillings and announ-
cing year-on-year increases to help roll out the SCG to forty new districts by
2020 (interviews with leading MFPED and donor officials, January 2016).
4.3. A comparative analysis of the politics of cash transfers
and health insurance in Uganda
Elite commitment to social protection in Uganda remains both limited and
uneven. To date, more progress has been made in institutionalizing social cash
transfers than any other form of social protection, including social health
insurance, despite both being promoted within Uganda over roughly the
same period.⁵ Here we argue that the different levels of progress made by
these policy agendas have been directly shaped by two main factors: the
capabilities of the transnational policy coalitions that have formed around
each agenda and (in particular) their ability to secure an alignment between
their respective policy agendas and the dominant ideas and incentives within
Uganda’s political settlement. The analysis is summarized in Table 8.2.
4.3.1. Transnational policy coalitions and the power of ideas
It is now well understood that policy ideas are not free-floating entities but
instead have to be actively created and sustained by particular actors in alliance
with each other (Mosse 2005). Processes of policy learning and transfer involve
particularly important roles for epistemic communities of academics and
policy entrepreneurs who have the capacity to make the scientific case for
adopting a new approach, as well as actors with the financial and organizational
resources to support them (Peck and Theodore 2015; Stone 2012). In relation to
⁵ The main research for this chapter was undertaken over 2014–16. By 2017, there seemed to have
been some shift in the President’s position on NHIS; for example, in his 2017 State of the National
Address, the President included the NHIS Bill as being amongst those to be tackled by government and
parliament in the 2017/18 financial year.
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the promotion of social protection in Uganda, similar types of coalitions
formed around both SCTs and SHI, in that they were composed above all of
government bureaucrats and international development agencies, which then
drew in and helped nurture a wider ‘epistemic community’, before trying to
enrol further support from within local civil and political society.
However, in every respect, the transnational policy coalition that formed
around SCTs in Uganda, and the strategies that it devised and deployed to
promote SCTs, outweighed and outperformed the coalition that formed
around SHI. A stark illustration of this can be found in a comparison of the
ESP Secretariat, which acted as both a policy advocacy and project delivery
unit for SCTs within the Ministry of Gender, with that of the NHIS Secretariat
Table 8.2 The politics of social cash transfers and social health insurance in
Uganda compared
Drivers/obstacles Social cash transfers Social health insurance
















under pressure from donors and
grassroots actorsMFPED:
oppositional, some internal
champions MPs: broad support
base CSOs: supportive Middle-
class: support not required Rural
poor: supportive
President: largely opposes under
pressure from private sector
actorsMFPED: oppositional, no
internal championsMPs: narrow
















Alignment with patronage and
‘dignity’ eventually trumps
concerns with dependency and
deservingness
Poorly aligned with culture of
patronage and presidential




consensus on effectiveness and
mode of delivery
Complex ideaNo consensus on
ideal form or mode of delivery
Source: Authors’ construction. MFPED: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development;
CSOs: civil society organizations; SCTs: social cash transfers.
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within the Ministry of Health. Whereas the latter consisted of between two and
five officials located within a small part of the main ministry building, ESP has
over twelve senior staff based in the central office with a further team of
regional coordinators. ESP’s office occupied its own plot in a prime part of
Kampala and is very well equipped with computers and a fleet of vehicles.
These differences directly reflect the uneven prioritization given to the two
policy initiatives amongst donors. DFID and the World Bank are amongst the
most powerful development agencies in Uganda, and were also promoting
cash transfers more broadly as part of a new global policy agenda that their
organizations were playing a central role in establishing during the mid-2000s
(Hickey and Seekings, this volume). DFID in particular proved able to form a
sustained coalition of agencies around social protection. In comparison, the
World Bank has not been as active in promoting health insurance in Uganda
(or elsewhere); sustained support for social health insurance in Uganda came
from WHO alone.
The coalition in support of SCTs proved much more adept at navigating the
politics of social protection in Uganda. Whilst the NHIS Secretariat gained the
support of key actors on the health committee of parliament, little effort was
made to broaden this nucleus into a wider forum of support within parlia-
ment (as happened with cash transfers) or to include oppositional figures in
higher-profile events such as international study tours, as occurred around
cash transfers. Strongly informed by political economy analysis, the SCT
coalition engaged in a campaign that was persistent, well resourced, clearly
targeted, and both creative and flexible in nature. The SHI policy coalition
was further hampered by the fact that its advocacy efforts generated oppos-
ition from players with significant holding power and close connections to
the President, namely the Private Sector Working Group, that formed a
coalition against a NHIS. This did not occur with the SCT case, where
opposition was centred around some influential actors within MFPED who
could be targeted more easily.
Importantly, the SCT policy coalition was able to draw on a relatively
simple policy idea that was gaining global traction at the time, whereas social
health insurance remains a more complex and technical agenda that lacks
the wider appeal of ‘just giving money to the poor’ (Hanlon et al. 2010). In
contrast to the growing consensus about the value of cash transfers and
growing experience of how they could be implemented from pilot schemes,
there remains no wider consensus on the best way of constructing and
delivering health insurance schemes in low-income contexts (Lagomarsino
et al. 2012: 933).
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4.3.2. Political settlement dynamics: elite ideas, incentives,
and holding power
Ideas clearly mattered here, from the nature of the policy solutions through to
the fit between these and paradigmatic ideas within Uganda’s political settle-
ment (Schmidt 2008). Unlike the SCT coalition, advocates of SHI lacked a
pilot scheme that could generate evidence and help persuade powerful players
that a new policy idea could work effectively within Uganda. At a higher level,
shifting the focus to ‘vulnerable groups’ rather than ‘the poorest’ per se allowed
SCT advocates to overcome elite concerns around dependency and deserving-
ness and tap into a belief that older people deserved help to secure their
dignity. The trope of just giving money to the poor also aligned well with
the increasing tendency of the President to do just that through the ‘poverty
tours’ that were being used to shore up declining political support in rural
areas and undermine opposition support in the north.⁶ In contrast, the notion
of SHI directly contradicted an earlier electoral promise of free healthcare,
something that—as with universal primary education (Kjær and Muwanga
2016)—the President was unwilling to row back on within the context of the
shifting dynamics of Uganda’s political settlement from the early 2000s
onwards, which had rendered him more vulnerable to pressures from both
the political opposition and grassroots actors.
Whereas the increasingly personalized and populist approach to govern-
ance that the President adopted during this period was relatively easy to align
with the logic of cash transfers, it was inimical to the more institutionalized
and systematic approach required to deliver both a higher-performing health
sector and a complex new scheme for financing it. The leadership crisis that
has characterized the health ministry since the mid-2000s is symptomatic of
these wider shifts within Uganda’s political settlement, in which increased
levels of political competition and internal factionalism within the NRM have
forced the President to view appointments in such ministries as an avenue for
building patronage networks and securing elite support as opposed to pro-
moting service delivery (Bukenya and Golooba-Mutebi 2019). These shifts,
and the damage they did to the possibility of bureaucrats performing their
roles in a technocratic and effective manner, directly undermined the progress
⁶ As discussed in more depth in Hickey and Bukenya (2016), it was not accidental that the north
featured heavily in the initial roll-out of the pilot, or that Yumbe, which the President ordered would
become the fifteenth district to benefit, is based in the region. The SCG was seen as part of a wider
charm offensive that was undertaken by the NRM within the north after peace had largely been
established after 2006, and which was aimed at both offering a post-conflict dividend and turning an
historically oppositional region into supporters of the NRM.
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of the NHIS, both in terms of the Ministry’s capacity and commitment
to deliver reforms effectively and with regards to the poor quality of
provision undermining popular support for a scheme that would render
them more dependent on a failing system, and having to pay more for the
privilege.
The logic of exchange that characterizes the notion of health insurance also
runs counter to the reciprocal logic of the patron–client relationships that
continue to predominate in Uganda. Rather, they invoke the terms of a new
‘social contract’ that involves the government delivering higher-quality ser-
vices in exchange for tax-payers’ money, and also a sense of social solidarity
amongst citizens, whereby a pooled financial risk mechanism for healthcare
access is created within which the rich can subsidize the poor, the single can
subsidize those with families, the healthy can subsidize the unhealthy, and the
young can subsidize the old. Writing with reference to ‘free’ basic primary
education, but with obvious parallels to the abolishment of fees in the health
sector, Tripp notes that free social policies make it difficult to develop pro-
ductive relationships between citizens and the state ‘built on mutual obliga-
tion, for example, paying taxes in exchange for the provision of public goods’
(Tripp 2010: 188). At the local level, the abolition of citizens’ contributions
towards services they consume is associated with an apparent disconnect
between service delivery institutions such as hospitals and schools, on one
hand, and their communities on the other (Dauda 2004).
5. Conclusion
The fact that Uganda has made more progress with social cash transfers than
social health insurance, despite each having been promoted over roughly the
same period, reflects the differing nature of the two policy agendas, the ways in
which they have been promoted and by whom, and the level of ‘fit’ with
domestic political economy factors. In both cases, the critical factors have been
the extent to which a transnational policy agenda has been persuasively
promoted by a policy coalition in ways that rendered it legible to the dominant
interests, actors, and ideas within Uganda’s shifting political settlement
(Lavers and Hickey 2016). Comparative insights on the politics of health
insurance in sub-Saharan Africa suggest that progress requires not only high
levels of elite commitment but also a high degree of capacity when it comes to
enforcement, as in the cases of Ethiopia (Lavers 2019b) and Rwanda
(Chemouni 2018). Although the ‘dominant-developmental’ nature of Uganda’s
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political settlement might have been up to this challenge during the initial
period of NRM rule, since then its commitment to poverty reduction and its
capacity to deliver institutionalized responses to it have both waned. A key
issue here is that each policy invokes different types of state–society relation-
ship, whereby the logics of SCTs largely go with the grain of Uganda’s political
settlement, whilst social health insurance requires a move against this grain in
pursuit of a new social contract between government and citizen. Unfortu-
nately for Uganda’s significant population of vulnerable citizens, there are few
signs at present that such a contract is in the process of emerging.
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9
Social Assistance, Electoral Competition,
and Political Branding in Malawi
Sam Hamer and Jeremy Seekings
1. Introduction
The proliferation of social assistance programmes across Africa has coincided
with redemocratization, i.e. the return of multi-party systems with regular,
competitive elections in place of one-party states and military regimes. Elec-
tions replaced coups as the primary mechanism for leadership change. Studies
of other areas of public policy, including health and education, suggest that
democracy sometimes prompts public policy reforms (e.g. Harding and
Stasavage 2013; Carbone and Pellegata 2017) and has almost always prevented
death through famine (Devereux and Tiba 2007). To date, however, there has
been little analysis of whether and how democratization matters for social
assistance in Africa, or of whether and how social assistance informs electoral
and partisan politics.
The standard explanation of why elections matter focuses on the represen-
tation of poorer citizens. Opposition parties may oust incumbents whom poor
voters consider insufficiently responsive to their needs. Even when opposition
parties fail to win an election, they sometimes pose a sufficiently serious
challenge that incumbent parties are pushed into reforms intended to bolster
their support. Democratic freedoms also allow the media and civil society to
monitor more effectively governments’ performance and to draw attention to
governments’ failings.
The experience of the advanced capitalist countries suggests that democratic
competition shapes both the extent and form of welfare state-building. Indeed,
Huber and Stephens argue that ‘partisan politics was the single most important
factor that shaped the development of welfare states through time’ (2001: 1,
emphasis added). The form of welfare state-building in the advanced capitalist
countries after the Second World War was largely determined by whether
their governments were dominated by a social democratic party, a Christian
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
Sam Hamer and Jeremy Seekings, Social Assistance, Electoral Competition, and Political Branding in Malawi
In: The Politics of Social Protection in Eastern and Southern Africa. Edited by: Sam Hickey, Tom Lavers, Miguel
Niño-Zarazúa, and Jeremy Seekings, Oxford University Press (2020). © United Nations University World
Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198850342.003.0009
democratic party, or parties in the ‘secular centre and right’ (Esping-Andersen
1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). In Latin America and South and East Asia,
social assistance reforms have generally been pioneered by politicians or
parties on the left or centre-left (Seekings 2012), although some right-wing
candidates have subsequently embraced and even extended these reforms
(Fairfield and Garay 2017).
In Africa, few parties line up neatly on the left–right political continuum
associated with industrialized societies. Many presidents and parties have
regional or even ethnic support bases and vague ideological positions. Populist
leaders and parties have emerged, but their populism tends to be rather
nebulous. Politicians, and even presidents, move from one party to another
(Rakner et al. 2007; Resnick 2012). Voters expect their parliamentary repre-
sentatives to deliver patronage to their constituents rather than legislate
programmatic reforms (Cheeseman 2016) and vote at least in part along
ethnic lines (e.g. Norris and Mattes 2013; Hoffman and Long 2013). Election
campaigns tend to focus on valence issues, with competing candidates claim-
ing to be more efficient (and less corrupt) (Bleck and Van de Walle 2013).
Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that electoral competition in Africa has
contributed to social assistance policy reforms. Changes of government were
consequential in Zambia (Siachiwena 2016, Pruce and Hickey, Chapter 7 of
this volume), Zimbabwe (Chinyoka and Seekings 2016), and perhaps also
Ghana (Grebe 2015). The vulnerability of incumbent parties drove reform in
Botswana (Hamer 2015; Seekings, Chapter 2 of this volume) and Zanzibar
(Seekings 2016). In most of these cases, social assistance has been a valence
issue, in that the competing parties have not staked out starkly contrasting
positions. In any particular country, parties generally concurred on the direc-
tion of reform, i.e. they were usually either uniformly supportive (at least
rhetorically, claiming pro-poor credentials) or uniformly opposed (sharing
concerns over both the affordability of and ‘dependency’ on government
‘handouts’). Elections may have sometimes provided a mechanism through
which voters have held governments to account, but they have rarely been
decided on the basis of distinct policy platforms. In office, however, parties
have differed in their approaches to social protection, shaping the form of
welfare state-building. In Botswana, for example, the Botswana Democratic
Party built a welfare state with conservative characteristics (see Seekings,
Chapter 2 of this volume).
Malawi has been a significant exception to some of these more general
patterns. Until the mid-2000s, Malawian parties were largely indistinguish-
able, voters did not form blocks defined by their common interests, and
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elections were therefore not mechanisms for the representation of voters with
well-defined interests (Rakner et al 2007; Svåsand 2013). Since 2005, however,
the fluidity in partisan politics provided a powerful incentive to individual
presidential candidates to develop strong, clear, and national ‘brands’. The
dominant ‘brand’—developed by Bingu wa Mutharika (president from 2004
until 2012) and then inherited by his brother Peter Mutharika (who was
elected president in 2014)—focused on generous support for small farmers
to expand agricultural production. When Joyce Banda succeeded the older
Mutharika as president in 2012, she chose to brand herself as the champion of
social assistance. Despite widespread ambivalence within the Malawian elite
and the absence of any organized domestic constituency in favour of social
assistance reforms, the issue was raised high up the national policy agenda.
Starkly contrasting positions on social assistance reform featured prominently
in the 2014 elections.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the political conditions
leading to social assistance policy reform in Africa. We argue that competitive
elections in Africa can provide an incentive to reform by pushing presidential
candidates and parties to brand themselves, often in populist ways. The
chapter also points to the limits of this electoral impetus to reform. Joyce
Banda was defeated heavily in the 2014 election. Although the scale of her
defeat reflected other factors also, the case of Malawi does not support the
contention by Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme (2010) that social assistance is
uniformly popular. Voters might prefer alternative forms of public expend-
iture and might also doubt the deservingness of at least some categories of
grant beneficiaries. Competition can push candidates to brand themselves
with social assistance reform, but this may not be a sufficiently popular
brand to win an election. Indeed, if it was clearly a popular issue, the other
parties might be expected also to express at least rhetorical support for reform.
2. The Economy, Politics, and Policy
Under Bingu wa Mutharika
Malawi has long been one of the poorest countries in southern Africa, suffer-
ing from slow economic growth, chronic food insecurity, widespread poverty,
and dependence on foreign aid. The overwhelming majority of the population
remained dependent on peasant agriculture, supplemented with migrant
remittances. Malawi’s first president, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, imagined
that agricultural estates would be the primary engine of economic growth.
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At the same time, he sought to encourage smallholder maize production,
through price support and subsidized inputs. In the 1980s, economic crisis
and pressure from the World Bank led to the liberalization of farm input and
maize markets. Peasant cash crop production expanded, but maize production
faltered (Harrigan 2003, 2005). Banda suppressed any discussion of poverty,
but the country’s first household survey, conducted in 1997–8 after Banda had
been ousted from office, showed that almost two thirds of the population lived
in poverty (Ellis, Kutengule, and Nyasulu 2003).
In 1993, after a devastating drought, deepening domestic opposition, and
growing international criticism, Banda acceded to a referendum on the
restoration of multi-party democracy. Banda lost the referendum, and the
following year he and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) were defeated in
multi-party elections by the United Democratic Front (UDF), led by former
MCP secretary-general Bakili Muluzi. Both the MCP and UDF had regional
support bases, in the central and southern parts of the country, respectively.
A third party—the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)—was based in the
north. All three parties tried but failed to project themselves as supra-regional
(van Donge 1995). The parties did not have distinctive political platforms, and
their leaders readily switched loyalties in shifting coalitions, changing their
colours in a ‘democracy of chameleons’ (Englund 2002: 17). This regional
distribution of support was largely repeated in 1999 (when Muluzi was
re-elected) and 2004 (when his chosen successor Mutharika was elected).
Voters seem to have been swayed by their perceptions of regional favouritism
in patronage by successive governments (Ferree and Horowitz 2010).
The Muluzi governments acknowledged the scale of poverty in Malawi, in
contrast to the previous regime, and focused on smallholder production. In
1998, one year prior to elections, the government launched a Starter Pack
Programme to encourage maize production. Initially funded in large part by
donors (primarily the UK’s Department for International Development,
DFID, and the World Bank), the Starter Pack Programme provided free
seeds and other inputs to almost 3 million households in 1999/2000. Donors
became increasingly sceptical, however, preferring to address poverty through
targeted public works programmes¹ and other measures. Donor pressure
¹ The World Bank supported successive phases of the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF):
MASAF I (1996–2001), MASAF II (1998–2003), MASAF III (in three stages from 2002), and, much
later, MASAF IV (from 2013). Most of these phases included a public works component, although most
of the funds seem to have been allocated to the provision of building materials. Communities were
expected to provide free labour; little MASAF funding was spent on paying for labour. We are grateful
to one of the reviewers for clarifying this point.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
228     
resulted in subsidized inputs being targeted more narrowly on the poor, as a
safety net rather than a production-oriented intervention (Harrigan 2005;
Potter 2005). Nonetheless, and despite drought and food crisis in 2001–3
(during which one third of the population needed food aid—Devereux and
Tiba 2007), real GDP per capita rose and poverty declined (albeit slowly).
The political landscape changed dramatically in 2005. One year after his
election, President Mutharika resigned from the UDF and founded a new
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Mutharika chose to brand
himself by launching what he presented as a historic crusade against famine
and food insecurity. His flagship programme—the Agricultural Input Subsidy
Programme (AISP), later renamed the Farm Input Subsidy Programme
(FISP)—massively expanded the provision of subsidized fertilizer and seed
to smallholder farmers. The programme was launched in the 2005/6 season,
following a drought, raised maize prices, and food shortages (Chinsinga and
Poulton 2014). The programme helped to stimulate rapid growth in maize
yield and restored national food security (Denning et al. 2009). This in turn
contributed to a sharp rise in real GDP per capita.
The AISP was not only the government’s flagship programme; it was also
what defined the DPP, which adopted a logo featuring four maize cobs.
Mutharika himself took over the portfolio of Minister of Agriculture and
Food Security. AISP subsidies were symbolically important as well as materi-
ally valuable to small farmers. Subsidized or free farm inputs appealed to
strongly held values. Because ‘a good and respectable life in the village means
growing one’s own food’, programmes such as the Starter Pack Programme
and AISP helped ‘to restore self-respect’ (Van Donge, 2005: 125). In addition,
Mutharika could tap into nationalist sentiment in a populist but positive way.
When the international development community insisted that the government
accept more food aid instead of offering subsidies, Mutharika famously
declared: ‘Enough is enough; I am not going to go on my knees to beg for
food; let us grow the food ourselves’.² In the 2009 election, Mutharika used the
AISP to present himself as a ‘food security president’. Mutharika even boasted
that the programme’s success showed that ‘it is possible for Africa to become
the food basket of the world’.³ In the run-up to the election, Mutharika’s
² ‘Unravelling the “Miracle” of Malawi’s Green Revolution’, GRAIN, 14 January 2010 (http://
www.grain.org/article/entries/4075-unravelling-the-miracle-of-malawi-s-green-revolution, accessed
19 April 2017).
³ Molalet Tsedeke, ‘ “It Is Possible for Africa to Become the Food Basket of the World”, Says
Mutharika’, Nepad.org, 28 October 2010 (http://www.nepad.org/news/it-possible-africa-become-
food-basket-world-says-mutharika, accessed 3 June 2019).
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government scaled up subsidies massively, to almost US$300 million, i.e. one
sixth of all government expenditure and about 6.5 per cent of GDP.
Malawi’s citizens rewarded Mutharika and the DPP with their votes.
Mutharika himself won 66 per cent of the presidential vote, with clear major-
ities in all three regions. No previous candidate had won even a plurality
outside his home region. The DPP won 114 of the 193 seats in the National
Assembly. Mutharika’s defiance of international aid donors in implementing
the AISP and boosting maize production underpinned his supra-regional
appeal and hence his electoral victory (Ferree and Horowitz 2010).
The AISP reached a large number of voters across the country. A panel
study of three districts (one in each region) found that three quarters of rural
households benefited. The programme did not target the poorest (or most
food-insecure) households; indeed, female-headed households were less likely
to receive benefits.⁴ The study found no evidence of either partisan or ethnic
targeting, but there were partisan consequences. Households that received a
subsidy in 2009/10 were more likely to become DPP partisans than households
that did not receive the subsidy, and this effect remained significant even when
controlling for a range of other variables (Dionne and Horowitz 2016; see also
Brazys et al. 2015).
Mutharika showed little interest in social assistance, despite evidence that
farmer support programmes were missing many poor households. In 2006, a
report co-authored by German consultant Bernd Schubert suggested that one
in ten households in Malawi was poor because it had no one able or available
to work and was thus unable to benefit from farm input subsidies. It was
estimated that a targeted cash transfer programme costing approximately
1 per cent of GDP would reduce the ultra-poverty rate from 22 to 12 per
cent. In 2006, a pilot Social Cash Transfer Programme was initiated in Mchinji
District, with backing from UNICEF. Only ‘labour-constrained’ households
below the ultra-poverty line were eligible for the modest benefits (which
averaged just over US$11/month/household). The programme’s advocates
envisaged that coverage would be gradually extended, reaching about
140,000 households by the end of 2012. Even though the programme was
almost entirely funded by donors, and a preliminary impact evaluation
showed positive effects, the Mutharika government was not enthusiastic. By
2012, the programme reached only 30,000 households in total, and the roll-out
⁴ The 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey found no difference between male- and female-headed
households, but did find that access was higher among non-poor than among poor households (World
Bank 2013: 117).
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was yet to begin in nineteen of the country’s twenty-eight districts (Angeles
et al. 2016: 282–305). A draft National Social Support Policy was not approved
by the government. Many poor households did benefit from school feeding
programmes, and some from other programmes, but less than 1 per cent of
households received cash transfers (Malawi 2012: 173–4, 177–8). In contrast,
about one half of all rural households received FISP subsidies. FISP, almost
entirely funded by the government, cost five times as much as all social
protection programmes (including feeding and public employment pro-
grammes), almost entirely funded by donors (World Bank 2013: 111).
The slow expansion of cash transfer programmes in Malawi reflected
ambivalence or even hostility towards cash transfers not only within the
DPP but also within the Malawian elite more generally. In 2008, Kalebe-
Nyamongo interviewed ministers and MPs, senior government officials,
and prominent people in the media, academia, and NGOs. She found that
Malawi’s elites tended to view poverty as ‘normal’ (at least in rural areas) such
that it could not be eliminated in the short-term. Whilst elites attributed
poverty to insufficient economic development and political will, and poor
education, they also blamed poor people for not trying hard enough to escape
poverty. Social assistance programmes were said to encourage laziness and
‘dependency’ on ‘handouts’. The elites preferred policies that assisted the poor
to work their way out of poverty (Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette 2014).
Our interviews with Malawian government officials and other members of
Malawi’s elite broadly corroborated this assessment.⁵
3. Joyce Banda, Social Assistance, and Political Branding
Mutharika pushed for his brother Peter to succeed him as DPP leader. When
the elected vice-president, Joyce Banda, declined to step aside, Mutharika
expelled her from the DPP, but was unable to depose her as vice-president
of the country. In April 2012, Mutharika suffered a heart attack and died.
Banda—who had established her own party, the People’s Party (PP), four
months earlier—became president.
Her expulsion from the DPP and then unexpected ascent to the presidency
presented Banda with the challenge of constructing a distinctive national and
moral image. She chose to brand herself and her party as pro-poor. Whereas,
⁵ Sam Hamer interviewed sixteen political leaders, officials in government and NGOs, and academ-
ics, in mid-2014.
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she claimed, Mutharika and his DPP had been pro-growth without concern
for the poor, she and the PP were both pro-growth and pro-poor. Social
assistance programmes played a central part in her branding exercise, distin-
guishing both her and her party from Mutharika and the DPP’s embrace of
farmer input subsidies.
Banda thus staked out a public brand not only outside the mainstream of
the elite, but in defiance of it. ‘The Joyce Banda I have come to know’,
commented blogger Kondwani Munthali, ‘is the mother who speaks on
empowering the poor [ . . . ] who removed all the trappings of the Vice
Presidency and went to sit down on a mat in [the peri-urban township of]
Ndirande to console a [ . . . ] victim of police brutality’.⁶ Indeed, Mutharika had
reportedly chosen Banda as his running mate in 2009 precisely because of her
pro-women and pro-poor image.⁷ Banda’s own story was one of success in the
face of the difficulties facing many women in Malawi. She completed second-
ary school at the age of twenty-five, having had three children. She left an
abusive marriage, remarried, and opened a textile manufacturing company
that grew to employ more than a hundred people. She made it her ‘mission in
life to assist women and youth to gain social and political empowerment’, she
claimed, just as she herself had experienced empowerment through education
and business. In the 1980s, she co-founded the National Association of
Business Women, which grew into the country’s largest network of rural
women, with more than 50,000 members. She co-founded the Young
Women Leaders Network and the Hunger Project. The Joyce Banda Founda-
tion provided meals and care for thousands of orphans and vulnerable chil-
dren, earning Banda a Goodwill Ambassadorship for Safe Motherhood from
the African Union. In interviews, Banda explained her decision to enter
politics as following on from her work as an activist and philanthropist: ‘For
me, the motivation [ . . . ] was to be involved in influencing laws that have a big
impact on women and children’.⁸
Reality did not entirely match this carefully constructed image. Banda’s
second husband was the Chief Justice, and the two of them were considered to
⁶ Kondwali Munthali, ‘The Joyce Banda I Know and Trust’, 26 April 2012, http://www.munthali.
com/2012/04/joyce-banda-i-know-and-trust.html.
⁷ ‘Malawi Leader Chooses Foreign Minister as Running Mate’, Reuters, 6 February 2009, (http://
www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-malawi-election-idAFJOE5150KO20090206, accessed 19 April 2017).
⁸ Joyce Banda, ‘Why We Care’, not dated (http://www.universalaccessproject.org/global-leaders/
joyce-banda, accessed 7 March 2017); ‘President Joyce Banda on Women’s Health and Empowerment
in Malawi’, January 2013 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzcoHYNR0yA); ‘The Journey of
Dr Joyce Hilda Banda, the President of Malawi’, November 2013 (https://wethewomenourjourneys.
wordpress.com/2013/11/28/dr-joyce-hilda-bandathe-president-of-malawi, accessed 16 March 2015).
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be core members of the powerful ‘Zomba mafia’ within the political parties
that governed Malawi for twenty years. The National Association of Business
Women celebrated successes that were far removed from the lives of poor
women. Whatever the reality, however, Banda was energetic in promoting her
new brand.
Banda refused to resign as vice-president after she was expelled from the
DPP because, she declared, she had a constitutional responsibility and man-
date to fight for the well-being of the ‘ordinary Malawian’.⁹ As leader of a new
opposition party, and then as president, Banda developed her brand as a
champion of women and the poor, whom (she claimed) Mutharika had
neglected. Distancing herself from her more elitist and male peers, Banda
professed to understand the challenges facing women and the poor. At a rally
in the north, Banda—herself from Zomba in southern Malawi—explained:
I know the kind of suffering that women are going through in this country.
Their suffering does not need any introduction to me. I am the best advocate
of the poor because I know what poverty is. I have fought against this, and
will continue to fight.¹⁰
Mutharika’s widow mocked Banda for supposing that someone who had
distributed a ‘little money here and there for village women to sell fritters or
doughnuts’ could become president.¹¹ Banda turned this around, responding:
‘she is right, because I’ve spent thirty years of my life empowering rural
women; if I am aligned with the majority of women who struggle every day
[ . . . ] that’s fine, that’s my mission’.¹² Banda used her first State of the
Nation Address, in May 2012, to distance her government from her
predecessor’s. In addition to ‘transforming the structure of the economy in
order to achieve economic growth’, her government would protect ‘the
vulnerable and the excluded’. She staked out a distinctive populist position:
‘As a Malawian woman who knows the humiliation of Malawian women; as a
Malawian who has championed the plight of rural poor’, she would champion
⁹ ‘Malawi: Vice President Joyce Banda Launches New Party’, Vibe Ghana, 8 September 2011 (http://
vibeghana.com/2011/09/08/malawi-president-joyce-banda-launches-new-party, accessed 3 June 2015).
¹⁰ ‘JB Attacks Poverty: “I KnowMalawians Are Suffering”’, Nyasa Times, 22 July 2013 (https://www.
nyasatimes.com/jb-attacks-poverty-i-know-malawians-are-suffering, accessed 9 June 2015).




¹² ‘Madam President: Meeting Malawi’s Joyce Banda’, Guardian, 20 December 2012 (https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=qBmaeOM1omY&feature=youtube_gdata_player).
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the causes of people who had fallen through the cracks as a result of Mutharika’s
growth-focused policies.¹³
In practice, Banda’s government’s first priority was to stabilize the
economy, which had slid into crisis under Mutharika’s second government.
She sought a rapprochement with international aid donors, agreed an aid
package from the IMF and World Bank in exchange for devaluing the cur-
rency, and reversed several Mutharika-era laws curtailing political freedoms.
Banda became the darling of the international community. She ordered the
government to shed its fleet of Mercedes-Benz automobiles, sold the presi-
dential jet, and reduced her own salary by one third.¹⁴ ‘I had to look at the
situation of my fellow Malawians’, Banda said; ‘if we are going to ask Mala-
wians to make sacrifices, I must be the first to do it’. Her government’s
austerity measures did indeed require sacrifices by many Malawians, through
inflation and food shortages. In response, the government sought social
programmes that could ‘cushion’ the poor.¹⁵
In July 2012, the new government approved the long-dormant National
Social Support Policy. The value of the social cash transfer (SCT) was
increased and an ambitious implementation programme was developed. The
SCT Scheme Pilot was renamed the SCT Programme. Whilst no new pro-
grammes were introduced (as DPP MPs pointed out¹⁶), the new government
proposed a rapid, countrywide roll-out of the SCT Programme as well as the
expansion of public employment and school feeding programmes, with the
cost to be shared between donors and the government of Malawi. SCTs would
be rolled out to the poorest 10 per cent of the population, i.e. about 300,000
households, at a total cost of more than 1 per cent of GDP, of which the
government would pay 40 per cent (Angeles et al 2016; Juergens and Pellerano
2016). The World Bank was broadly supportive, recommending that FISP
focus on ‘viable’ peasant farmers, i.e. farmers with the capacity to expand
production significantly, so that funds could be freed up for SCTs targeted
more precisely on the poor (World Bank 2013).
¹³ State of the Nation Address, May 2012.
¹⁴ ‘Malawi Sells Presidential Jet to Feed Poor’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September 2013
(http://www.smh.com.au/world/malawi-sells-presidential-jet-to-feed-poor-20130906-2t944.html,
accessed 18 March 2015).
¹⁵ Interview with Joyce Banda, Talk Africa, 28 August 2013 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
yS0FR2XDDSU, accessed 7 March 2017); ‘Malawi Leader Defends China Links, Tells the West: “Don’t
Tell Us What to Do” ’, Nyasa Times, 22 March 2013 (http://www.nyasatimes.com/2013/03/22, accessed
April 2017).
¹⁶ George Chaponda, Response to the State of the Nation Address, Hansard, 20 May 2013. There
does not appear to have been any significant discussion of an old-age pension. It was only in 2015/16
that the ILO and HelpAge International began to work with Malawi government officials in developing
new plans for a more comprehensive social protection ‘floor’, including social pensions.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/10/2019, SPi
234     
Banda herself was said to be ‘euphoric on how the social protection
programme has [ . . . ] acted as a cushion against devaluation’.¹⁷ In practice,
however, programmes expanded much more slowly than envisaged. Service
delivery failed to match the ambitious rhetoric. Only modest additional
funding was provided for public works programmes by either the government
or the World Bank (Juergens and Pellerano 2016).¹⁸ Whilst there are no
available data on the coverage and cost of SCT programmes at the end of
Banda’s government in mid-2014, data for late 2015 show that even then SCTs
reached only 160,000 households (in eighteen of the country’s twenty-eight
districts), at a cost of just under 0.6 per cent of GDP. Both coverage and
expense were just over one half of the targets set in 2012/13. Moreover, the
government was paying for only 11 per cent of the cost (less than 0.1 per cent
of GDP), compared with the target of 40 per cent (or just under 0.5 per cent of
GDP). School feeding programmes had expanded slowly, but only to reach
25 per cent of all primary school children. The government contribution to the
costs of the school feeding and public works programmes had remained low, at
between 10 and 20 per cent (Juergens and Pellerano 2016).
Faced with slow progress in the roll-out of these programmes, and the
imminence of elections in May 2014, Banda resorted to the longstanding
practice of high-profile handouts, packaged as new presidential programmes,
implemented through her office and run by her own appointees. The Presi-
dential Initiative on Poverty and Hunger Reduction (PIPaHR) targeted rural
women,¹⁹ including through the provision of seeds and a ‘Cow-a-Family’
programme that (borrowing from a similar programme in Rwanda) provided
poor families with a cow. Banda herself regularly and personally distributed
cows to beneficiaries. Although the Cow-a-Family programme had distributed
only 756 dairy cows by the end of April 2014, it was given massive publicity.
Banda announced her intention for the programme to benefit 1.5 million
people over the following five years, if she was re-elected as president. The
government also distributed 8,680 goats and sheep through a parallel Small
Stock Project.²⁰ The Mudzi (Village) Transformation Trust (MTT) was
¹⁷ Chaponda, Hansard, 20 May 2013.
¹⁸ ‘Malawi President Launches K10bn Public Works Programme: Economic Recovery’, Nyasa
Times, 9 December 2012 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-president-launches-k10bn-public-
works-programme-economic-recovery, accessed June 2015).
¹⁹ ‘Presidential Initiative on Hunger Reduction to Realize K7 Billion’, Banthu Times, 12 December
2013 (http://banthutimes.com/presidential-initiative-on-hunger-reduction-to-realize-k7-billion, accessed
18 March 2015).
²⁰ ‘JB Launches “a Cow a Family” Initiative: Pledges Houses for Malawi Flood Victims’, Nyasa
Times, 28 February 2013 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-launches-a-cow-a-family-initiative-pledges-
houses-for-malawi-flood-victims, accessed 8 June 2015); Henry Nyaka, ‘Malawi: One Cow a Family
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another hallmark programme on Banda’s ‘people-centred development
agenda’. ‘As a mother’, Banda explained, ‘it is my sincere wish that Malawians
must have decent, adequate and affordable accommodation’. By building
houses for poor households, the MTT would ensure that development was
inclusive and prosperity was shared. Banda herself presented ‘Mudzi houses’
to beneficiaries, with much publicity—although only 500 houses had been
built by the end of 2013.²¹
Banda’s new programmes were widely criticized as entailing self-promotion
more than poverty reduction: ‘The president is just trying to popularise
herself ’.²² Opposition MPs claimed that the president’s travel to deliver cows
cost many times the value of the cows themselves.²³ But even critics acknow-
ledged that these programmes were politically popular.²⁴ Giving cows to poor
women was reported to be ‘effective with female voters especially’.²⁵ In her
campaign for re-election in 2014, Banda emphasized both the cow and house
programmes as symbols of her dedication to the poor. ‘It is a known fact that
Initiative Goes to Rumphi’, Malawi News Agency, 16 July 2013 (https://allafrica.com/stories/
201307170205.html, accessed 7 March 2017); ‘JB Says “One Cow per Family” to Benefit 1m Families
in Malawi’, Nyasa Times, 5 April 2013 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-says-one-cow-per-family-to-
benefit-1m-families-in-malawi, accessed 8 June 2015); Memory Kutengule, ‘756 Cows Distributed to
Vulnerable Farm Families’, Malawi Voice, 29 April 2014 (http://joycebanda2014.org/?p=518, accessed
19 April 2017).
²¹ ‘Malawi Leader Lays Foundation Stone for 7,500 Houses’, Nyasa Times, 2 July 2013 (https://
www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-leader-lay-foundation-stone-for-7500-houses-chinese-company-to-
build, accessed 7 June 2015); ‘Malawi President Banda Leaves for US for UN General Assembly’,
Nyasa Times, 16 September 2013 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-president-banda-leaves-
for-us-for-un-general-assembly, accessed 7 June 2015); ‘Mzimba Chiefs Happy with Mudzi Trust’,
Nyasa Times, 22 September 2013 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/mzimba-chiefs-happy-with-mudzi-
trust, accessed 7 June 2015); ‘JB Hands Over Mudzi House to Gogo Nyasoko of Kasungu’, Nyasa
Times, 3 December 2013 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-hands-over-mudzi-house-to-gogo-
nyasoko-of-kasungu, accessed 7 June 2015); Memory Kutengule, ‘Malawi: Almost K1 Billion
Spent On Mudzi Transformation Trust Project’, Malawi News Agency, 25 November 2013
(https://allafrica.com/stories/201311260092.html, accessed 19 April 2017); ‘JB Storms Ndirande,
Assures Better Life for Malawi Citizens’, Malawi Nyasa, 9 December 2013 (http://www.nyasatimes.
com/2013/12/09/jb-storms-ndirande-assures-better-life-for-malawi-citizens, accessed June
2015); ‘Mudzi Transformation Trust to Continue’, Malawi24, 7 July 2014 (http://malawi24.
com/2014/07/07/mudzi-transformation-trust-to-continue-pp, accessed 12 June 2015).
²² ‘Queries Over Joyce Banda Maize’, Face of Malawi, 3 November 2012 (http://www.faceofmalawi.
com/2012/11/queries-over-joyce-banda-maize, accessed 23 March 2015).
²³ Chaponda, Hansard, 20 May 2013; ‘JB Takes Food Distribution Exercise to Mangochi’,
Nyasa Times, 9 November 2012 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-takes-food-distribution-exercise-to-
mangochi, accessed 26 May 2015).
²⁴ ‘CSOs Thrash JB on Mudzi Transformation Trust, One Family One Cow’,Malawi Voice, 20 June
2013 (http://malawivoice.com/2013/06/20/csos-thrash-jb-on-mudzi-transformationtrust-one-family-
one-cow-we-need-decisions-that-transcend-political-considerations-81875, accessed 18 March 2015).
²⁵ McGroarty, Patrick, ‘Malawi President Looks to Ride Free Cows to New Term’, Wall Street Journal,
20 May 2014 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565453088446512, accessed
19 April 2017).
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anyone who will come after me will not continue these projects’, she beseeched
voters at one rally in early 2014; ‘so for the continuation, vote for me’.²⁶
Banda herself embraced the discourse of ‘handouts’, using a word that was
usually anathema to elites not only in Malawi but also across much of Africa.
‘Even in Western countries’, she said, ‘there are ultra-poor people who survive
on handouts’. If re-elected, she would ‘continue to give help to those in need’.²⁷
‘I want all of you to know’, she proclaimed at a November 2012 food
distribution event, ‘that I will continue distributing maize to the needy people
of this country. There is no way I can stand by and drink tea when people are
suffering’. Moreover, she emphasized that these were her initiatives, rather
than government programmes: ‘I will not tire, myself and various members of
the People’s Party will continue to distribute maize where it is needed most’.²⁸
Images of Banda personally delivering bags of maize, dancing with rural
women, and sitting with elderly villagers appeared in the media during the
weeks leading up to the election.²⁹ The PP’s logo was adorned with PIPaHR
maize bags (which were also stamped ‘Joyce Banda’) and Mudzi houses.³⁰
Whilst the distribution of cash and even houses during elections was a well-
established practice in Malawi, Banda differed from her predecessors in that
she formalized ‘handouts’ as programmes and explicitly incorporated these
into the core of her political brand.
As the election approached, Banda attempted to keep the public’s attention
on her ambitions to reduce poverty. The PP manifesto, ‘Transforming
Malawi Together’, trumpeted Banda’s successes in ‘modernizing rural areas
and fighting poverty’ through the MTT. In her preface, Banda wrote that she
remained ‘committed to continue to champion the cause of the rural and
urban poor’ (PP 2014). Banda toured the country, touting her record on
poverty alleviation and distributing maize, livestock, and houses at ‘develop-
ment rallies’, reinforcing the notion that she was the champion of the poor
²⁶ ‘JB Vows to Continue Pro-Poor Initiative: Seeks Her Own Mandate’, Nyasa Times, 11 May 2014
(https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-vows-to-continue-pro-poor-initiative-seeks-her-own-mandate, accessed
26 May 2014).
²⁷ ‘JB Vows to Continue Pro-Poor Initiative: Seeks Her Own Mandate’, Nyasa Times, 11 May 2014
(http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/05/11/jb-vows-to-continue-pro-poor-initiative-seeks-her-own-mandate,
accessed 26 May 2014).
²⁸ Chaponda, Hansard, 20 May 2013; ‘JB Takes Food Distribution Exercise to Mangochi’,
Nyasa Times, 9 November 2012 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/jb-takes-food-distribution-exercise-to-
mangochi, accessed 26 May 2015).
²⁹ ‘Malawi’s First Lady Weighs in on Sacked VP Vilification Campaign’, Afrique en ligne, 19 December
2012 (https://web.archive.org/web/20101220022458/http://www.afriquejet.com/news/africa-news/malawi-
first-lady-weighs-in-on-sacked-vp-vilification-campaign-2010121864612.html, accessed 7 March 2017).
³⁰ ‘A Long Way to Go’, Economist, 19 March 2013 (http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/
03/malawi, accessed 19 April 2017). See also Gabay (2014).
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(Dulani and Dionne 2014: 219). ‘If you want the programmes we have been
doing for the people of Malawi [ . . . ] to continue, vote for me’.³¹ ‘The president
loves handouts’, noted one observer; ‘she says she’s a charitable president and
would like to give to people to alleviate their poverty’.³²
4. The 2014 Election and the Limits
to the Social Protection Brand
Banda approached the election in 2014 with a clear brand but a party in
disarray. After forming a party in 2011, and especially after assuming the
presidency in 2012, Banda had achieved considerable success in building up
her party, recruiting seventy-seven MPs (out of 193) from other parties by
February 2013. In September 2013, however, the ‘Cashgate’ corruption scandal
broke. It was revealed that civil servants and senior ministers in the Banda
government had stolen about US$30 million from government coffers,
prompting donors to withhold about US$150 million in budgetary support.
Corruption had long been a concern to voters (Zimmerman 2015), but
Cashgate served to link this firmly to Banda’s government specifically. The
prospects for Banda and the PP began to look bleak, and many of her party’s
MPs defected. Lacking an established grassroots network or a reliable bureau-
cracy that could implement a large-scale poverty-alleviation programme,
Banda had little choice but to emphasize her brand on the basis of her
‘handout’ initiatives.
Both major opposition parties were outspoken in their condemnation of
Banda’s initiatives. They denounced ‘handouts’ and insisted that economic
growth was the only way to alleviate poverty. The president’s fiercest critic was
the MCP’s presidential candidate Lazarus Chakwera, a minister in the Assem-
blies of God church and a newcomer to national politics. In his preface to the
MCP’s election manifesto, Chakwera wrote of the ‘dependency syndrome’,
which was ‘being exploited by the leaders to gain political popularity through
handouts’. The manifesto itself emphasized the importance of economic
growth and did not specify any poverty-alleviation programmes (MCP
2014). In his stump speech, Chakwera attacked Banda’s programmes on the
basis that they actually increased poverty: ‘Malawians are poor not just
³¹ ‘JB Increasingly Upbeat to Win Malawi Elections’, Nyasa Times, 11 May 2014 (https://www.
nyasatimes.com/jb-increasingly-upbeat-to-win-malawi-elections, accessed 18 March 2015).
³² Interview with Henry Chingaipe, Director, Institute for Policy Research & Social Empowerment,
by Sam Hamer, 19 May 2014.
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because of God’s will but [ . . . ] due to the spirit of hand-outs which has grown
roots among Malawians’, Chakwera declared; ‘no country in the world can
develop through the spirit of giving its citizens Cows, Houses and any other
Materials’; development required ‘teaching people to work hard’.³³ On Elec-
tion Day, Chakwera urged voters to vote for him ‘not because I am giving you
handouts in this campaign but because you desire to see change of things in a
Malawi to come [sic]’.³⁴
Peter Mutharika—the DPP leader and presidential candidate—simply
promised to ‘continue from where my brother left off ’.³⁵ The DPP added
pictures of Bingu wa Mutharika to their party regalia alongside the maize cob
motif. It promised to abolish the Banda government’s reforms of FISP and to
‘make subsidized fertilizer available for every maize subsistence farmer that
needs it’. Malawi would be transformed ‘from being a predominantly import-
ing and consuming country to a predominantly producing and exporting
country; and a food-sufficient country where hunger is eliminated’ (DPP
2014). Subsidies were still needed, Mutharika explained, ‘so that every
Malawian can afford the means to produce food while earning the dignity of
labouring to feed [themselves]’.³⁶ Whereas Banda and the PP simply handed
out houses, the DPP would subsidize cement so that Malawians could ‘build
what they want by themselves’.³⁷ The DPP also promised to pass a ‘Law on
Handouts’, without providing any detail (DPP 2014: 11).
The three major parties thus campaigned with three distinct brands with
respect to poverty alleviation and hence to the moral imagery required of
political leaders in order to build supra-regional coalitions (as van Donge had
argued in 1995). Banda branded herself unapologetically as the champion of
‘handouts’ to the poor, including especially her own initiatives. Chakwera
branded himself (and the MCP) as the pro-growth party, and denounced
‘handouts’. Mutharika and the DPP rebranded themselves as the party of
³³ ‘Southern Region Shuns MCP Once More, as Chakwera Scorns JB’s One Cow per Family
Initiative’, Malawi Voice, 8 May 2014 (http://malawivoice.com/2014/05/08/southern-region-shuns-
mcp-chakwera-scorns-jbs-one-cow-per-family-initiative, accessed 23 March 2015); ‘Chakwera Attacks
JB on Hand-Outs in Zomba’, Nyasa Times, 8 May 2014 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/chakwera-
attacks-jb-on-hand-outs-in-zomba, accessed 23 March 2015).
³⁴ ‘Chakwera Bemoans Handouts’, Afriem.org, 12 May 2014 (http://www.afriem.org/2014/05/
chakwera-bemoans-handouts-2, accessed 23 March 2015).
³⁵ ‘The Spirit of Bingu and a Leadership Without an Agenda: Z Allan Ntata’, Maravi Post, 11 May
2014 (http://www.maravipost.com/the-spirit-of-bingu-and-a-leadership-without-an-agenda-z-allan-
ntata, accessed 22 June 2015).
³⁶ ‘Mutharika Wants Feedback on Proposals to Tackle Malawi “Intellectual Crisis” ’, Nyasa Times,
19 April 2014 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/mutharika-wants-feedback-on-proposals-to-tackle-
malawi-intellectual-crisis, accessed 24 March 2015).
³⁷ ‘Goodall Mocks JB’s Mudzi Transformation Trust’, Malawi Oracle Times, 7 April 2014 (http://
www.orakonews.com/goodall-mocks-jbs-mudzi-transformation-trust, accessed 11 June 2015).
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farm input subsidies. Both Chakwera and Mutharika lauded hard work, but
Mutharika and the DPP were happier for the state to play a large role in
fostering agricultural growth.
The three parties articulated the three dominant approaches to poverty
reduction across east and southern Africa. Chakwera’s position resembled
that of political leaders such as Peter Ng’andu Magande, the Finance Minister
of Zambia in the mid-2000s, who had blocked donor-backed social protection
programmes (Kabandula and Seekings 2016). The Mutharika/DPP position
was the classic ‘agrarian’ route to poverty alleviation that had been more
common in the first decades after independence (see Lavers on Ethiopia,
Chapter 3 of this volume). Banda’s position was an unequivocal defence of
social assistance for the poor, especially those poor people who were unable to
take advantage of farming subsidies. In contrast to most advocates of social
assistance, however, Banda chose not to defend it on developmental
grounds—as, for example, the World Bank did, including in Malawi (World
Bank 2013)—but on the basis of need. This was a discourse employed more
often by foreign and local NGOs, and only rarely by political leaders.
In the run-up to the election, these differences were overshadowed by other
issues. In addition to the Cashgate scandal, the government’s perceived com-
petence was undermined by another drought, which left almost 10 per cent of
the population (or 1.5 million people) dependent on food aid. Amidst the
swirling scandal and a stuttering economy, Banda won only 20 per cent of the
vote, behind both Chakwera (with 28 per cent) and Mutharika (with 36 per
cent). Banda won pluralities in every northern district, and majorities in
southern districts where her co-ethnic Lomwes predominated. Chakwera
and the MCP won all of the central districts. Atupele Muluzi, son of the
former president, earned pluralities for the UDF in south-eastern districts
where co-ethnic Yaos predominated. The DPP dominated the rest of the
south. The PP won only twenty-six parliamentary seats, behind the DPP
(fifty-one seats) and MCP (forty-eight seats).
The election outcome seemed to mark a return to the regional patterns
characteristic of Malawi prior to 2009. There were, however, two significant
shifts between the pre-2009 and 2014 elections. First, although he did not win
a majority of the votes in any northern or central district, Mutharika nonetheless
came second in both of those regions, suggesting that there may have been some
residual support there for the Mutharika/DPP food security brand (Patel and
Wahman 2014). Second, Banda did win one in five votes—rather more in the
north—after she was endorsed by important northern politicians. Banda’s result
suggests also that her pro-poor brand did not preclude all support.
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In early 2014, prior to the election, Afrobarometer asked Malawian citizens
to identify the most important difference between the incumbent and oppos-
ition parties. The largest proportion (40 per cent) indicated ‘economic and
development policies’, with much smaller proportions opting for the honesty
or integrity of leaders, ethnic or regional loyalties, or the leaders’ personalities.
The Afrobarometer data suggest, however, that Malawian voters prioritized
food security over the alleviation of poverty per se. When they were asked to
identify the most important problem facing the country that the government
should address, the most commonly cited problem in every Afrobarometer poll
between 2003 and 2014 was ‘food shortage and famine’. The proportion of
respondents citing this peaked at almost 50 per cent in the 2005 survey, declined
in the 2008 and 2012 surveys, but then rose somewhat in the 2014 survey, to
27 per cent. By comparison, ‘poverty and destitution’ were cited by between
4 and 7 per cent across these surveys. In both 2012 and 2014, the second most
frequently cited ‘most important problem’ was the ‘management of the econ-
omy’. All of this suggests that there remained a strong constituency for pro-
grammes to support small farmers, and this constituency grew during periods
of drought. The Banda ‘brand’ was probably not a substantial vote-winner.
Dorward et al. (2009: 9–10) report research that suggested that poor farmers
preferred programmes that helped them to produce more food themselves
than food- or cash-for-work programmes (as suggested earlier by van Donge
2005). Several of our interviewees suggest that Banda may have been misguided
in her belief that a focus on direct transfers (‘handouts’) would endear her to
poor voters.³⁸
Afrobarometer polls in June 2012 and March/April 2014 show that Banda’s
branding did not prevent a rapid decline in popular approval of her perform-
ance, from more than 65 per cent to less than 40 per cent. Approval of the
government’s economic management also declined dramatically. The propor-
tion of voters saying that they would vote for the PP, if elections were held
tomorrow, fell from 46 per cent in 2012, when the PP was ahead of both the
DPP and MCP, to only 19 per cent in 2014, behind both the DPP and MCP
(which was almost exactly the outcome of the election). By 2014, the DPP was
identified by most voters as the party most likely to solve every one of a set of
challenges, including not only fighting corruption, managing the economy,
and ensuring food security, but also reducing poverty.
Whilst Banda’s brand did not prevent a decline in support, had the election
been fought in 2012 (or early 2013) then—the data suggest—she would have
³⁸ Interviews by Sam Hamer, 16 May 2014.
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performed strongly. The 2012 Afrobarometer survey found strong evidence of
enthusiasm for Joyce Banda, presumably in part because she was seen to be
strong on the valence issues of economic management and fighting corrup-
tion. At that time, her distinctively pro-‘handout’ stance did not seem to have
been a political liability, although it was yet to be subjected to the intense
criticism of an actual election campaign. The sharp decline in support for
Banda and the PP between 2012 and 2014 suggests that a strong pro-poor or,
more specifically, pro-‘handout’ brand is likely to succeed only if the candidate
is expected to deliver also on basic economic management and action against
corruption. Put another way, if the economy is growing or expected to grow,
voters may feel more indulgent towards the poor, but at times of economic
difficulty and widespread corruption, voters veer towards more conservative
candidates with their discourse of hard work and responsibility.
5. The Conditions for Social Assistance Branding
The presidential election in Malawi in 2014 was unusual, at least within Africa,
in that the candidates held strong and contrasting positions on poverty-reduction
strategy. Social assistance was, unusually, not a valence issue. In post-apartheid
South Africa, the major parties have broadly concurred over the importance of
extensive social protection. In Botswana, the opposition parties have accused the
governing party of not doing enough, but they share a general commitment to
both the principle of state responsibility for the poor and specific social protection
programmes. In Kenya, rival coalitions share both a rhetorical commitment to
social protection and a reticence to implement reforms when in office. In
Zimbabwe, the entry of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change into
a Government of National Unity in 2009 did lead to reforms, but these were not
because the MDC itself had any clear commitment to social protection. In
Zambia, the then opposition Patriotic Front did include a commitment to
expanded social protection in its 2011 election manifesto, but it was not a
prominent element in its campaign. The 2014 Malawi election was perhaps the
first election in which contrasting positions on ‘handouts’ featured prominently
in the rhetoric of the competing candidates and parties.
Why, then, did Banda seize on social assistance when branding herself and
her new party? Conditions specific to Malawi in the 2000s may have favoured
the emergence of social assistance on the electoral agenda despite elite ambiva-
lence and uncertainty as to how voters would respond. Most obviously,
political parties in Malawi were unusually weakly institutionalized. Malawian
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parties have long been weak on the ground, MPs often switch allegiance from
one party to another, and even opposition party leaders defect to join the
government (Rakner et al. 2007; Svåsand 2013). Moreover, the parties of both
presidents Mutharika (DPP) and Banda (PP) broke away from existing parties.
Given that, ‘as a new party’ in 2005, Mutharika’s DPP had ‘lacked even
minimal infrastructure and was poorly suited to monitor clientelist exchanges
at the local level’ (Dionne and Horowitz 2016: 217; see also Dulani and Dionne
2014), bold branding was the obvious strategy—and, as it turned out, a very
successful one. Banda’s expulsion from the DPP in 2011 placed her in a similar
position. If she formed a new party rather than joining one of the existing
opposition parties, bold branding was the obvious strategy.
Immediately after the 1994 election, van Donge (1995) argued that the
regional and ethnic demographics of Malawi led presidential candidates to
search for a moral brand that could underpin and justify a supra-regional (and
supra-ethnic) coalition. For ten years, political leaders failed to develop a
successful brand (see also Rakner et al. 2007). In 2009, it seemed that Bingu
wa Mutharika had found a winning formula: his support for small farmers (at
a time of sustained economic growth) enabled him to win the election by an
unprecedented margin and with unprecedentedly broad support. Although
support for Mutharika and the DPP declined thereafter, their ‘capture’ of the
pro-farmer brand pushed rivals into alternative positions that they might
otherwise not have chosen. The MCP was pushed into a stark neoliberal
position, advocating growth and the state’s retreat from statist interventions
(‘handouts’, whether for farmers or the poor). This left little space for Banda
and the PP other than to adopt an interventionist, pro-poor position, distin-
guished from the DPP by its support for the poor rather than farmers, i.e.
social assistance rather than farm input subsidies.
Neither Banda/PP nor the Mutharikas/DPP adopted the kind of populist
strategy discussed by Resnick, with particular reference to the experience of
Michael Sata (and his Patriotic Front) in Zambia. Sata’s populism was char-
acterized by ‘an anti-elitist discourse, a policy message oriented around social
inclusion, and a charismatic leader who professes an affinity with the under-
class’ (Resnick 2012: 1352; see also Pruce and Hickey, Chapter 7 of this volume
and Siachiwena 2016). Sata adopted a populist stance in opposition to the
broadly pro-market incumbent Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD), appealing to poor urban voters not through clientelism (or vote-
buying), or through ethnic appeals, but rather through a populist promise to
incorporate them into the political arena. Resnick shows that this populism
made particular sense in Zambia, with its unusually large, urbanized
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populations in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. In Malawi, in contrast to Zambia,
the urbanized population was small, and elections were fought and won in
rural areas. Both Mutharika and Banda therefore developed brands that were
in their own way populist but were quite different from that of Sata and the PF,
appealing to rural voters. Moreover, Banda could not brand herself as a critic
of the poverty generated by free market policies given that the DPP was
already championing massive (and expensive) state support for farmers.
One other southern African leader who sought to develop a personal ‘social
protection’ brand was Ian Khama in Botswana. Khama became president in
2008, largely on the basis that he was the son of founding president Seretse
Khama and, like his father, had been chief of the BaNgwato. His party—the
Botswana Democratic Party—had been in power since independence in 1966,
but its support had fallen to only just over one half of the vote. Ian Khama
needed a distinctive brand that would carry him through the election in 2009
by allowing him to claim his father’s mantle at the same time as emphasizing
novelty and distancing himself from his immediate predecessors. Like Banda,
Ian Khama seized on social protection as the basis of his brand, but his chosen
focus was a public employment programme. He had the advantages of being
able to dust off a public employment programme associated with his father—
and appealing to conservatives concerned with the work ethic—whilst pre-
senting this as an innovative reform that would address problems of urban as
well as rural unemployment. He succeeded in sustaining the BDP’s share
of the vote in the 2009 election. In 2014, he held onto enough votes to be
re-elected, despite not winning a majority (Hamer 2015; see also Seekings,
Chapter 2 of this volume).
The case of Malawi in the 2010s contributes not only to a rethinking of the
factors underlying electoral success in contemporary Africa but also to a fuller
understanding of the emerging politics of social assistance. In the 2009 and
2014 elections in Malawi, presidential candidates offered clearly distinctive
brands to the voters, even if their parties’ manifestos did not demonstrate
meaningful or obvious ideological or policy differences (as noted by Dulani
and Dionne 2014: 220). In 2014, the three major candidates offered brands
corresponding to the key developmental and political choice facing govern-
ments across much of Africa: liberalized markets (Chakwera), statist interven-
tions to sustain small and medium farmers (Mutharika), or pro-poor
interventions (Banda). In practice, even Mutharika’s subsidies—costing
about 5 per cent of GDP—mitigated rather than ended poverty. They helped
poor households ‘to “hang in” but not “step up” or “step out”’ from poverty
(Dorward et al. 2013: 103). Banda’s ‘handouts’ were even more modest,
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although they were more precisely targeted at the poor. Under Banda, the roll-
out of cash transfer and workfare programmes was accelerated but failed to
achieve the targets. Even statist interventions were constrained by a general
conservatism. Pro-poor rhetoric was not matched by service delivery on the
scale required to reduce poverty significantly. Nonetheless, social assistance
had been placed on the agenda, and ‘handouts’ loudly championed by an
incumbent president. Critics of ‘handouts’ will be expected to deliver on their
promises. If they do not, then electoral pressure for social assistance pro-
grammes is likely to intensify.
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Who Should Get What, How, and Why?
DFID and the Transnational Politics of Social Cash
Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sam Hickey and Jeremy Seekings
1. Introduction
Social cash transfers (SCTs) proliferated across much of sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) from the early 2000s (Garcia and Moore 2012; Bastiagli et al. 2016).
‘Social protection’, which was variously defined but always included SCTs,
was endorsed by one after another of the international agencies and bilateral
aid donors. The early frontrunner was the World Bank, whose enthusiasm for
SCTs deepened, shifting in part from ‘social safety nets’ to ‘conditional cash
transfers’ (CCTs). Towards the end of the 2000s, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) assumed a leading role in global debate. Its need to reach
out beyond formally employed workers led it to champion the expansion of
coverage through ‘social protection floors’. HelpAge International andUNICEF
identified SCTs as crucial to the well-being of the elderly and children, respect-
ively. The World Food Programme (WFP) sought to channel more of its relief
through cash-for-work programmes, which served similar functions as SCTs;
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also adopted a social protection
strategy. Various European national donor aid agencies identified social pro-
tection as central to their poverty-reduction strategies and, by 2012, even the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledged that social protection
was necessary if development was to be inclusive. Whereas in 2000 there
had been no place for social protection in the Millennium Development
Goals, by 2015 SCTs were widely regarded as crucial to the new Sustainable
Development Goals. SCTs had become a truly ‘global social policy’.
Agreement over the importance of SCTs, and social protection more gen-
erally, did not mean that these diverse international and national agencies
shared the same view of SCTs. They differed in their views not only of who
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should get what (and, to a lesser extent, how) but also of the overall purpose or
role of SCTs. Gramscian wars of position were fought within and between
agencies as individuals and groups sought to define the policy agenda. In an
early analysis of this contestation, Deacon (2007) contrasts the ‘neoliberal’
position of the US-based World Bank and the supposedly ‘social democratic’
position of the ILO and other Europe-based organizations. Hanlon, Barrientos,
and Hulme (2010) boldly represent the rise of SCTs as a (‘quiet’) revolution
from the global South, pointing to innovative programmes developed in
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India, and elsewhere. Deacon (2013) provides
an exemplary analysis of the struggles within the ILO, and then between it and
other agencies, over the social protection floor initiative. Peck and Theodore
(2015) focus on the role of the World Bank in promoting the Mexican
model of a CCT, whilst downplaying the alternative Brazilian CCT model.
Von Gliszczynski and Leisering (2016) (and Von Gliszczynski 2015) identify
the World Bank, HelpAge, and UNICEF as the champions of alternative
approaches to SCTs. National aid agencies also promoted their specific
approaches to social protection. Across east and southern Africa, the most
influential of the national aid agencies was the UK’s Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID).
It is evident from national case studies—in this volume and elsewhere—that
there has been a wide array of international actors marching to and fro over
the battlefields of agenda-setting and policy-making around SCTs (and other
forms of social protection) in SSA. Table 10.1 summarizes our assessment of
the lead players in SCT reforms in east and southern African countries. We
offer this assessment with trepidation: the relative importance of different
agencies has not only changed over time and varied by type of programme
(and government department), but it is also often far from clear (especially to
participants themselves) who had more or less influence. Despite these caveats,
several things seem clear. First, we have not identified ‘southern’ actors as
being directly influential in this process (beyond the single case of Brazil in
Ghana; Grebe 2015): ‘southern’ governments might have developed innova-
tive models, as Hanlon et al. (2010) asserted, but the organizations that
promoted their diffusion elsewhere were all based in North America or
Europe. Second, the World Bank enjoyed considerable influence but was far
from hegemonic. Third, despite its role in promoting the concept of the social
protection floor, and thus shaping the nature of social protection as a global
policy agenda, the ILO has not proved to be a major actor in the spread at the
national level in SSA of social protection or SCTs in particular. Fourth, DFID
was a prominent actor in a number of countries. In Anglophone Africa, DFID
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was certainly the most influential of the government aid agencies from the
global North.
In the 2000s, DFID developed a distinctive approach to SCTs. For DFID,
SCTs came to be seen in terms of the goal of reducing poverty, not the goal of
managing risk (to facilitate development, as the World Bank emphasized) or
the goal of securing otherwise corporatist social insurance programmes (as the
ILO hoped). Given that the elderly and children were often disproportionately
poor, DFID shared many of the concerns of HelpAge and UNICEF. DFID was
Table 10.1 Agencies promoting SCTs and related programmes in eastern and
southern Africa¹
Country Programme Lead agency/ies Support agency/ies
Ethiopia Productive Safety Net
Programme (PSNP)
WB DFID, USAID, WFP, EU,
Irish Aid, CIDA, UNICEF














Rwanda Vision 2020 Umerenge
Programme (VUP)
DFID, with WB UNICEF, SIDA
Tanzania Tanzania Social Action
Fund (TASAF)
WB UNICEF, DFID
Uganda Social Assistance Grants
for Empowerment (SAGE)
DFID Irish Aid, UNICEF,
HelpAge, and WB on overall
strategy






Zanzibar Universal old-age pension HelpAge UNICEF
¹ This reflects which agencies played leading and supporting roles in ensuring that specific social
assistance programmes were adopted and in shaping the form they took. Focus here is on the largest
social assistance programme/s in each case. Whilst these ‘rankings’ are not based on quantified
measures, we took into account advocacy, technical assistance, and direct funding. We drew on
interviews with staff in the agencies themselves and our country case studies, including: Lavers
(Chapter 3 of this volume, Ethiopia), Grebe (2015a, 2015b, Ghana), Granvik and Seekings (2016)
and Wanyama and McCord (2017) (Kenya), Granvik Saminathen (Chapter 6 of this volume, Lesotho),
Hamer and Seekings (Chapter 9 of this volume, Malawi), Lavers (Chapter 4 of this volume, Rwanda),
Ulriksen (Chapter 5 of this volume, Tanzania), Bukenya and Hickey (Chapter 8 of this volume), Grebe
and Mubiru (2014), and Grebe (2015) (Uganda), Pruce and Hickey (Chapter 7 of this volume),
Kabandula and Seekings (2016), and Siachiwena (2016) (Zambia), and Seekings (2016, Zanzibar).
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less enamoured by either World Bank-style conditionalities or large-scale
workfare, and had some sympathy for the rights-based approach favoured
strongly by some other donor agencies, especially from Nordic countries such
as Finland. At the same time, DFID favoured targeting tax-financed benefits
on the deserving poor, applying an approach that had long characterized
much British social policy-making, without the conditions favoured by either
the World Bank (through workfare and CCTs) or the ILO (through contribu-
tions). Its approach was, in general, more pragmatic than doctrinaire, but
DFID’s pragmatism was shaped by specifically British policy traditions, tradi-
tions that had influenced the initial adoption of social assistance in SSA in
countries such as Mauritius and South Africa (Seekings 2007, 2011). Von
Gliszczynski and Leisering (2016) identify ‘general household assistance’ as
one of their models of SCTs, but underestimate the role of DFID in promoting
this model. DFID was also unusual in recognizing the limits of a purely
technical approach to policy reform. DFID paid close attention to the politics
of reform at the national level, working hard to build political constituencies
for SCTs in SSA countries and even imagining that SCTs might perform
‘transformative’ political roles in poor countries.
DFID has been overlooked in the existing literature on international organ-
izations and social protection, despite its prominent role across much of
SSA. In this chapter we examine how a distinctive position evolved within
DFID, how it compared and contrasted with the approaches of other inter-
national organizations, and how its character both underpinned and limited
its efficacy on the ground, in national processes of policy-making. Our focus
on DFID enables us to fill an important gap in the current literature on how
social assistance has been promoted, to locate recent reforms in a more
historicized view of the longue duree of policy transfer, and to examine how
and why policy ideas ‘travel’.
Our approach draws critically on Li’s (2007) analysis of how development
ideas have travelled and taken root across the global South. Li (2007) first drew
on Marx to understand how accumulation, exploitation, and exclusion created
the conditions for new policy ideas to be articulated. Li then drew on Gramsci
to understand how ideological contests over different forms of development
are fought and play out. Finally, she drew on Foucault to understand the ways
in which poverty is rendered as a technical problem, prompting specific modes
of governmentality. We find Li’s use of Gramsci and Foucault particularly
useful when tracking the rise of SCTs and their promotion within SSA. It is less
clear how far DFID’s approach can be explained in terms of a crisis of
capitalism rather than the deepening of post-colonial responsibility for
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poverty that persisted despite global economic growth during the 2000s. We
also borrow from Mosse (2005), who called for careful analysis of the internal
workings of the ‘aidworld’. As Peck and Theodore (2010, 2015) note, even
apparently technocratic policies are socially produced. We draw on interviews
with key actors within DFID and other international agencies to explore this
‘social’ construction and promotion of global public policies, following
Mosse’s entreaty to deepen a Gramscian view of how actors fight on the
‘terrain of contestation’ through understanding better the ideas and incentives
at play within organizations. This involved recognizing ‘the complexity of
policy as institutional practice . . . the social life of projects, organisations and
professionals . . . the perspectives of actors themselves and . . . the diversity of
interests behind policy models’ (Mosse 2005: 6). Our approach thus builds on
but also goes beyond current analyses of how social protection has become a
global policy agenda, none of which have so far discussed the role played by
DFID in this process or actually tracked the process through which SCTs
became transferred from a global policy agenda to becoming facts on the
ground in SSA.
Paying attention to the role played by DFID also serves to locate the post-
2000 proliferation of SCTs in an historical context that is more complex than
is generally recognized. SCTs may be substantially novel but they are not
entirely unprecedented. When the World Bank, Hanlon et al., and others
lauded CCTs in Latin America, they were acknowledging reforms that were
innovative across most of that region. In those parts of the world that had been
settled or colonized by Britain, however, there was a longer history of SCTs.
Imperial Britain exported not only its Poor Laws to some of its ‘dominions’
and colonies, in the late nineteenth century, but also the social pensions and
other SCTs that represented the modernization of poor relief in the early and
mid-twentieth century. In SSA, social pensions were first introduced in South
Africa in the late 1920s (Seekings 2007). The British government generally
tried to dampen any further interest in social pensions, preferring to promote
development (and contributory programmes for select groups of workers in
formal employment) (Seekings 2013), but social pensions were introduced in
Mauritius in 1950 (Seekings 2011) and were debated much more widely across
east and southern Africa between the early 1940s and early 1960s. Britain’s
history of unconditional SCTs represented an alternative to both the CCTs
initiated in Latin America (and backed by the World Bank) and the contribu-
tory social insurance programmes long championed by the ILO. The design of
drought relief from the 1960s reflected British colonial ideas about who
deserved what. When SCTs resurfaced on the policy agenda in the 2000s, it
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is striking that DFID seemed to draw on deep-rooted British traditions in
identifying poor households and especially the elderly poor as the primary
target for their programmes.
In the post-2000s period, as in earlier periods of policy reform in SSA,
reforms have resulted from the interaction between SSA governments and
transnational ideas and international actors. SSA governments have variously
resisted and embraced, adopted and adapted models from elsewhere, and in so
doing created new models. Having emphasized the significant roles played by
political actors from within east and southern African countries throughout
this volume, this chapter focuses specifically on the transnational dimension of
this process.
2. Why Did SCTs Rise Up the Global Policy Agenda?
The process through which global public policies are constructed and trans-
ferred can be viewed most clearly from the type of critical constructivist
perspective adopted by Li.² This approach recognizes that such processes are
‘deeply structured by enduring power relations and shifting ideological align-
ments’ (Peck and Theodore 2010: 169) whilst acknowledging the potential for
social interaction to reshape the policy models being advocated (Stone 2012;
Mosse 2005). Ideas about the welfare state gained traction in western Europe
in the middle of the twentieth century, as Polanyi (1944) first observed, as a
‘counter-movement’ generated by the contradictory forces of industrial capit-
alism, and specifically by the urge to mitigate the damaging effects of com-
modification (see also Esping-Andersen 1990). Materialist analysis also helps
us to understand how ideas about ‘development’ have been generated by the
need for imminent policy solutions to deal with problems of exploitation and
dispossession that arise from immanent processes of economic growth and
change (Cowen and Shenton 1996).
SCTs first appeared on the global policy agenda in the 1990s, with the
World Bank’s largely rhetorical concern to address the social costs of struc-
tural adjustment through ‘safety nets’ (World Bank 1990), and, perhaps more
substantively, ‘social action funds’ (de Haan 2014). Safety nets may have been
² See Stone (2012) for the distinction between ‘rational-institutionalist’ and ‘constructivist’ posi-
tions, and Hickey and Seekings (2017) for a discussion of their relative merits. In brief, we find that
rational-institutionalist approaches pay insufficient attention to the role of politics and conflict in how
policy ideas travel, and that critical constructivist approaches are more closely attuned to the highly
contested and polycentric character of policy transfer today.
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very modest, but they marked an important break from the emphasis on
contributory programmes that had dominated the global social protection
agenda for more than fifty years. It took a larger rupture within the global
capitalist economy, however, for mainstream development ideology to shift
significantly enough to offer an ideological environment within which social
protection could flourish. The East Asian crisis in the late 1990s provided an
influential shock, prompting the World Bank to emphasize the role of social
protection, particularly safety nets, in managing ‘risks’, in its 2000/1 World
Development Report. It served almost as a manifesto for the new ‘post-
Washington Consensus’ (Hayami 2003), based on a partial recognition of
the negative consequences of unfettered market capitalism, and of the need
to try and re-embed processes of commodification within a social logic (Craig
and Porter 2006). The Bank’s focus on social protection became institution-
alized during this period. It published a ‘Social Protection and Labour Strategy’
in 2001, established a Social Protection and Labour Unit, and allocated funds
to experimental CCT programmes.
In knowledge-broker mode, the Bank made major investments during this
period to evaluate the effects of cash transfer programmes in Latin America,
and to start sharing learning around such schemes. Peck and Theodore (2015)
document the World Bank’s infatuation with the Mexican Progresa CCT
programme (later renamed Oportunidades, and later still Prospera). In 2002,
the World Bank hosted a conference on CCTs in Mexico, and took partici-
pants on a ‘pilgrimage’ to Oportunidades facilities. This was the first ‘rallying
point for the true believers, founding fathers of what would become the CCT
movement’ (Peck and Theodore 2015: 86, emphasis in original). The World
Bank promoted SCTs through workshops, conferences, publications, technical
assistance, and generous funding. It sought to persuade national governments
that they could and should contribute more. The World Bank produced one of
the first two estimates of the costs of social protection programmes in SSA in
2005 (Kakwani and Subbarao 2005).
The global financial crisis of 2008/9 provided further impetus to the World
Bank’s interest in SCTs. In Peck and Theodore’s assessment, ‘the economic
and political dislocations prompted by the global finance crisis . . . widened the
ideological bandwidth on a host of issues in the long-neglected field of social
security’ (2015: 123). In 2012, the World Bank restated forcefully the case for
social protection in a new strategy document for 2012–22 (World Bank
2012a). It also published a dedicated ‘Social Protection Strategy for Africa’
(World Bank 2012b) and an enthusiastic assessment of SCTs in SSA (Garcia
and Moore 2012), i.e. in a region where the Bank had hitherto seen SCTs as
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impractical. As the authors of the latter report wrote, ‘the question is not
whether cash transfers can be used in the region, but how they should be used,
and how they can be adapted and developed to meet social protection and
development goals’ (2012: 9, emphasis in original). In 2014, the World Bank
produced its first State of Social Safety Nets Report (World Bank 2014).
In her analysis of ideas about ‘development’, Li (2007) also focuses on the
World Bank. Given the sensitivity of the Bank (and the international financial
institutions (IFIs) in general) to the perceived health of global capitalism, and
the Bank’s prominence in (re)constructing the idea of development, it is not
surprising that Li drew a link between global capitalism and ideas about
development. The rise of SCTs up the policy agenda was not due to the
World Bank alone, however. Other international organizations besides the
Bank took up the issue of social protection, and began to lobby for SCTs, for a
variety of reasons less directly related to the health of global capitalism or the
‘harm done by the free market’ (Hanlon et al. 2010: 167). As Peck (2011: 168)
writes, policy transfer in the 2000s has been ‘a multi-site, multi-actor process’;
‘policy models’ need not follow a linear trajectory, or radiate outward, from a
singular place of ‘invention’; social policy-making has been ‘globalizing’, but it
has been uneven, shaped by the interactions between different international
organizations and ‘translocal networks’.
The ILO played an especially important role in this at the global level. The
ILO had, since the 1920s, been the leading proponent of contributory,
insurance-based forms of social protection. The ILO slowly sought a way of
broadening its approach to social protection beyond its concern with the
privileges enjoyed by workers in formal employment, especially in advanced
industrialized economies (Seekings 2010). In the early 2000s the ILO began to
prioritize the goal of extending ‘coverage’ to ‘all’. Contestation within the ILO
led to the emergence of the ‘social protection floor’, including tax-financed
SCTs and public health care, as the favoured strategy (Deacon 2013). In 2005,
at the same time as the World Bank, the ILO published its first study of the
cost of SCTs in SSA, attesting to their ‘affordability’ (Pal et al. 2005). The ILO’s
efforts were also propelled forward by the global financial crisis (Deacon
2013). When the UN called on its disparate agencies to co-ordinate their
responses to the global crisis, the ILO persuaded the other agencies to launch
a social protection floor initiative, co-chaired by the ILO and World Health
Organization. An Advisory Group—chaired by former Chilean president,
Michelle Bachalet—was established to examine proposals. This eventually
led to the adoption by the International Labour Conference in 2012 of
Recommendation #202 on Social Protection Floors, which its champion
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Michel Cichon described as ‘a “Magna Carta” of social protection’ (Cichon
2013: 37). The ILO also joined with the IMF in arguing for increased expend-
iture on social protection (ILO and IMF 2012). In 2014, the ILO published a
World Social Protection Report (ILO 2014), which can be read as an effort to
rebrand itself and to reclaim the mainstream terrain of international social
protection policy from the World Bank.³
Several other agencies took up the issue of social protection not so much in
response to the vicissitudes of the global economy but rather to the persistence
of poverty. The persistence of both episodic famine and chronic poverty in
SSA and elsewhere posed challenges to European aid agencies. Global poverty
here was framed as a humanitarian problem more than one flowing from the
underlying political economy. Poverty and famine were overwhelmingly con-
centrated in rural areas, not among industrial or urban populations. They were
not so much the products of ‘development’ (or the harm caused by the free
market, as Hanlon et al. put it) as the consequences of the absence of devel-
opment and the limits to economic growth. Whereas the impetus behind
welfare state-building in the global North in the twentieth century had been
the counter-movement against commodification through industrialization,
the impetus to social protection in Africa was deagrarianization, whether
short-term (through drought) or longer-term (through population growth
that exceeded both the availability of land and productivity rises). Poverty
was also exacerbated in east and southern Africa by AIDS, which (initially)
killed working-age adults, resulting in households without anyone available to
work. Regardless of the extent to which famine and rural poverty were the
consequence of capitalist development under and after colonialism, the agen-
cies themselves understood their roles as primarily humanitarian.
An important early initiative in the formulation of social protection as a
global policy agenda developed under the auspices of the Development Assist-
ance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). The DAC serves as a thinktank for the governments of
industrialized countries on issues around development. In 1999, the DAC
established a Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET), which formed three
‘task teams’ on agriculture, infrastructure, and private sector development.
Pushed by SCT advocates including Timo Voipio (from Finland), Stephen
Kidd (from the UK), and Rudiger Krech (from the German GTZ), POVNET
appointed in 2004 a fourth Task Team on Risk, Vulnerability, and Social
³ We are grateful to Tom Lavers for this insight.
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Protection (later renamed Social Protection and Social Policy) (Voipio 2007).
This brought together a large team of social development and social protection
experts from several OECD countries (including Finland, Germany, Sweden,
and the UK), international agencies (including the World Bank, ILO, and
UNICEF), large international civil society organizations (including HelpAge
International), and members from organizations in the global South such
as the Commission of the African Union. It became the main forum for
consensus-seeking inter-agency dialogue on the social protection agenda
and how it could gain a foothold in the broader development agenda. An
OECD-POVNET Guidance document on social protection was published
in 2009.
The UK’s DFID had prioritized poverty reduction since its establishment as
a standalone government department in 1997 (Hulme 2010). DFID partici-
pated energetically in POVNET, and approached the issue of social protection
primarily from a poverty-reduction perspective rather than as a means of
addressing risks or promoting rights. DFID—and the other aid agencies
working in Africa and South Asia—was influenced by developments on the
ground, including the threats to food security posed by drought and AIDS. In
an echo of the role played by colonial officials based in Africa during the 1940s
and 1950s in calling for more generous welfarist responses to various crises,
DFID staff based in countries like Ethiopia and Kenya drew the attention of
London-based officials to the role that SCTs might play as a more institution-
alized response to pressing social problems on the ground.
There was nothing inevitable about the rise of social protection as a
commitment within DFID. In 2002, DFID established a policy team entitled
Reaching the Very Poorest (RtVP) within its Policy Division. The RtVP team
became the locus for exploring and promoting an institutional-level focus on
social protection, especially following the appointment in late 2004 of Stephen
Kidd as team leader. It commissioned a series of papers, including the 2005
‘practice paper’ on Social Transfers and Chronic Poverty (DFID 2005), that
helped persuade senior staff within DFID of the need to champion social
protection. Buoyed by this initial success, the team leader changed the name of
the RtVP policy team to ‘Social Protection’ and successfully lobbied for a
commitment to social protection to be included in DFID’s 2006 White Paper.
Perversely, this nearly led to the RtVP team being disbanded, on the grounds
that it had achieved its objective. After informal back-channelling to UK
government ministers, the team was retained through a merger into a broader
team on equity and rights (also under Kidd’s leadership). For the newly
promoted team leader, this meant having a larger budget of £2m with
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‘complete authority over how spending could be done . . . that helped us fund
all these events, get these things out and going’ at the country level in Africa
and elsewhere.⁴
From the mid-2000s onwards, DFID worked with other international
agencies and domestic policy actors to establish pilot SCT projects and
national-level social protection policy processes in several countries. DFID’s
spending on social protection rose steadily, peaking at almost £300m in 2010
in direct response to the global financial crisis (see Figure 10.1). Expenditures
declined after 2010, when a new coalition government comprising the Con-
servative and Liberal Democrat parties replaced the previous Labour Party
government. DFID also helped to fund other initiatives that promoted SCTs.
The London-based non-government network HelpAge International was an
early convert to SCTs, advocating universal social pensions as a way to protect
the rights of older people. With financial support from DFID, HelpAge played
a leading role in steering the African Union to recognize social protection as
an integral element in social policy through a conference in Livingstone
(Zambia) in 2006 and further consultative meetings in different African cities
over the following two years (Leutelt 2012). DFID helped to fund further work
by the ILO on the costs of SCTs in Zambia and Tanzania, and also helped to
establish the African Platform for Social Protection as a network of civil
society organizations to advocate for this new policy agenda within and across
African countries.
The World Bank, ILO, DFID, and many other international organizations









2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
DEID spending on social protection (estimated, £m)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Fig. 10.1. DFID expenditure on social protection, 2003–14.
Source: www.devtracker.dfid.gov.uk.
⁴ This paragraph is based on interviews with DFID staff in June 2015.
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early 2000s, then more forcefully in the aftermath of the 2008/9 global
financial and economic crisis, in line with Li’s suggestion that shifts in the
global political economy can play significant roles in the rise of new global
policy agendas. These different organizations had diverse motivations and
objectives, extending beyond the stabilization of the global economy to the
protection (and strengthening) of existing policies (favouring organized busi-
ness and labour) and a largely humanitarian concern with poverty reduction
(informed by the priorities of tax-paying voters and civil society in the
democracies of the global North, as well as problems such as persistent food
insecurity in eastern Africa). The common interest in SCTs and social pro-
tection was reflected in the apparent consensus eventually achieved over (for
example) the ILO-led social protection floor initiative. But international
organizations saw SCTs in diverse ways. There was little agreement between
them over who should benefit (the poor, the destitute, older people, mothers
or families with children, formally employed workers, informally employed
workers, peasant farmers, or everyone), by how much (i.e. how generous
should benefits be?), and with what (if any) conditions attached. The result
was that the international organizations engaged in Gramscian wars of pos-
ition (Li 2007), not only with respect to the national governments whose
policies they hoped to shape, but also with respect to the other international
organizations (Deacon 2007) and, as suggested by Mosse (2005), to other
interests and ideas within their own organizations.
3. Wars of Position Over Global Social Policy
Almost all of the international organizations published documents, convened
workshops and conferences, took national politicians and officials on study
tours, and provided or paid for technical assistance. Some of them helped to
fund, or funded entirely, approved SCT programmes. These were mechanisms
through which international organizations promoted their own vision of
SCTs, and sometimes criticized alternative visions. In her work on how ideas
about development travelled, Li (2007) employed a Gramscian approach to
contestations over ideas and the role of discourse. ‘Policy transfer’ flows
through relations of power not only between the global actors and national
governments but also between global actors themselves. International policy
spaces are thus ‘terrains of contestation’ within which advocates play out ‘wars
of position’ over ideas and policies (Deacon 2007). These ideas and discursive
struggles took place across three distinct levels: ‘paradigmatic’ ideas at the level
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of worldviews, ‘problem-framing’ ideas which serve to identify and define the
‘problems’, and specific ‘policy solutions’ (Schmidt 2008; see also Hall 1993).
International organizations differed on all three levels. Workshops, study
tours, documents, and the other mechanisms of advocacy were weapons in
these wars of position over SCTs.
Writing in 2007, Deacon assessed that the global social policy landscape was
contested by three main ideological camps: ‘USA-influenced desire for global
neoliberal policies’; ‘European-influenced desire for global social democratic
policies’; and ‘Southern-centred debates about getting out from under any
northern-imposed agenda for global economic and social policy’ (2007: 22).
With hindsight, it is clear that this typology was only half valid. Labelling the
World Bank approach as neoliberal understates its new-found enthusiasm for
large-scale, tax-financed SCTs, within the broad ideological shift towards the
‘inclusive neoliberalism’ of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (Craig and
Porter 2006), as well as its later willingness to drop conditions in many
settings. Viewing the changing in thinking about SCTs as a ‘southern’ revolu-
tion (as Hanlon et al. put it in 2010) was accurate with regard to the geographic
location of some of the original models (Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India)
but underestimates the importance of international organizations based and
rooted in the global North as the brokers or agents of subsequent diffusion.
Whilst regional organizations (such as the African Union) have adopted
policies on social protection, and some governments (notably Brazil) have
actively promoted their model,⁵ there is little evidence that these have
had much effect relative to the influence of northern-based and rooted
organizations.⁶ Viewing European approaches as broadly social democratic
was correct insofar as they proposed a more extensive role for the state than
the World Bank, but the label masked deep differences over the form of state
intervention between (for example) the ILO, the Nordic countries, and
DFID. Whilst the ILO did embrace SCTs, it also rejected proposals from
within the ILO for more universal SCT programmes (Deacon 2013). In
practice the ILO continued to favour employment-related programmes, view-
ing tax-financed programmes as residual, for groups of people without any
employment. The Nordic social democratic approach—which was especially
⁵ The Africa–Brazil Programme on Social Development, financed by DFID, brought together
delegations from Brazil and six African countries to discuss SCTs. This seems to have influenced the
design of the LEAP programme in Ghana (see Leite et al. 2015: 1454; Grebe 2015).
⁶ The diffusion of social pensions to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland seems to be an example of
south–south diffusion, from South Africa. But there is no evidence of any active agency by the South
African government or any other organization (see Chapters 6 and 2 by Granvik Saminathen and
Seekings, this volume).
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influential within OECD-POVNET—entailed a rights-based approach and
favoured universal programmes over programmes targeted on the poor.
A focus on the ‘social dimension of development’—as opposed to employment
or poverty—was ‘characteristic of our Nordic approach to development cooper-
ation’, wrote the Finnish chair of the OECD-POVNET Task Team on Social
Protection (Voipio 2007: 45). DFID, in contrast, reproduced a distinctively
British tradition, which tended to favour the market as the engine of develop-
ment and residual state programmes targeted at the poor, although more
generously and with a broader sense of deservingness than the World Bank.
Each of these organizations sought to promote its models, its definition of
the problems to be solved, and even its worldview. The World Bank was
especially energetic in this from 2002, hosting major conferences to promote
CCTs in Puebla (Mexico, 2002), Sao Paulo (Brazil, 2004), and Istanbul
(Turkey, 2006). The Bank promoted CCTs first in Latin America, working
with the Inter-American Development Bank, and then in middle-income
countries elsewhere (Holzmann 2008; Sugiyama 2011; Peck and Theodore
2015; von Gliszczynski 2015). In ‘knowledge-broker’mode, the Bank provided
an electronic platform to help establish a Latin American ‘community of
practice’ on social protection and a series of international conferences aimed
at facilitating policy learning; starting with the Istanbul conference in 2006,
this became institutionalized as a series of ‘South–South Learning Forums’.⁷
The World Bank was not initially persuaded that governments in SSA had
the capacity or level of social service provision required to adopt CCTs.
Presentations at its 2006 CCT conference covered small programmes in
Angola and Sierra Leone, but the Bank ignored unconditional SCT pro-
grammes in southern Africa and continued to prioritize instead community-
driven development initiatives and public works schemes, especially in arid,
drought-ravaged areas. By this time DFID had mostly withdrawn from Latin
America, and had little direct contact with either Mexico or Brazil. But DFID
had personnel all over SSA, and saw the continent as very much its terrain.
DFID thus sought to fill the regional gap left by the Bank. Hitherto, DFID’s
initial forays into the ongoing construction of social protection as a global
policy agenda had been timid. DFID staff recall attending World Bank meet-
ings on social protection inWashington DC during 2003–4: ‘We saw ourselves
as largely falling in with the Bank, we were sent to the Bank to listen and learn,
not to challenge’.⁸ By 2006, DFID felt able to directly contradict the Bank’s
⁷ Interview with senior World Bank official, 7 December 2015.
⁸ Interview, 12 June 2015.
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assumptions that SCTs were only feasible in middle-income countries and its
preference for conditional programmes.⁹
This policy-level ‘war of position’ (Deacon 2007; Li 2007) played out at the
third of the World Bank’s conferences promoting CCTs, in Istanbul in 2006.
Keen to challenge the Bank’s hegemony over social protection debates, DFID’s
Social Protection Team helped co-finance the conference, and brought in
some of its favoured consultants, including Dr Michael Samson of the Eco-
nomic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) in Cape Town, an organization which
DFID amongst others helped to finance. At the conference, Samson clashed
with the World Bank’s Norbert Schady over the evidence in support of
conditionality.¹⁰ Although the Bank did not change its position at this stage,
DFID secured an agreement for further research to be undertaken, the results
of which revealed that conditionality played a partial role at best in securing
the developmental impacts associated with cash transfers (Fizbein and Schady
2009). A similar confrontation took place at a workshop on child protection in
Kenya, where DFID funded a consultant to challenge the Bank’s favoured
consultant (Francisco Ayala) on the role that conditions had played in cash
transfer programmes in Latin America. This led to a further agreement to test
conditional against unconditional grants, and also hard against soft versions
of conditionality. According to a DFID team member, the evidence for
conditions fell apart when tested through SCTs for orphans in Kenya.¹¹
When the World Bank later broadened its support for SCTs from workfare
to child and family grants, from about 2012, it did not push for condition-
ality. In the meantime, DFID and other agencies had taken on leading roles
in promoting SCTs in SSA, something further enabled by the ‘harmoniza-
tion’ dimension of the Paris Declaration, which in some contexts saw the
Bank relinquish leadership to DFID in this policy domain (e.g. in Zambia;
see Chapter 7 of this volume).
DFID now saw itself as promoting an alternative to the World Bank. As one
DFID official put it, the Bank was at the time concerned only with ‘risk, they
weren’t talking about chronic poverty, so we saw a gap’ and framed ‘ourselves
in a way to create a niche for ourselves’.¹² DFID’s approach was more
European than the World Bank’s, but it was not rooted in the strong com-
mitment to rights and universalism that characterized the Nordic agencies.
⁹ Interview with World Bank policy expert on social protection, 7 December 2015.
¹⁰ These issues arose at the previous conference, in 2004, when Brazilian scholars challenged the
hard conditionality and inattention to rights in the Mexican model (Peck and Theodore 2015), but the
Brazilian critics did not have the institutional backing of an international organization.
¹¹ Interview, 20 June 2015. ¹² Interview, 3 June 2015.
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DFID officials saw themselves as pragmatic, approaching things ‘in contextual
terms, what works and is required in different contexts’,¹³ a pragmatism
typical of British policy and ideological traditions.
DFID sought to displace the indirect influence that the Bank exerted in SSA
countries, deploying consultants who favoured bolder SCT programmes
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004), funding annual training programmes
in Mombasa and elsewhere, and seeking a leading role for its own or like-
minded personnel on the social protection sector working or advisory groups
formed by international organizations to ‘harmonize’ their approaches and
‘advise’ national governments. DFID’s approach to promoting social protec-
tion in SSA would be strongly informed by its institutional practices and the
‘zeal’ of the Social Protection Team Leader, as well as its wider ideological
positionality. Faced with an often sceptical response from government officials,
DFID advisors were able to respond rapidly to requests for financial and
technical assistance in considering and developing social protection policies
(e.g. fiduciary risk assessments, pilot evaluations), provingmore nimble than the
World Bank, with its more cumbersome internal workings (Hickey et al. 2009).
4. The Governmentality of Social Protection: From
‘Rendering Technical’ to ‘Working Politically’
Despite the contestation within and especially between international
organizations over the purpose and form of SCTs, most of the international
organizations utilized a discourse that rendered the adoption of SCTs as a
purely technical process. In their interactions with national governments in
SSA, international organizations generally presented arguments in favour of
SCTs as technically efficient ways of achieving technical goals such as poverty
reduction, downplaying the political choices that had to be made. In the third
dimension of her approach, Li draws on Foucauldian studies of governmen-
tality to understand ‘the ways in which rule is actually accomplished’. This
involves examining the way that powerful transnational actors ‘render tech-
nical’ the intractable challenges of poverty and inequality in order to sustain a
particular world order. As Li writes: ‘To render a set of processes technical and
improvable an arena of intervention must be bounded, mapped, characterised
and documented; the relevant forces and relations must be identified; and a
¹³ Ibid.
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narrative must be devised connecting the proposed intervention with the
problem it will solve’ (Li 2007: 126).
The technical approach to SCTs is evident for most international organ-
izations. For the ILO: ‘The lack of access to social protection constitutes a
major obstacle to economic and social development. Inadequate or absent
social protection coverage is associated with high and persistent levels of
poverty and economic insecurity, growing levels of inequality, insufficient
investments in human capital and human capabilities, and weak aggregate
demand in a time of recession and slow growth’ (ILO 2014: xix). For the
World Bank, the ‘gold standard experimental design’ of the Mexican CCT
model served to validate it, and to ‘bullet proof ’ it from ‘political interfer-
ence’; ‘what often are inescapably political decisions about the design and
financing of antipoverty interventions’ were elevated into ‘the heady heights
of scientific progress’ (Peck and Theodore 2015: 93–5). Peck and Theodore
note that ‘a deepening reliance on technocratic forms of policy development
and delivery is a widely observed feature of late-neoliberalism’ (ibid.: 172),
but with respect to SCTs even many of the Bank’s critics couched their
counter-arguments in technical terms. Hanlon et al., for example, chose to
conclude that SCTs were affordable, that recipients did not ‘waste’ the money,
that SCTs were ‘an efficient way to directly reduce poverty, and they have the
potential to prevent future poverty by facilitating economic growth and
promoting human development’ (2010: 2). HelpAge International empha-
sized strongly the rights of elderly people on its website and in general
strategic documents (e.g. HelpAge 2011), but when it promoted SCTs within
SSA it emphasized their efficiency in terms of mitigating poverty among
the elderly, with hardly a reference to rights (see, e.g., Knox-Vydmanov and
Galvani 2016, on Malawi).
Crucial to their projects of specifying and solving ‘problems’ was the
deployment of ‘expertise’ and the construction of ‘epistemic communities’.
‘Knowledge networks and epistemic communities give discursive, intellectual,
and scientific structure to the global agora’, argues Stone (2008: 32); ‘they
provide scholarly argumentation and scientific justification for “evidence-
based” policy formulation’. An important role is played here by ‘policy
entrepreneurs’ who ‘use their intellectual authority or market expertise to
reinforce and legitimate certain forms of policy or normative standards as
“best practice” ’ (Stone 2012: 494). Policy entrepreneurs and international
organizations generally did not invent challenges: poverty, drought, AIDS-
mortality, and so on were real. But they did serve to shape how these
challenges were packaged as problems, and more specifically as problems
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that needed to be prioritized, and this prepared the ground for the advocacy of
specific suggestions.
In terms of problem-framing, the World Bank funded a series of national-
level risk and vulnerability assessments from the early 2000s, in part to help
provide a diagnostic basis for its risk-based approach to social protection
(Kozel, Fallavier, and Badiani 2008). UNICEF helped to specify the problem
of ‘orphans and vulnerable children’ (OVC), which included those ‘single-
orphans’ who had only lost one parent, regardless of the presence of other kin
(Green 2011: 33–58). In SSA, the first SCT policy entrepreneur was probably
German development consultant Bernd Schubert, whose experience with a
small SCT in Mozambique in the early 1990s was followed by pioneering work
in crafting the Kalomo SCT pilot project in Zambia and then further initiatives
in Malawi and elsewhere (von Gliszczynski 2015: 28–30). Schubert was
deployed variously by GTZ, DFID, and UNICEF. Other agencies deployed
their own ‘experts’. The World Bank used extensively an ex-staffer from
Ecuador, Francisco Ayala, who established his own consulting firm to provide
technical assistance on the design and implementation of SCT programmes,
with a particular focus on CCTs. DFID (and other agencies such as UNICEF)
later countered through using Michael Samson, based in Cape Town, who
emphasized a more rights-based and welfarist approach to social protection.¹⁴
Employed by different development agencies to design and help implement
schemes that reflected their ideological and programmatic preferences, these
and other policy entrepreneurs played important roles in determining the
specific form that SCTs actually took on the ground in SSA.
Ferguson (2015) argues strongly that SCTs were fundamentally subversive
of the development agenda, by shifting attention from issues of production
(and, especially, work) to issues of distribution. Ferguson’s point is important
because many of the actors in struggles over SCTs did not acknowledge this in
the discourses they employed to specify and solve problems. In employing
developmentalist discourses, international organizations tended to reinforce
technical rather than political understandings of the problem. It is not clear
that this was politically effective in the SSA countries where they were pro-
moting SCTs. As the country case studies in this volume show, political elites
¹⁴ Interview with ex-DFID policy leader on social protection, 30 June 2015. We discuss these
particular policy entrepreneurs not to suggest that they were the only ones who played important
roles in shaping which policy ideas travelled to SSA, but to illustrate and extend the broader point that
certain individuals were crucial not only to the wars of position within and between international
organizations (Deacon (2013), but also to the process of rendering political choices as technical ones at
the country level.
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in SSA tended to view SCTs through conservative lenses. For political elites
across much of SSA, poverty was a moral issue, rooted in the irresponsibility of
individual poor people, not primarily a social issue. As almost all international
organizations recognized, framing SCTs in terms of rights was especially likely
to stiffen opposition.¹⁵
DFID was the first international organization to recognize that the promo-
tion of SCTs was a political challenge and to adapt its strategy accordingly.
DFID’s initial approach to promoting social protection and SCTs in SSA
involved largely standard forms of technical and financial assistance, including
a concerted effort to develop a stronger evidence base around social protection
and pilot different modes of operationalizing cash transfers. However, where
elite resistance was encountered, DFID adapted its approach to incorporate
the new ‘thinking and working politically’ agenda (Dasandi et al. 2016). DFID
had been an early adopter of this new approach, and by the mid-2000s had
moved from using country-level political economy analysis to inform pro-
gramming and policy engagement to commissioning studies of particular
policy sectors (DFID 2009). This included at least three studies of the political
barriers and opportunities associated with promoting social protection in SSA
(including Barrientos et al. 2005, on Zambia, a confidential study on Uganda,
and a multi-country analysis by Hickey et al. 2009). This led DFID staff to
work on building broader ‘coalitions’ in support of SCTs (see Bukenya and
Hickey on Uganda (Chapter 8) and Pruce and Hickey on Zambia (Chapter 7);
also Kabandula and Seekings 2016; Siachiwena 2016). Tens of millions of
pounds were spent on ‘policy engagement projects’ aimed at influencing
African governments to adopt social protection.¹⁶ Senior bureaucrats and
politicians were sent on study tours to witness the benefits of successful cash
transfer projects in a range of Latin American and African countries. Pilot
projects that were launched to help generate country-specific evidence on the
effectiveness of cash transfers started to generate their own political dynamics,
leading citizens and MPs to lobby their governments to extend cash transfer
programmes. DFID money has also funded media campaigns to help spread
awareness of cash transfers and their effectiveness, and has been increasingly
willing to do so during key political moments. For example, whereas
¹⁵ National governments (and especially ministers of finance) were also concerned with the costs of
social protection programmes (see Seekings 2017b). DFID sponsored some research into the afford-
ability of programmes, including in Tanzania and Zambia.
¹⁶ One example is the Expanding Social Protection programme in Uganda, which spent over £54
million between 2009 and 2015 to try to increase the level of political commitment to social protection
in Uganda and the capacity of the Ugandan government to deliver a coherent social protection strategy
(https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204861).
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DFID staff in Zambia sought to hold back the roll-out of a pilot programme
for fear of it being used as a form of vote-buying in relation to the 2011
elections, their counterparts in Uganda used the build-up to the 2016 elections
to politicize further the case for cash transfers in order to secure further
financial support from government for SCTs (see Bukenya and Hickey,
Chapter 8 of this volume).
This contrasted markedly with the World Bank’s country-level approach to
policy engagement; as one World Bank policy expert on social protection
noted, when it comes to ‘influencing, we don’t do the DFID thing’ (Interview,
7 December 2015). The approach also created some disquiet within DFID, in
part as there was a sense that the advocacy effort was running ahead of the
evidence base regarding the effectiveness and affordability of cash transfers in
SSA. As one DFID team member admits, ‘We were in advocacy mode, we
over-egged the growth aspect if we’re honest’ (Interview, 3 June 2015).
Another was concerned that: ‘We were handing very difficult problems to
our partners, with missionary zeal, and it wasn’t very savvy. That is an NGO’s
job not a donor’s job, not really for the UK to throw its weight around in other
countries in that way’ (Interview with Social Protection Team member,
15 June 2015). This raises important concerns regarding issues of sovereignty
and who controls the policy agenda in SSA, despite donor rhetoric around
‘ownership’ (Whitfield 2009).
DFID tended to understand national-level political dynamics in terms of
political disagreements between the ‘finance ministry’ and ‘civil society’ ten-
dencies identified by Kanbur (2001).¹⁷ In countries such as Zambia and
Uganda in the mid-2000s, one group of government officials was more closely
aligned with the policy preferences of the World Bank and other IFIs, whilst a
separate group shared many of the preferences of European and UN develop-
ment agencies. As we have seen above, however, the IFIs were not opposed to
SCTs, and at least in the 2010s advocated increased expenditures on them, but
they preferred expenditure on children and workfare over other forms of
SCT. Also, as we have seen above, the European and UN development
agencies did not share exactly the same approaches to SCTs. The result was
that each agency sought to mobilize and strengthen its own allies at the
national level. The ILO, for example, had much stronger links with ministries
¹⁷ The finance ministry tendency includes not only ministries of finance, but also of trade and
business, central banks, many officials within IFIs, and certain civil society organizations, including
think tanks. The civil society tendency, meanwhile, is usually constructed of social sector ministries,
UN and European aid agencies, and civil society organizations (Kanbur 2001).
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of labour (and a specific set of NGOs) than with ministries responsible for
‘social development’ (and NGOs concerned with this). In relation to struggles
over social protection from the early 2000s, DFID generally sought to
strengthen specific ‘civil society’ tendencies at the national level in SSA.
Wars of position at the national level were thus shaped by the wars of position
at the international level.
The political dynamics over SCTs within SSA countries could not
be reduced, however, to disagreements between officials aligned to either the
World Bank or one or other of the European and UN agencies. In some
countries, political elites were sceptical of SCTs in part on the conservative
grounds that SCTs undermined patriarchal family relations and social rela-
tionships within communities, eroded the work ethic, and created ‘dependency’
on the state. By providing ‘something for nothing’, SCTs violated conservative
norms of who deserved what, how, and why (Kalebe-Nyamongo and
Marquette 2014; Ferguson 2015; Seekings 2017a). DFID and other agencies
sought to challenge these beliefs on largely technical grounds, commissioning
studies to demonstrate that SCTs had productive (or developmental) as well as
protective benefits. This kind of evidence made sense in a war of position
against neoliberal critics, but was largely tangential to more conservative
anxieties. DFID and other agencies were generally aware that it was not a
good idea to refer to individual social and economic rights in their interactions
with national policy-makers, but they lacked a good understanding of how to
engage with conservative policy-makers. This helps to explain the narrow and
parsimonious form that SCTs have so far taken across much of the continent.
5. Conclusion
The rise of SCTs as a global public policy since the turn of the millennium, and
their subsequent (slow) roll-out in SSA, has been shaped by the convergence
of different aspects of political economy, ideas, and governmentality, as
worked through the aid world and the role of aid agencies in promoting
development as specific forms of ‘institutional practice’.¹⁸ At both the inter-
national and national levels, international agencies fought wars of position
with rivals and sceptics. They tended to employ technocratic discourses, but
¹⁸ Note that the slow rate of progress in most countries also needs to be understood in relation to the
contraction of fiscal space that most low- and middle-income countries faced as a result of the global
financial crisis of 2007 (ILO 2014).
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the politics was never far below the surface; ‘Global poverty management’ is
not as technocratic and depoliticized a process as some critics tend to
suggest (e.g. Li 2007; Peck 2011). Cash transfers have certainly been pre-
sented as the ‘practically feasible solution’ to an ‘ideologically framed con-
sensus’ regarding poverty alleviation, but what we found striking with the
case of DFID is rather the highly and deliberately politicized approach that
this has sometimes involved.
The process through which the global SCT agenda has been created by
international organizations with specific interests, practices, and ideas has
led to the production of ‘a fragmented and incomplete universalism’ (Von
Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016: 325) on the ground in SSA. This incom-
pleteness includes the absence of a focus on forms of social protection that
go beyond the ameliorative to embrace more transformative forms of social
protection (e.g. Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). In one sense, this fits
with the critique that global policy transfer today involves promoting
technical and ameliorative responses to the highly political challenges of
poverty and inequality in order to sustain a particular world order (Li 2007;
Peck 2011). The result is a strategy for promoting poverty reduction that
responds to failures in market access and poor governance rather than an
entirely new, southern-based model of welfare capitalism (as Hanlon et al.
(2010) suggest).
However, if one takes more seriously the role of domestic elites and their
ideas in transnational processes of policy transfer, as we do within this volume,
there is little evidence to suggest that a more radical approach would have been
welcomed by political or bureaucratic elites on the continent, whose
ideological perspectives are arguably more closely attuned to liberal and
conservative forms of social protection, involving minimal transfers to
labour-incapacitated or otherwise highly deserving individuals (Seekings
2017a), than to more radical forms of social protection (Hickey 2014). African
elites have for around a century been receptive to certain liberal ideas around
social assistance, but generally to a parsimonious extent. A ‘pauperist’ model
of welfare reform took hold in some parts of SSA in the mid-twentieth century,
and expanded (evolving into a more citizenship-based model) in the
(unevenly) democratized polities of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-
century SSA. This was because some of the relevant ideas and models articu-
lated or promoted by outsiders resonated with local colonial and post-colonial
elites in the face of changing social and economic conditions, which are of
crucial importance. Foreign models were therefore only embraced and
adapted where they were aligned with the underlying normative worldview
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of local elites (Seekings 2016)—and, as we show elsewhere in this collection,
their political interests. The strongest examples of elite commitment to social
protection have little to do with an alignment with either the World Bank’s
residualist position or the welfarist rights-based approach of the UN (and
Nordic agencies) or DFID’s poverty agenda, but reflect rather the productivist
ideology that has become widespread across SSA, particularly amongst gov-
ernments with more developmentalist ambitions (see Lavers on Ethiopia and
Rwanda, Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume).¹⁹
However, there has arguably been more space for promoting an approach
that reflects the wider lessons from the redistributive benefits of progressive
fiscal policy in Latin America (Melo et al. 2014) rather than the narrow
version cherry-picked by the World Bank (Peck and Theodore 2015). Cast
within the broader goal of securing a stronger fiscal contract between states
and citizens (Teichman 2008), this would have involved adopting a more
joined-up approach to promoting improved levels of revenue generation and
more progressive forms of taxation and government capacity-building,
alongside a more ambitious focus on employment as well as social transfers.
Promoting a narrow and limited focus on cash transfers risks problems of
convergence in the realm of politics as well as undermining developmental
progress, whereby, ‘in the absence of a redistributive societal compromise
involving both increased taxation and social spending, progress on the social
policy front (particularly increased financial commitment) raises the spectre
of a descent into populism unless increased financial resources are forth-
coming’ (Teichman 2008: 455).
This scenario already seems to be unfolding in countries such as Uganda
and Zambia, where cash transfers are converging with clientelistic and popu-
list forms of politics. This latest phase of transnational–national negotiations
over the form that social protection should take in SSA remains a work in
progress, and different socio-political implications may emerge from the move
to adopt social cash transfers if they start to become a more institutionalized
part of state–society relations (Ferguson 2015). For now, however, the nar-
rowness of the instruments being used, the parsimonious level of transfers
involved, and the ideational convergence around a thinly redistributive form
of liberalism all suggest that any broader gains for citizenship and the social
contract in SSA may be a long time coming.
¹⁹ In many cases, national elites have shared the concerns of the World Bank over possible
‘dependency’ on ‘handouts’.
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